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## Near East/South Asia Report

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8 August 1985

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

DFLP MEETS WITH JOHN GARANG--An important meeting was held between a Sudanese People's Liberation Army delegation headed by the Army's leader John Garang and a delegation from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine headed by comrade Abu-Firas Muhammad, a member of the DFLP's Central Committee. Discussion at the meeting dealt with the situation in Sudan and the region following the overthrow of dictator Ja'far Numayri. The DFLP's delegation reiterated its solidarity with the struggle of the Sudanese nationalist and democratic forces for the sake of bolstering the victory that was achieved by the recent popular uprising. The delegation also stressed [the need for] a just and democratic solution in southern Sudan within the framework of a unified and independent country. Garang expressed his appreciation for the position of the DFLP and its support of the struggle by progressive Sudanese for their just causes. [Text] [Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 26 May 85 p 25]

CSO: 4404/405

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ARMENIANS REPORTEDLY PLAN TO RAISE 'GENOCIDE ISSUE' AT UN

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 5 Jun 85 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Now That the Resolution Has Failed to Pass, the Armenians Are Appealing to the UN"]

[Text] Now that the resolution to commemorate the Armenian Genocide has been rejected by the House of Representatives, preparations are being made to place the question of "genocide" on the UN agenda.

As we know, in addition to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, official reports pertaining to the "Armenian Question" have also been prepared by the appropriate committee of the European Parliament.

Wire services report that the Armenians are presently preparing to appeal to the UN, with the claim that in the past they were the victims of genocide by the Turks. In connection with this a special report is being prepared which, according to Turkish authorities, "of all undertakings to date, presents the greatest threat to Turkey and the Turks."

According to a number of sources, British Laborite Benjamin (Whittaker), a reporting member of the UN Subcommittee on Minorities, is convinced that the issue is a legitimate one and will throw his support behind it.

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CSO: 4605/175

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN 'CLAIMS' DISCUSSED IN MOSCOW WITH POLITBURO MEMBER

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 1 Jun 85 p 1

[Article: "Karaduman Visits Kremlin, Aggravated By Armenian Demands: 'The Article Published in the 24 April Issue of PRAVDA Caused Great Pain to Turkish Public Opinion'"]

[Text] Sedat Erkin reports today in CUMHURIYET that Grand National Assembly Speaker Karaduman reported on a number of meetings which took place at the Kremlin during his recent visit [to the USSR]. Karaduman discussed his meetings with Politburo member and Vice Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers Kuznetsov, stating that during those meetings the two of them also discussed the U.S. "Star Wars" nuclear arms schemes. Karaduman reported that Kuznetsov had stated the following on this issue: "'Star Wars' is the most sophisticated kind of nuclear warfare. This is a very dangerous approach. We agree that one must utilize every means to avoid that danger."

Karaduman stated: "We also expressed the same concerns. We added, however, that meetings on this issue must take place on a world level."

It is evident from the statements made by Karaduman that Turkey is upset over two additional issues: first, the situation with Bulgaria, as well as the Soviet position on the Armenian Question. Karaduman noted that the reply received in connection with the Bulgarian situation is not satisfactory. Nor is the Soviet position regarding Armenian terrorism satisfactory from Turkey's point of view.

Karaduman stated to Kuznetsov: "In the article published in the 24 April issue of PRAVDA, the Armenian claims are repeated point for point, and the Armenian position is defended. This has caused much pain to the Turkish public." Kuznetsov stated in his reply that "things which cause us pain are also published in the Turkish press."

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CSO: 4605/180



EGYPT

AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS, RELATIONS WITH U.S.

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 12 May 85 p 6

[Interview with 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Ridi, Egyptian ambassador in Washington, by Hidayat 'Abd-al-Nabi: "President Mubarak's Ideas Have Encouraged U.S. Administration To Move on Middle East; United States Supports Important Role Played by Egypt for Area's Stability; United States Interested in Finding Quick Solution to Taba Issue on Basis of 25 April 1982 Agreement"]

[Text] 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Ridi, Egypt's ambassador in Washington, stated that the Egyptian movement and President Husni Mubarak's visit to Washington last March are what have led to a revival of the U.S. position in the area, including Secretary of State Shultz' visit to Egypt, Israel and Jordan.

The ambassador also asserted that 1985 could be the best possible year for achieving progress on the Middle East problem and on the Palestinian issue in particular.

At the outset, the Egyptian ambassador explained the current U.S. visualization regarding the Middle East and asserted that the reelection of President Reagan by a big majority is one of the positive realities of the situation. Added to this is, indisputably, the change that has occurred in Israel where there is a government headed by Shimon Peres--a government that does not reject the Reagan initiative. This also represents one of the other positive realities. There is, therefore, a kind of flexibility or of what we may call an open door. Moreover, there are changes in the Arab arena: there is the development in Egyptian-Jordanian relations, the positive development in Egyptian-Palestinian relations and the Jordanian-Palestinian accord, which is an extremely significant development. Thus, these new given facts create a new situation and this situation makes 1985 the best possible year in the coming period to achieve progress.

[Question] Will not the upcoming congressional election obstruct this procession if it starts?

[Answer] This election will take place in 1986 and it will somewhat shackle the U.S. administration's position. Therefore, we are facing a reality, namely that we must enhance the movement in the current year.



## What Is Possible for U.S. Administration

[Question] What, to your mind, are the limits within which framework the U.S. administration can move?

[Answer] When you ask the Americans this question, their answer is: this depends on the parties concerned. If these parties can move in the direction of direct negotiations, then the Americans' answer is: we are prepared to move. But when President Mubarak came to Washington, he suggested to the U.S. administration that this administration itself undertake this movement and take the initiative so as to get the ball rolling and holding a dialogue between the U.S. administration and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. This proposal has had its impact and it has been the main factor in getting the U.S. administration going. As a result of this proposal Murphy made his visit and Shultz is making his current visit to follow up on this movement.

[Question] But there is an impression that Murphy's tours do not achieve much progress--an impression which comes as a result of the silence that accompanies these tours.

[Answer] Murphy is an experienced diplomat who does not like to resort to making declarations and who is careful in all his statements and moves. This is why I do not attach a lot to the fact that he does not talk. This must not be interpreted to mean that his tours have achieved no progress. Murphy favors the process of calm diplomacy.

## Palestinian Delegation and National Council

[Question] But what are the limits within which the American agree to move? It is said that the only limits concern the selection of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, with the Palestinian side comprised of members of the Palestinian National Council and PLO members who are not prominent members of the organization?

[Answer] This provides for a degree of movement and flexibility in the position because we have certain facts facing us, namely: the Israelis are not prepared to negotiate with the PLO and the Americans also are not prepared to talk to the organization unless it recognized Resolution 242 and Israel. Moreover, the PLO is not prepared to recognize Resolution 242 and Israel unless it makes certain that there is something in return because it considers recognition of Resolution 242 the last card in its hands.

Therefore, there was inactivity in the situation and if matters had continued as they were, it would not have been possible to employ the new realities in the situation. Matters would have remained as they were: separate islands with no contact between them. President Mubarak's initiative came to break the stagnation barrier.

[Question] Is there in the diplomatic lobbies an encouraging sign concerning the forthcoming selection of the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation?

[Answer] We hope that there will be movement and that all parties will be flexible.

[Question] What is your assessment of the steps that must be taken now to get the situation moving?

[Answer] Forming a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and beginning the dialogue with the United States constitute the start.

#### Jewish Lobby and Arabs

[Question] What is your assessment of the current Jewish lobby in the United States?

[Answer] The issue of the Jewish lobby is an existing issue which we cannot discard because it is a fact of U.S. life and policy. But we, the Arabs, must not stand as a stumbling block in the face of these facts. We must take the initiative and must have enough wisdom and courage to move the U.S. position, despite the presence of this lobby.

The truth is that the main element in reviving the situation is the Egyptian element, particularly President Mubarak's movement and initiative.

[Question] What is your evaluation of current Egyptian-U.S. relations?

[Answer] They are many-sided relations and I can say that they are moving well. The United States understands the significant role played by Egypt for stability in the area and understands the dedication of Egypt's efforts for development. The U.S. administration has requested from Congress military aid for Egypt amounting to \$1.3 billion in 1986, all in a grant, and \$815 million in economic aid, including \$200 million in the form of cash remittances. Moreover, Egypt has requested additional aid for 1985. Congress, on agreement with the administration, has taken its own initiative and appropriated an additional \$500 million for 1985.

[Question] What is the difference between Israel and us at present?

[Answer] Egypt ranks second after Israel. Insofar as economic aid is concerned, Israel gets it in the form of cash remittances whereas we get it in the form of projects. But for 1986, there is a tendency in Congress to appropriate one-fourth of the economic aid in the form of cash remittances.

This is a new development and we must appreciate this role on the part of the United States. This position is taken by the United States out of appreciation for Egypt's constructive role and Egypt's policy, which seeks stability in the area and supports the forces of moderation.

We must not always be compared with Israel. Naturally, we do take into consideration what is given to Israel. But U.S. aid for Egypt must also be viewed from the angle of Egypt's needs and Egypt's development programs.

We must also realize that this year is a year of an enormous deficit in the U.S. budget and that there is consensus in the U.S. administration and Congress on the need to reduce the budget deficit. Despite this, the 1986 budget shows an increase in aid for Egypt over the 1985 budget.

#### Egyptian Ambassador and Arab Ambassadors

[Question] What kind of relations bind the Egyptian ambassador in Washington with the other Arab ambassadors?

[Answer] The Arab ambassadors in Washington are dear colleagues and I have received nothing but welcome and brotherhood from all of them. At the human and fraternal level, there are good and strong ties.

As for the ambassadors whose countries are tied to Egypt by diplomatic relations, there are other levels of cooperation and consultation.

#### Iraq-Iran War

[Question] What is the U.S. administration's view of the ongoing Iraq-Iran war?

[Answer] They want to end this war. However, ending the war is the responsibility of the warring countries. To tell the truth, the responsibility in this regard falls on the shoulders of the Iranian regime because Iraq has proven constantly that it wishes to reach a peaceful settlement, and its position is well known. As you are aware, President Mubarak exerts efforts in the direction of ending the war. Last year, I had the honor to be President Mubarak's special envoy to Pakistan and Bangladesh in an endeavor to combine the forces in the Islamic Conference and in the nonaligned movement to put an end to this war. But regrettably, such efforts are smashed on the rock of the Iranian refusal to end the war.

[Question] And what about Sudan?

[Answer] The United States is concerned with the importance of Sudan and Sudan's role in the area. It hopes that stability will prevail in Sudan and that the new Sudanese regime will successfully overcome the difficult conditions it is facing.

[Question] What is the U.S. view of the Taba problem?

[Answer] It is exerting efforts to end the crisis emanating from the Taba problem as quickly as possible. My reading of the U.S. position tells me that the Americans are interested in finding a quick solution compatible with the provisions of the peace treaty and the 25 April 1982 agreement. We find that this is positive and we are careful to include the U.S. side in the negotiations that take place to end this crisis.

#### Priorities of U.S. Policy

[Question] What is the tendency of the U.S. policy's priorities now that Gorbachev has assumed the leadership of the Soviet Union?

[Answer] I believe that both the United States and the Soviet Union are certain that regional problems can influence the quality of the relationship between the two superpowers either negatively or positively. This is where the idea of holding consultations between the two countries has emanated. These consultations intensified through the Murphy-Polyakov meeting in Vienna last March. I believe that there will be other rounds of such consultations on issues concerning the Middle East. Moreover, consultations are taking place between the two sides on the issue of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and these consultations are proceeding well. So, there is a desire on both sides to avoid any mistake that may lead to confrontation between them because of one regional problem or another.

The United States and the Soviet Union are inclined toward a summit meeting. This meeting will take place next fall during the convocation of the UN General Assembly. In preparation for this meeting, Shultz will meet with Gromyko in Vienna after his Middle East tour. There is a tendency on the part of both sides to improve their relations, and the regional problems can be a part of this improvement.

[Question] What are the U.S. administration's priorities in the Middle East?

[Answer] As an area, the Middle East is the top U.S. priority because it means oil, a strategic position and the Suez Canal. With its regional problems, the Middle East can be a cause dragging the U.S. and USSR toward confrontation. The Middle East continues to be the most dangerous area in the world and it could be the spark that leads to a confrontation between the two countries and a source of danger to world peace.

We tell the Americans that for this reason, they must exert efforts to solve the most serious problem in this area, namely the Palestinian problem, because this will lead to lessening the tension and to developing normal conditions in the Middle East area.

8494

CSO: 4504/356

EGYPT

# AL-TALMASANI COMMENTS ON RELIGIOUS GOVERNMENT

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 11 Jun 85 p 9

[Article by Ahmad Al-Suyufi: "'Umar al-Talmasani in Confrontation with the Religious Government"]

[Text] This is another encounter with the religious government and all the controversy that has been raised around it recently. Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani discussed this controversy and talked about the difference between it and the Islamic government in his short book, "The Religious Government," in which he gets into a friendly debate with the secularists. He addresses, in a composed and engaging style, all the suspicions that have been raised about the subject of the religious government.

Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani began his talk about the religious government by saying: "The religious government is a new slogan frequently repeated in the press by writers whose intellectual tendencies and doctrinal inclinations are no secret to anyone. This slogan is completely alien to Islam, which disavows it in form and content. Islam, in its teachings, does not distinguish between clergymen and other men, or between a clergyman and a non-clergy man. If such prattle were to be true, can I then imagine, hypothetically, that the holders of this slogan picture in their minds the state of papal power in the Middle Ages when the pope, the archbishops and the priests allowed whatever they pleased and forbade whatever they pleased, sending to heaven whomever they chose and throwing into hell those they hated. [It is] the age when they gave out documents for remission [of sins] or excommunication and threw people out of the church, depriving them of its blessings and approval. [It is] the age when the pope's wrath against a prince or a king was sure to turn his people against him and to spread terror in his heart.

After this foreward about the religious government, Mr 'Umar explains the position of Islam toward it. He believes that this picture is completely alien to Islam because God Almighty made all people in Islam. He made all men and women equal in everything with regard to rights and duties and between the ruler and his subjects. The rector of al-Azhar [University], for example, has no advantage over the al-Azhar Mosque doorman except in righteousness. There is no difference between the president of the republic and the guard who stands at his door, except in one matter prescribed by the Koranic verse: "O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of



a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous."

Muslims were aware of this fact and dealt with each other by this rule. The Prophet of God told his daughter, Lady Fatimah al-Zahra: "Work for I have no power to intervene on your behalf with God." In other words, although he is the Prophet of God and the closest and dearest one to Him, his position was not any help to her with God. He told the people, "For I am human just like you." This means that the Prophet of God, the head of state and the grand mufti have no power to intervene on their behalf with God, and that his status did not allow him to open the people's hearts to see what is in them. The only thing he can expect from them is to say "there is no God but God and Muyhammad is the Prophet of God" in order to spare their life and property. This removes any doubt that the Prophet himself decides what is permissible and what is not in accordance with what is revealed to him.

Mr 'Umar then goes on to present to us a portrait of the caliphs after he gave us a picture of the Prophet. He said:

"The caliphs followed the same course as the Prophet. They did not claim holiness for themselves through privileges not enjoyed by their subjects. Indeed, they candidly admit that they are not the best Muslims. Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, the father of Lady 'A'ishah, the wife of the Prophet, said in his first speech after assuming power: 'I have been appointed your ruler but I am not the best among you, so if I follow the right path, help me, but if I deviate from the right path, set me straight.'"

I do not think there is more convincing proof that the Islamic government claims for itself the same privileges claimed by the popes which raised them above all their Christians. When Abu Bakr heard the women of his neighborhood in al-Madinah lament their fate after he took over the caliphate, by saying "alas, who will take care of our affairs after Abu Bakr takes over the caliphate," he reassured them by saying "I will be the same with you as before I took over the caliphate." Is this a head of a government which decides what is permissible and what is not at will, claiming a right it does not possess? Is this the government feared by the holders of the "religious government" slogan, confusing doctrine with the Shari'ah?

'Umar Ibn al-Khattab

'Umar Ibn al-Khattab presented himself as caliph to his subjects, asking them to straighten his crookedness. One of the subjects said in defiance: "If we find any crookedness in you, we will straighten it with our swords." The caliph did not get angry, did not fly into a rage and did not arrest anyone. Rather, he replied with happiness and delight: "Thank God for creating someone in Muhammad's nation ready to straighten 'Umar's crookedness with his sword." Is this the government you call religious and whose rule you fear? Or do you see the specter of the distant past which you read about in history and you judge every government which applies God's law

as a religious one similar to the specters you see? Would it not be fair to give Islamic history the same consideration at least as your perceptions of the papal governments? God save you if you are willfully distorting the image of a government governing according to God's revelations, no matter what its standing is with the people.

'Uthman Ibn 'Affan

'Uthman Ibn 'Affan came after the two shaykhs [i.e., Abu Bakr and 'Umar]. Toward the end of his term, there was unrest and some of his opposition besieged him at his home, so the Companions offered to protect him and disperse the crowds. He turned them down, putting his fate in the hands of his people. This is the Muslim ruler who does not call up some of his people against others, thus sacrificing his life for the sake of the nation's unity and in order to avoid a confrontation with the sword on his account. Is this what you call a religious government, afraid it will rule the country by the word of God and the Sunna? Can you find in your civilized world a ruler who treats his people the way Dhu al-Nurayn did? Why this fanaticism? Why this prejudice against a government governing by the law of God?

'Ali Ibn Abi Talib

'Ali Ibn Abi Talib assumed power and was stabbed by a fanatic with a poisoned sword. His people wanted to take revenge, but he forbade them and reminded them of God's law which he applied to his subjects. He said; "If I recover, rebuke will be his punishment, and if I die, beware of people like him." Do you see the method of a government which governs by the word of God? You reject and disavow this kind of splendor while the ruler, who concocts an imaginary assassination plot against himself to create for himself a fallacious popularity, arrests thousands of people and tortures and kills hundreds of people on the charge of intent to commit murder.

Mr 'Umar denounced these allegations by saying: "If Islam in its entire history does not acknowledge this slogan (the religious government), why do you insist on attaching this adjective to anyone who demands the application of God's law to this Muslim country? It would have been more appropriate for you to explain to the people your understanding of the government you call the religious government since you do not lack the education or the qualifications to explain and elucidate. Do you call every government that governs by the law of God a religious government? If this is your intention, why do you not declare it? You do not lack the moral courage to explain your viewpoints, goals and methods!

"We read about the Prophet of God and we read his works and we believe in everything he said through the Traditions that were handed down in uninterrupted sequence. This Prophet tells us: "If I see my nation afraid to tell an oppressor he is unjust, it cannot go on living." Is there a clearer way to demonstrate that Islamic government must commit itself to justice and counsel and avoid injustice and autocracy, and that the people must do their duty to obligate the ruler to be just and refrain from oppressing the people. What more can the government and the people



who follow this right path do? Is this not better than autocracy under governments which have afflicted us with oppression and tyranny for dozens and even hundreds of years?

"The Prophet, who urges us to follow such a lofty course in the dealings between the people and their Islamic government and the people's right to demand freedom of opinion and expression, says: "Enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong does not drive away livelihood nor does it bring death." Why do you call the government of this Prophet who made such a statement a religious government in defamation and revilement? Have mercy on yourselves and explain to us why you say what you say. If partisanship and parliaments are a guarantee of freedom, Islam does not deny the idea of counsel and, indeed, enjoins it, leaving it up to each era to decide the form best suited to the developments and events which occur from generation to generation."

Mr 'Umar then said: "If it has been established and proven that the honorable Islamic ulema used to face the tyrannical Muslim rulers confident that they had no reason to fear them and that they had nothing to offer them in the hereafter and they used to warn them against evil, and if it has been established that the Muslim ruler is bound to the law of God, who does not oppress, show favoritism or suppress, it can be firmly and positively established that the Islamic government, which has been called a religious government, is the best government on earth. If all this has been established, and there is no doubt that it has, all the pretexts of those who hate Islamic rule under the slogan of the 'religious government' are rendered null and void. Perhaps the main reasons that compelled these people to invent this slogan is their fear of the emergence of an Islamic tide. Ever since Imam Hasan al-Banna', the first master of the Muslim Brotherhood, appealed to the Muslims by saying: 'Your nation is the best nation evolved for mankind to lead to guide and to be strong so that they may regain their place on earth with glory, vigor, progress and civilization,' some frantic cries by dubious writers have appeared on the pages of newspapers that cast doubt on everything which is Muslim, warning the people against what they deceptively call the religious government by analogy with the paper government. The religious government is a newly-created expression not mentioned in any of the works by Muslim jurisprudent experts who concerned themselves with government. They turned their attention to a government that applies the law of God, and this is exactly the demand the Muslim Brotherhood has put forth ever since it came out with its pure, innocent call. It talks about a government under whom all people, rulers and subjects are equal and the only thing that sets them apart is their righteousness and fear of God, on grounds that every Muslim is a clergyman and his government is an Islamic government because its people are devout Muslims, even though some of them may be carried away with desire and digression. But the digression some writers flaunt concerning some rulers in Islamic countries who claim to have an Islamic government is not the fault of Islam, but rather the fault of the rulers who claim that they apply Islam, which they are far from in their commitment, conduct and practice.

"It is the Islamic government which is applying the law of God in its entirety, so does anyone have any objection to this? It appreciates the

fact that the matter of deciding what is lawful and what is unlawful is in God's hand alone and that it has no power to send anyone to paradise or throw anyone in hell, and that the responsibility of the ruler to God is many times greater than his responsibility to any of his flock, for if he is oppressive and unjust, he will pay the most on the Day of Judgment, and if he is honest and just, he will be rewarded the most on the Day of Reckoning. The Islamic government has no right to arrest, jail, torture, kill, nationalize, confiscate or seize the property of any person except within the limits of what God has allowed it. It must conduct its policy within the limits of God's revealed wisdom in accordance with the circumstances and environments of the time.

#### Islamic Government Accomplishments

"The Prophet, who came out with the idea of monotheism, prayed to the Ka'bah while it had over 300 idols on its roof because the situation called for it. Abu Bakr fought those who forbade the alms tax for fear of shaking the foundation of the alms tax law, thus harming Islamic society. Then came 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, who stopped the legal punishment for theft during the "Ramadah" years and used non-Muslims in some state affairs, hiring many Romans for government offices because the Muslims did not have experience in these fields. Were these not magnificent accomplishments by an Islamic government?"

Then Mr 'Umar said in indignation: "Why do you censure an Islamic government whose prophet says 'Enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong. Reproach the incompetent and exalt the truth or God will deal severe blows to all of you and will curse you as he cursed them.' Do you deny the government that takes care of you and accept one that protects prostitution, permits gambling and opens the way to bars and nightclubs? If you say yet, you are sinners and if you say no, then what are you denouncing? By God, I fear that by this way of thinking the warning that the Prophet of God spoke about, as related by Ibn 'Umar, will be realized: "(For) the one who has my spirit, the hour of resurrection will not come until God sends lying princes and profligate ministers and treacherous helpers and unjust teachers and corrupt (Koran) readers, their miens the miens of monks, their hearts stinking with the stench of corpses, their sects diverse, then God will reveal to them a dark, clear sin and they will disdain it, and whoever has Muhammad's spirit, then (let Islam be destroyed bit by bit?) so that it is not said, By God, you are ordered to do good and to forbid the one who would deny or God will certainly give your evil ones power over you, and they will be answered, Do good and forbid the one who would deny or God will send to you someone who will not have mercy on your young or honor your old."

Mr 'Umar then wondered, saying: "What is it that disturbs you about the establishment of an Islamic government that enforces a constitution free of falsehood and does not give in to personal desires and does not yield to whims and selfish interests?"

## Non-Muslim Minorities

Mr 'Umar then went on to talk about the non-Muslim minorities, saying: "Every country in the world has minorities, so can the weepers challenge me that there are minorities who enjoy as many privileges as the minorities living under the Islamic governments? Or do they weep without any justification? I will not go into their intentions, for this is due to those who know the secret, but are not telling. But I do not accept this weeping. This is my right in observance of the freedom of opinion which has attained under the auspices of the Islamic government a level not reached by present-day societies. Were it not for Islam and its governments, not a single Jew would have survived in the Middle Ages."

Mr 'Umar also wondered if any strong civilized country with a Muslim minority has appointed a Muslim minister, while Muslim governments have had Christians or Armenians appointed as prime ministers, ministers and presidents of parliament and have owned several buildings and thousands of feddans. I am not exaggerating when I say that at one time all the textile importers in Egypt were Jews. The law that applies to the majority is the same one that is applied to the minority."

## Islam and Workers

Concerning workers and laborers, Mr 'Umar says: "I believe everyone is aware of the rights guaranteed to workers and laborers under Islam. Unions cannot match one tenth the rights guaranteed by Islam."

Finally, Mr 'Umar came to a number of decisions, saying he was tired of freedoms that allow a human being to deny God his true Shari'ah. He said there will be no government in the universe that will protect and safeguard freedom as an Islamic government achieves peace of mind, security and stability for people of all colors and creeds.

He added: "The Islamic government you hate does not arrest, torture, confiscate, nationalize or deprive people of their freedoms. It supports sound thinking and creativity."

"The Islamic government does not entrust the affairs of the people to relatives, in-laws, followers and untrustworthy individuals."

With this presentation, Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani explained the concept of the religious government and the difference between it and the Islamic government in most areas.

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## ISLAMIC VIEWS ON DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL DIFFERENCES CONSIDERED

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 10 Jun 85 p 16

[Interview with Ibrahim Bayyumi Madkur by Sana' al-Sa'id: "Interview of The Week: Islam As a Philosophy Emphasizes Democracy of Dialogue, Opinion and the Other Opinion"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Islam as a religious philosophy exhorts us to address the mind and use it in the best way possible. It advocates that the mind must be put to work and not ignored. As a philosophy, it lifts and does away with any kind of tutelage of man over his fellow man. It is a way of life that shuns violence and supports freedom of thought. Its only true purpose is to grant man freedom of opinion and action and to support this freedom with all the talents and faculties God Almighty has bestowed upon the human being so that he may judge many things in a manner that allows him to decide, rule and act in light of what he believes in and feels comfortable with. Islam is a religion of the mind. It does not acknowledge the superstition of sex or race or discrimination on the basis of blood and color. Under Islam, intellectual expression has never witnessed pressure, oppression, coercion or closed doors, but rather has left each one think the way one deems proper.

[Question] Islam as a philosophy guides us to investigate, as a first step, the nature of intellectual significance and the applied reality of philosophy.

[Answer] It is a mental human attempt aimed at explaining the greater issues of human thought. These are the issues that basically revolve around the world, man and the Creator of the universe. Each of these fields includes many branches and interpretations. But it is a clear mistake to think that philosophy, for example, is isolated from science, for science has supported and nourished philosophy from the first day it came into existence. Indeed, scientists have always been philosophers and philosophers scientists.

[Question] Can we say that Islam has a special philosophy?

[Answer] Definitely, Islam has a special philosophy. This has been proven and established by the testimony of researchers and scholars, not just by Islamicists but by world researchers. If by philosophy we mean addressing the mind and using it in the soundest and best way, there is no



doubt that Islam calls for this with resolve in all aspects of our life and our affairs. But if we mean theories, it is a matter for the specialists, not for the teachings directed at the Muslim masses.

[Question] The text of Islam always emphasizes the necessity of using the mind, not to neglect it. I wonder to what extent the mind is free to work and think in Islam?

[Answer] Islam is a religion that always says, "Look into the Kingdom of Heaven and Earth." So long as this is its call, it has lead definitely to open-mindedness and close scrutiny of everything it sets forth. However, there are some facts handed down which we can reconcile with intellectual meanings. Suffice it to point out that the problem of revelation--a problem which has been the object of study and discussion since Islam emerged as a religion and became revelation--has been forcefully raised and interpreted by the thinkers of Islam, both scientifically and psychologically.

[Question] We notice that with all the almost-absolute freedom of thought and expression the Muslims and their philosophers enjoyed, there were currents bent on violence, represented by groups that went overboard in their radicalism, such as the Khawarij. How can we reconcile these two phenomena: the phenomenon of freedom which gives free rein to discussion, leaving no room for violence, and the phenomenon of the presence of violence under the auspices of this mentality?

[Answer] The al-Mu'tazilah school of thought has no doubt thought about this. However, the Khawarij and Shi'ites are a product of political development and political problems on which there are numerous and differing opinions. This is how the Shi'ites, the followers of 'Ali, came into being, and also the Sunnis, who had one imamate after another: Abu Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthman. There are also some Khawarij who noticed a difference of opinion among the Muslims toward some issues, so they rebelled against this and went their different ways and formed their own personal opinions. At any rate, all of them, and Islam has many groups, demonstrated that the intellectual movement in Islam has never acknowledged pressures or coercion and has never closed the door to other opinions. It has allowed each one to employ his own personal thinking. Some were right and some were wrong.

[Question] To what can we attribute the doctrinal dogmatic difference during the early period, or, to be exact, what was the point of departure for these doctrines and their proliferation?

[Answer] The difference, in reality, was over issues which may still be an object of conflict to this day. The foremost issue is fate and divine decree, which some people wanted to explain their own way, while others believed that is is part of God's knowledge and what God knows can only be attained through His revelations to us. What has not been revealed is a secret known only to God Almighty. There is no doubt that life has secrets we try to uncover. I believe that the movement of science and scientific

research in the 20th century clearly attests to the fact that the secrets of the universe are many and we cannot find a single scientist who claims he has uncovered all the secrets.

[Question] The issue of predestination and choice is one controversial issue which has been and is still being raised. Some believe that it frustrates personal initiatives because its discussion is often confined to the fact that the obligation to observe the religious precepts concerning it compels man to be predestined, but nonetheless, he is called to account as though he had complete choice?

[Answer] Fortunately, fatalism among the thinkers of Islam is confined to a very limited and narrow group. One more thing that bears witness to Islamic thought is that this kind of thinking is not shared by many people. God Almighty created man to be an entity. He addresses humanity, He addressed each man individually and He addressed the community: Get up-pray-do this--roam the earth--traverse its tracts. O people, beware of any trust greater than the Creator's trust in man. Would you empower someone to act on your behalf only to outline for him a limited course after that? Of course not, or else why the proxy? If the proxy serves no purpose, why not do it yourself. Everything contained in Islam is geared toward the individual's freedom to think and act and supports these faculties which God gave to man and by which He enables him to render judgment. There might be some secrets that escape him and he should leave them to those who know them. But he has to decide and judge in light of what he believes in and feels comfortable with.

[Question] With regard to monotheism, can we say that the philosophy of Islam is based on monotheism inasmuch as it turns man away from the dualism and the separatism of word and deed? [This is] in the sense that the foundation of the philosophy of Islam is based on the unification of man's moral life and, therefore, is free of a suspicion of a schism?

[Answer] The doctrine of Islam in this regard is very clear. It is evident that planning and organization in the universe has no room at all for more than one manager. Otherwise, we would see unrest, disorder and dissension in the presence of more than one manager. I think we already see this on the face of the earth, so think how it would be if we overstepped that! In this world of different planets and the so-called star wars--which can be set off by the will of the various antagonistic human beings who, if they were to agree, would fear God and there would be no need to think about star wars or any other such means--monotheism and oneness is the only way to come together in opinion, action and all other matters.

[Question] Islam as a philosophy has completely kept its distance from violence, as evidenced by what you have said in this interview--that the intellectual movement in Islam was not pressure and coercion, but rather a call for the freedom and use of the mind.

[Answer] You have shifted to a matter already discussed, whose underlying idea is that Islam spread its call by the sword. This is a completely unfounded pronouncement because Prophet Muhammad began his call with messengers and teachings, so there was no war, invasion or battle unless there was opposition or a danger threatening those who espoused the faith.

I think tolerance in Islam is supported by the actions and positions of the Prophet, as demonstrated by the fact that when he went to al-Madinah, he concluded a truce with the Jewish people there and lived with them as neighbors. However, these neighbors broke their pledge, so Islam had to protect itself against them.

This situation persisted in various Islamic countries. I do not think there is one political country which has been as open-minded about various religious doctrines as Islam and the Islamic countries. Suffice it to note that (Renois), a universally-known free thinker, praised Islam and made his famous remark that the Muslims' marriages to the People of the Book, both Christians and Jews, represents the most wide-spread cases of mixed marriages among the various religions. Christianity does not open the door to this, nor does Judaism.

[Question] Islam as a philosophy is against superstition and against explaining phenomena by other than their true causes?

[Answer] There is no doubt that in its first call, Islam did away with many superstitions. Perhaps one of these superstitions was the burying alive of new-born girls. Undoubtedly, this call of Islam was in keeping with the teachings that led to the Islamic viewpoint that the woman is a whole creature having all the same human characteristics as the man. I believe the Islamic Shari'ah has observed the woman's rights in many aspects. All the superstition about sex and race is not acknowledged by Islam. Likewise, Islam does not acknowledge discrimination on the basis of blood or color, for no Arab has an advantage over a non-Arab, save in righteousness, nor a white over a black, save for righteousness. They are all brothers in Islam if they understand it correctly.

[Question] Islamic philosophy, unlike many other philosophies, is not a theoretic philosophy, rather a pragmatic one that urges and emphasizes work. It used to constitute basic morals in the early environment of Islam and in the age of revelation?

[Answer] This is true. There was no avenue for preference between one human being and another except in what they had to offer. Prophet Muhammad outlined this position in the following tale: There was an invasion the Prophet wanted to finish; it was among the last invasions of the Muslims. So, he appointed Usamah Ibn Zayd as commander of an army which included 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab. He put Usamah in charge although he was the youngest one present. Abu Bakr went out with the army to bid farewell and insisted on marching with 'Umar behind Usamah. This story makes it perfectly clear that no Arab has an advantage over another Arab and no old man over a young man except in righteousness. In this instance, Usamah was marching to carry



out a matter of righteousness and therefore everyone had to be with him. Such are the positions and the traditions of Islam, of which I am afraid we are ignorant nowadays. I take this opportunity to point out that we had a wide-spread literary movement in the thirties and forties--the movement which offered portraits of our worthy ancestors such as Prophet Muhammad, Abu Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthman. These are the books I fear our young men have not read and thus have been deprived of an abundant source of comparison.

[Question] Islam as a philosophy has all the meanings that emphasize dialogue and democracy of dialogue, opinion and the other [or contrary] opinion, and consequently, cannot impose one opinion violently to root out all other opinions.

[Answer] I do not believe that the leaders of the early period of Islam and those who came after them tried to impose their opinions so long as they were thinkers and spoke in the name of thought and reason. But if people spoke in the name of politics, it is wrong to blame their mistakes on Islam. If a king or a caliph espoused a strange, condemnable opinion, should it be attributed to Islam, or should it be said that Islam had something to do with it? Of course not. It is unfair to perceive Islamic thought and doctrine as one of the phenomena brought forth as a reaction to a man's crimes against his fellow man. Islam is innocent of these crimes.

[Question] But what about when the matter is related to ordinary people, not to the ruler or the governor, who impose themselves and their opinions as though they were the hedge against error?

[Answer] Those are more deserving of loathing than the ruler because the ruler may have an excuse or may be in an abnormal or anomalous state. But to view the monopoly of opinion as a way of life is to commit a grave mistake. Healthy and sound societies work together on the same level morally, intellectually and conceptually. This is where I can say what I think and you can say what you think, and the only arbiter between us is reason and proof. The arbiter cannot be violence and the imposition of a certain opinion on others, no matter what it may be and no matter who they may be.

[Question] What about those who hide behind the front of a call with the underlying idea that their opinion and their thought must dominate others? What about those who claim for themselves a power to decide what is lawful and what is forbidden and to claim that theirs is the only opinion, or what is known in Islam as the official opinion, when Islam has nothing to do with them?

[Answer] It is enough to point out that 40 years after the Islamic call came into being, we find before us the Mu-tazalites, Shi'ites and Khawarij, groups that are different in some respects and each has its own tendency and opinion. There is no need to say that Malik Ibn Uns was the legist for al-Madinah and Abu Hanifah was the legist for Baghdad, while al-Shafi'i studied under Malik and went to Iraq where he acquired knowledge from the Iraqis, then went to Egypt to become a leader in Egypt and Syria. All of them were contemporaries and Islamic leaders. This matter has persisted to

this day to the extent that we hope--amidst the difference of opinion and the many jurisprudence tendencies brought about by the freedom of opinion and of thinking--to discover in these diverse and different tendencies a common ground to incorporate the main issues and basic principles in Islam so that the difference of opinion will not compel us to ignore our religious and intellectual commitment to come together on these issues.

[Question] If this is the meaning and the intent of Islam as a philosophy, is this not the more reason why arbitrary tutelage should not be imposed by one man over another?

[Answer] Islam came to lift such tutelage and to do away with it for good. No man can have tutelage over another man, and even a father cannot have it over his son, nor a husband over his wife. To substantiate this, suffice it to say that 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab stated it clearly from the rostrum when he was faced with a situation of being contradicted by a woman and saw that he was wrong. He said: "Umar was wrong and a woman was right."

[Question] Some weave from Islam a philosophy based on violent and radical thought by which they search for attempts that could lead to the physical elimination of others on the pretext that this is being done for the sake and protection of Islam.

[Answer] This is not found in Islam or in Christianity or in Judaism. None of the revealed religions allow this. Indeed, there is no human wisdom that justifies an individual shedding the blood of his brother because he has a different opinion. Facing opinion with opinion does not mean meeting the sword with a sword. It is a wrong and utterly ignorant tactic; it is an insame, coercive and useless tactic.

[Question] It is great to protect the upcoming generation and liberate it and keep it away from error, radicalism violence and ignorance. But how can this be done?

[Answer] The only way is confined to two things: the home and the school, which together must implant sound intellectual ideas in the minds of our children. The ordinary mother used to get her child used to prayer and fasting simply and easily without a philosophy or profundity. This was seen as a way to get close to God without going through a labyrinth. But when the child outgrew this phase and went to school, his teachers put the clear picture before him. What actually happened, unfortunately, is that the wave we are suffering now is the product of 30 or 40 bygone years when religion was mixed with politics and politics used religion as a weapon. Politics and this mix-up be damned! The destructive calls in particular wanted to wrap themselves with a religious garb to make themselves palatable to the masses.

[Question] Islam as a philosophy is a way of life. This keeps us away from those who want Islam to withdraw into itself and go into its own shell, alienating itself from life.

[Answer] I am very sorry to say that those who speak this language are alien to Islam, or, in other words, are ignorant of the true Islam. If ignorant ones such as these put themselves in a position of leadership, it is not only their fault, but also the fault of those who listen to them despite the fact that they see darkness atop darkness. The way to treat this properly is to spread sound, clear opinions among the Muslim population so that they may understand them correctly. If those misguided or deceitful preachers have a life, it is because they live in the dark. Therefore, if we can send out the light, we can certainly exterminate these insects.

[Question] Some are of the opinion that the philosophy of Islam may carry the trails of Sufist tendencies which some categorize as tendencies of the subconscious, which exclude Islam from being a tool for learning?

[Answer] The fact is that the freedom of thought in Islam and the unrestrained mind of the Muslim have opened the door to many issues whereby some religious observances and rites have been turned into philosophy which includes what we call Sufism. Islamic Sufism from this point of view is a course of action and thought. We do not disagree over the course of action so long as it does not signify that man has to lose his humanity. Rather he must fulfill his duty as a member of society. He is free to lead an ascetic life devoted to the service of God and to sit in some place for contemplation. This is his right. But if he wishes to transfer his life to such a monk's cell and to take the people with him to an eternal cell, this has absolutely nothing to do with Islam. God Almighty said: 'And say 'Work.' Soon will God observe your work, and His Apostle, and the Believers.'" Therefore, Islam contained in its origin a measure of contemplation and asceticism. Indeed, the philosophy of asceticism and contemplation was the work of Islamic thinkers who later on formed a school or branch of Islamic thought, which is the Sufis, as a branch of theologians and legists.

[Question] In light of your view that Islam does not deny development, may I ask you about the status of Islamic philosophy these days and whether it has changed in any way?

[Answer] If we mean by it the philosophic thinkers from among the Muslims, those are human beings before being Muslims or Christians. They lived in their own era and there is no value to a thinker who ignores the opinions, research and studies of his own period. Accordingly, Islamic thought was founded on a background of Greek thought, Indian thought and Chinese thought, in addition to other religious teachings of Christianity and Judaism. It borrowed from Greece as it borrowed from India. Hence, the thinkers and researchers of today are very wrong to place themselves in a cell and close the door because by so doing they live in the darkness of the past while we want them to live in the daylight of today.

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# ISLAMIC MEANS TO REGAIN PRE-1948 PALESTINE VIEWED

Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 12 Jun 85 p 3

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hadi: "When Will the Muslims Reclaim All of Palestine, Including Jaffa, Haifa, Tel Aviv, Elat and the Negev, Not Just the West Bank, Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque?"]

[Excerpts] How will the Muslims reclaim Palestine, every inch of Palestinian territory usurped by the Zionist Jewish gangs in alliance with the 20th century crusade, the colonialist empires of Europe and America?

How will the Muslims reclaim Haifa, Jaffa, Tel Aviv, Elat and the Negev, in addition to every handful of sand or every olive or orange tree in the land of prophecies, Palestine, not just the West Bank, Jerusalem, al-Aqsa Mosque and Gaza?

How will the Muslims awaken from their indifference and their giddiness which befell them as a result of the UN resolutions, the truce resolutions and the Camp David Accord, to realize that all of Palestine, not just part of it, is an Islamic land wrested from the Islamic nation? Reclaiming it is the due of every single Muslim subject through Holy War and the sacrifice of one's soul, one's properties and one's children.

When will the Muslims realize that they are all as sinful as the slave who leaves without his master's permission and a woman without her husband's permission until Palestine is returned to the land of Islam?

When will the Muslims respond to the order of God in his Holy Koran: "Slay them Wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter."

When will the Muslims regain their past glories and bring back the days of the Holy War leader, Salah-al-Din al-Ayyubi, who triumphed with the force of arms over the aggressive European crusade, rooting it out with Islamic armies which came together from the land of Palestine and Syria?

Accede to God's advocate and bring back the days of Salah-al-Din al-Ayyubi and "slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out for tumult and oppression are worse then slaughter."



## Negotiations Led Us to Camp David

Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il, People's Assembly member, said:

"God Almighty prescribed Holy War to deter aggression and repel the aggressors. We have tried with Zionism the policy of negotiation which led us to Camp David and the policy of normalization at the expense of our religion. God said: 'Strongest among men in enmity to the Believers wilt thou find the Jews.' It has become clear to us that we only reaped revilement, disgrace, contempt and the alienation of our Arab brothers and have put ourselves in a position tarnished with negativism in the face of the Israeli aggression against Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque, their expansion in building settlements, Sabrah and Shatilah [camps in Beirut], the Taba problem and the shelling of refugee camps in Lebanon. Furthermore, it has also become clear to us that only iron can dent iron. Witness the magnificent heroic position of this young Lebanese girl, Sana' al-Muhaydili, who forced Israel into a disorganized retreat and a terrorized withdrawal. The fact is that we are wasting time and effort when we imagine that our problem with Israel can be solved by international arbitration negotiations or world organizations. Besides, what use are these world organizations when America has the right of veto by which it can foil any decision the world adopts and the right to veto any resolution which does not comply with the whims of the super five: America, England, France, Russia and China.

The UN representative, a woman, stands up to thwart with one world in the name of America the world's resolutions to condemn the Zionist enemy.

## Egypt Receives Israeli Envoy

Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il added, saying: "God Almighty says: 'God only forbids you, with regard to those who fight you for (your) Faith, and drive you out of your homes, and support (others) in driving you out, from turning to them (for friendship and protection). It is such as turn to them (in these circumstances) That do wrong.' So God Almighty forbids any relationship between us and those who assist the enemy, but we are still receiving at the highest levels (Mirfer), Israel's envoy to us. We read a statement saying that Israel wants instant normalization of relations as though it imagines that we can press an electric button to transform hostile relations to normal ones despite the passage of 30 years of conflict between the Arabs and Israel. The latest news we have about the American mass media is the aggression against the reputation of the Prophet, definitely the purest of all creation, while we are sitting here doing absolutely nothing, as if 'I am in imminent danger and I say, "I was eaten the day the white bull was eaten."

## Palestine Will Not Be Regained Without Islam

Justice Mahmud 'Abd-al-Hamid Ghurab says: "Palestine can be regained only through Islam with all its concepts of Holy War for the sake of God. True Holy War is the battle of the soul which means that children, juveniles, old men, young girls and women go out with their weapons to fight the Jews. How far we still are from Islam. Worlds separate us from the leader of

Islam, Muhammad. Worlds separate us from Sana' Yusuf al-Muhaydili, the commando who came to the surface to dazzle the whole world. She was a leader and a pioneer who crushed the necks of all men. Palestine was lost because Muslims were too lazy to undertake Holy War. Jerusalem has been totally destroyed because the leaders did not do anything about the Camp David Accords, the peace accord which sounds good but is in fact evil. This accord gave the Jews the right to exist and created on the land of the Arabs and Islam a dreadful waste which divided the Arabs, slighted Islam and scared the leaders away from 'holding fast, all together by the rope which God stretches out.' 'Ye who believe! Take not My enemies and yours as friends (or protectors), offering them (your) love, even though they have rejected the Truth that has come to you, and have (on the contrary) Driven out the Prophet and yourselves.' The only thing left for us to do is to win God's favor through manhood, virtue and high ideals we learned from Islam."

#### Islamic Doctrine Basis of Holy War

Dr Mani' 'Adb-al-Halim Mahmud, a professor at al-Azhar University, believes that the Islamic Jihad has specific precepts a Muslim cannot undertake unless they are firmly implanted in his heart and mind. The first of these precepts is the existence of the Islamic doctrine in the fighter's soul. This is what the Prophet's Companions had with the Prophet. Without this doctrine victory cannot be achieved because the internecine fighting, division and defeatism that have afflicted the Muslims are due to their alienation from the Islamic doctrine. "God hath purchased of the Believers their persons and their goods for theirs (in return) is the Garden of Paradise." Therefore, there is a contract between God Almighty and the believers. But the second main condition for the Holy War is strength, be it economic, military or purely technological. Without such force the Islamic Holy War will not bring about any kind of steadfastness. It is the duty of the Islamic governments to prepare for the Holy War from now and to use all the capabilities they have to prepare the necessary force to defeat the enemies of God. We need careful studies stemming from our Islam to be able to retrieve it and achieve victory.

#### Al-Aqsa Mosque Is a Trust in the Charge of the Muslims

Dr Sa'd Zalam, dean of the Arabic Language College, says: "Ever since the Muslims conquered Jerusalem, al-Aqsa Mosque remained a trust in their charge and a hope for their sacred places until the crusades which tried to destroy the pledge which existed between the Christians and the Jews and between 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab. This provoked the wrath of Muslims in Hittin and 'Ayn Jalut and led Salah-al-Din al-Ayyubi to liberate al-Aqsa Mosque and regain this right because it is the right of all of us in our religious existence. This right has lasted from the time of al-Isra' wa al-Mi'raj [Muhammad's midnight journey to the seven heavens] and for 15 years before that, which is the age of the Islamic call before the Hejirah, when the Prophet used to turn to Jerusalem during his prayers, and even after the Hejirah, and until the revelation of the Koranic verse that says: "turn then thy face in the direction of the sacred Mosque." The Muslims turning to Mecca has a great significance that has given the Arabs an emotional hope by turning their faces to the first Kaaba in Mecca.

## Islam Knows No Limits

Holy War is the duty of every Muslim in any Islamic country, for Islam does not know any limit whatsoever. Any country that calls to prayer or has a Muslim who says "there is no God but God and Muhammad is the Prophet of God" is a Muslim country which must be defended by the Muslims. If you are called to war, go forth in Holy War. He enjoined upon the Muslims an individual duty to protect and support the Muslims against any enemy invading an Islamic country. Therefore, it is our duty to liberate Palestine because it is an Islamic land and Islam is a captive in the hearts of the Muslims there because they do not have complete freedom. Their land is occupied by a usurper and a Holy War for the sake of the land, honor and possessions is a sacred duty.

12502

CSO: 4504/394



EGYPT

# TELEVISION CRITICIZED FOR INADEQUATE RELIGIOUS PROGRAMMING

Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 12 Jun 85 p 3

[Article by Muhammad al-Shabashiri: "Television Cries Out From Within"]

[Text] Television has killed the true manifestation of the month of Ramadan celebrations. People used to receive Ramadan with the eagerness of the thirsty for water and the lost and the bewildered for the road that leads to the desired goal and the intended hope. They used to wait for the evening, for the recital of the Koran and for going to the mosque to hear the prophetic tradition and enjoy prophetic hymns and glorifications.

Instead, TV has become expert in creating ways to distract people from the religious teachings and to preoccupy them with morally depraved movies, vulgar serials and weak programs. It was not satisfied with the riddles and the programs which take up the viewers' time, but cancelled many of the religious programs the Muslims need in this holy month. Even the religious serials offered by TV are shown at inopportune times, thus making it difficult for the viewers to follow them. Furthermore, television conspires against the people by cramming its programs immediately after the evening prayer when people do not have a chance to pray or to eat dinner; it does not stop even during the breaking of the fast.

We met with Muhammad Kamal-al-Din, the religious affairs censor of Channel 2, who said:

"The religious programs offered on TV are limited and their scheduling is unreasonable, both during midday and in the evening.

"Religious programs must have a space in the evening schedule and must have a weekly or monthly evening show. This is the least that can be done. They must be shown at times when the largest number of viewers can watch them, after 6 pm in the evening.

"Also, Channel 1 and Channel 2 must be under one management. As it stands now, Channel 1 and Channel 2 are worlds apart. There is no coordination between them and, consequently, there is a repetition of ideas and talk-show guests. There are many examples of such a conflict. For example, the al-Azhar rector's program on Channel 1 is scheduled opposite the program

of Shaykh al-Baquri on Channel 2, so which one should one watch when both are required viewing since both subjects are prominent Islamic personalities?

"The fast program on Channel 1 is scheduled opposite "the Islamic Library" or "Legal Opinions and Legal Provisions." Which one should one watch when both are required for the viewer to whom we should transmit our religious productions? Therefore, both Channels 1 and 2 must have a coordinated or single management in order to avoid such a conflict.

"We live in an era in which we are demanding the application of the Islamic Shari'ah. To do that we must ensure that meaningful religious teachings are conveyed to the viewer at the proper time in the proper dosage and by the proper methods. There is nothing stronger or more effective than TV in view of it being the primary informational media in this era." Television announcer Muhammad "Abd-al-'Aziz, who presents religious programs, hosts the program, "Magazine of Islam," which introduces people to the rules of worship on ablution, including the divine precepts, practices and prayers related to this ritual, and to the provisions of the Islamic Shari'ah so that it [i.e., the program] may be a cultural university. [This is] besides dealing with contemporary subjects through analysis from an Islamic viewpoint.

Unfortunately, this program was cancelled during the month of Ramadan despite the Muslim's need for such religious programs during this month.

One serial shown on TV is the program, "Muhammad, Prophet of Humanity," starring 'Abdallah Ghayth, Rashwan Tawfiq and Aminah Rizq. We met with 'Abdallah Ghayth, who plays the role of Habib al-Masri "who suffered the oppression and injustice of the Roman authority which occupied Egypt. He was sent to fight a war he had nothing to do with and is captured in the rear lines and treated like a slave until he gets to Mecca where the message began. He becomes among the first believers for he sees in it freedom from slavery and bondage for him and all the oppressed people." Ghayth went on to say: "The serial is entitled 'Muhammad, Prophet of Humanity,' and deals with the problem of racial discrimination which the world is still trying to solve, but Islam has beat it to it. Its solution can be found in Islam, which does not differentiate between an Arab and a non-Arab except in righteousness. Balal Ibn Rabbah Habib al-Masri became one of the greatest leaders under Islam."

But it is sad and disgraceful that TV should create all kinds of ways to fight this good work by showing it at 1.30 am, when all the people are sleeping, or opposite a new movie or a popular evening show on Channel 2.

Television used to produce religious works, but refused to have anything to do with showing them to the viewers.

As for Rashwan Tawfiq, who plays the role of Farid Ibn Harithah who is martyred during an invasion, he wishes that television would offer religious programs during all the seasons and Arab months, not just during Ramadan. He also objects to the scheduled times for the serial, "Prophet of Humanity," and wonders why TV does not rerun it before the breaking of the fast, as was the case in previous years.

## Meeting with Vice-President of Television

We had to meet with Mr 'Abd-al-Salam Khalil, vice-president of television, who said: "Television offers two dramatic productions: first, the serial, 'There is no God but God,' which ties Egypt thousands of years ago to the doctrine of monotheism from the time of our Saint Indris and the prophets in Egypt and passing through the era of Ahmos who was mentioned in the Koran as Dhu al-Qarnayn. It presents monotheism in a historical script thousands of years ago in the sense that the message of monotheism originated from here.

"Second, 'Muhammad, Prophet of Humanity,' which explains how Islam dealt with the problem of racial discrimination through Habib al-Masri. It is a topic linked to Egypt as well."

About the religious programs shown on TV and his view of them, he said: "We want to offer productions which reach the mind and soul of every believer so he might benefit from them and be guided by them. I want TV to guide and follow the right path, not a twisted wrong path. It must present the facts to the viewers because our religion is the epitome of truth and the religion of tolerance."

12502

CSO: 4504/394

LIBYA

JANA: BALTIMORE SUN URGES U.S. TO ATTACK IRAN, LIBYA

LD131522 Tripoli JANA in English 1440 GMT 13 Jul 85

[Text] Washington, Shawwal 26, 13 Jul, (JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY)--The military editor of the American BALTIMORE SUN newspaper called on the administration to take military action against Iran and Libya saying that it is possible to attack Iran successfully for being busy in its war with Iraq and its exhaustion of most of its modern arsenal and the nakedness of the remaining units of its fleets and air force geographically. The military editor pointed out that Libya is more exposed considering that its capital and main military installations are situated along the coast making it within range of the American artillery and missiles in addition to the possibility of attacking it by air. The American military editor added that the capability and efficiency of Libyan military commanders and soldiers are in doubt.

This declaration asserts to any doubting person that the American hostile policies and plots are aimed at Iran and not Iraq. It is, therefore, Iran which is standing against America while American Iraqi contacts are being intensified to resume diplomatic relations and coordinate their stands of aggression against Arab-Islamic causes. As long as America is planning to hit the Islamic revolution in Iran, any one aligning himself with Iran is against America and its policies of terror and aggression. Hence, the only logical conclusion is the friend of my enemy is my enemy and the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

CSO: 4500/164

LIBYA

BRIEFS

UNITY PROPOSAL 'LAST CHANCE'--Al Zahf al Akhdhar said that the Leader's proposal for Arab union is the only touchstone and the last chance to test the extent of credibility of all the Arab regimes. In an article on the reaction and the betrayal of the Egyptian regime that fell completely into the laps of U.S. and the Zionist enemy, it explained that the true answer to the confrontation with colonialism's and reaction's plots against the Arab nation is the realisation of immediate unity, the establishment of unified Arab military force to confront the interferences and provocations of imperialism, zionism and reaction on Arab land and to cause the defeat of America and its agents and regain the dignity of the Arab nation. [Text] [Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYAH MAIL in English 6 Jul 85 p 12]

FOREIGN INVESTMENT COMPANY INCREASE--An official source in the Libyan Arab Foreign investment company declared that the number of companies established in the African continent has reached 34 companies specialised in agricultural products and their industry, fishing, marisport and tourism. The source, in a statement to JANA's correspondent explained that the Company's investment activities had gone beyond the Arab homeland, Africa and the Far East. The Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company had set up joint ventures in Nicaragua, Guyana and Pakistan which had been specialised in sea fisheries and agricultural production. The official source in the Company stated that the company has made more than 30 million dinars profit last year. [Text] [Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYAH MAIL in English 6 Jul 85 p 12]

CSO: 4500/166



MOROCCO

KING HASSAN SPEAKS AT ARAB-AFRICAN UNION SESSION

LD102344 Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 2200 GMT 10 Jul 85

[Text] King Hassan II affirmed that the Arab-African Union does not constitute an axis or a bloc against any quarter whatsoever and that it is open to all Arab and African countries, wherever they are geographically situated and whatever political regimes they had to join, and that the union was founded on virtue.

This was contained in the royal speech the king delivered at the final session of the Federal Body of the Arab-African Union.

The chairman of the Federal Body read the recommendations adopted by the body during its first session since last Saturday. These recommendations reiterated the call made by King Hassan II for holding an extraordinary Arab summit conference to study the Palestine question. They also denounced the massacres to which the Palestinians were exposed in the Lebanese camps. They also affirmed the need for creating Arab Maghreb unity as a nucleus for comprehensive Arab unity, and denounced the policy of Balkanization in the region. The recommendations expressed support for an internationally-controlled plebiscite in the Sahara.

The historic session was attended by Crown Prince Sayyidi Mohamed and his brother, Prince Moulay Rachid, and members of the government headed by Prime Minister Mohamed Kerim Lamrani and members of the Federal Body, and the secretary general of the Arab-African Union, Abdelwahid Radi, and his assistant Kamal Hasan al-Maqhur.

CSO: 4500/163

SUDAN

MINISTER DESCRIBES VARIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, REFORM POLICIES

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 4, 5 Jun 85

[Article: "Minister of Finance at Press Conference Yesterday: The 16-Year Period of Dictatorial Rule That Has Been Uprooted Was Characterized by Fumbling in Economic and Monetary Policies and Ostentation"]

[4 Jun 85 p 3]

[Text] There is no doubt that the economic problem is considered one of the greatest challenges facing the revolution. The condition the state has come to has arisen as a result of fumbling in financial, monetary and economic policies in the past 16 years. This period was characterized by a lack of sound planning and reliance on decrees from above, which led to damage to all the civil service institutions, and was also characterized by unguided spending, especially on the regime's repressive, political and constitutional agencies and organizations and the private agencies of the overthrown president and his entourage. More serious than all that, the economy came to rely on printed currency, without attention to the severe damage to the domestic economy that would entail, in addition to its increased reliance on the outer world even for the provision of foodstuffs. This was happening in a land which has 200 million arable hectares. Not only that, but the situation deteriorated to the level of famine and the death for thousands of our innocent citizens.

These policies brought a number of problems to the fore which our economy is facing today. These I could summarize as follows:

1. The aggravation of the intensity of inflation as a result of the flood of printed currency which has poured into the economy.
2. The accumulated foreign debts, which have come to \$9 billion.
3. The spread of unemployment. As an example, about 11,000 university graduates are now unemployed in addition to this year's graduates.
4. A total collapse in the civil service and the deterioration of morale as a result of the policy of the bygone era, which relied on loyalty before

competence, resulting in the dispossession of many people and prompting many people to emigrate. This, in turn, led to collapse in all the sectors.

5. A terrifying deterioration in the standard of living and suffering in obtaining the most minor facilities of life.

6. Migration to the towns, which aggravated the deterioration in standards of living, the spread of unemployment and the phenomenon of irregular housing.

7. The deterioration of special services in health, education, transportation and so forth.

Mr President:

Ministers:

After this brief review of the situation the state has come to, let me move on, with you, to the causes which have led to this. I will start with the area of development:

#### Development

In spite of the efforts made by technicians and experts to set out development plans and programs in scientific ways, the previous regime introduced many additions and modifications into them without study. These plans and programs were shelved and became mere ink on paper. Thus, projects which satisfied the whims of the former politicians were the ones that had priority, not the carefully studied, assured plan projects which technicians had prepared. Therefore we find that a large number were not destined to succeed. Not only that -- the situation reached the point where a decision was adopted in the Council of Ministers by recommendation of the economic sector, at its 34th meeting held on 27 February 1973, prohibiting technicians from expressing an opinion on the subject of financing for projects. The decree stipulated:

#### Loans Bearing on the Financing and Execution of Projects: Recommendation 15

The ministers should with complete clarity show the technicians in their ministries the limits of their areas of competence and powers regarding the subjects of technical study which they assign to them and the expression of opinions regarding them, to avoid all interference on the technicians' part in issues on which higher directives and instructions are issued for considerations which might sometimes be purely political and of necessity bring them out of the realm of their ordinary activities. Whenever their areas of competence and jurisdiction regarding any subject set out for study or the expression of opinions are expressed anew, the technicians must, for their part, totally commit themselves to the limits of these powers and not deviate from them by addressing themselves to things which do not lie within the authorities granted to them or the directives issued to them. All ministries must take the necessary procedures.

The same decree, in section "fourthly," under the title "Issueance of the statement on government policy regarding loans concerned with the financing and execution of development projects, Recommendation 16," states the following:

Since the method followed in the execution of development projects is to offer projects for international bids and awards, and because this method causes delay in the development process because of administrative complications and bureaucratic red tape and experience has proved that the bid system is not the best method for obtaining better tenders, in the recent period the government, to this end, has gradually entered into direct negotiations with foreign investors and financiers to carry out or finance some projects without offering them for international bids. Since this approach has prompted some government employees and local middlemen and agents to raise doubts and create an atmosphere of chaos:

On the basis of the foregoing, to ward off rumors and gossip, a statement is being issued by the Council of Ministers clarifying the government's policy on the subject while pointing out that the government is not restricted to the system of bids on all occasions but that it is prepared to accept any bid submitted to it directly to finance or execute any development project, and such bids may be presented to the competent ministry or the Ministry of Planning.

This decree is the turning point in the course of our economy, the main cause of the bankruptcy we are suffering from today and the cause of the heavy legacy we have inherited from the bygone era. It is that which opened the door wide to pillage, plunder, corruption, the spreading of corruption and the destruction of people's integrity. The decree began first of all with the dissolution of the technical consultative committee of the economic council, composed of deputy ministers, and the decree permitted each minister to sign any tender he received from middlemen and parasites, committing the government of the Sudan to it without surveillance, having silenced the tongues of the Sudanese civil service, which, before May, had been a model of integrity, ability and competence. Thus all financial laws and bills were paralyzed and plans and priorities were thrown to the winds, to the point where middlemen and agents themselves became the ones dictating to the Sudan its priorities and plans.

This was the situation with respect to the ministers. As to what happened in the republican palace, speak about it, do not be embarrassed: every local and international tramp and middleman made deals over anything and everything, far from the eyes of the people and in total secrecy, binding the Sudan to exorbitant nonproductive loans under whose burden we are staggering today. The loss of control over monetary policy resulted from this decree, and that led to great inflation in the money supply. When the situation reached intolerable limits and the economic situation deteriorated to a crushing abyss, the 1977 law was issued to suspend this folly on the part of the ministers, but the situation in the office of the president remained remote from the eyes of overseers and responsible financial agencies.

After the issuance of the 1977 law, the Ministry of Finance started to examine its foreign commitments for a number of years only, in order to

ascertain who the creditors of the government of the Sudan were and how much the indebtedness had come to. After it failed to tabulate these commitments, or even obtain the documents and agreements bearing on them, it was compelled to seek the aid of foreign experts and the tabulation process; it has spent close to \$2 million on this so far. Nonetheless, some documents and agreements still are not available to the government of the Sudan. What are the effects that have arisen from this?

Where have all these funds gone? Politics.

If all these funds had been spent on productive, carefully-studied, soundly-planned economic projects, these projects would have produced, in order to pay the commitments on their debts, and would have contributed their surplus to economic development. Herewith we will cite some examples of various aspects of spending, by way of example, not exclusively:

1. Part of this indebtedness was incurred to establish a system of roads. This is laudable but does not yield a rapid return; indeed, its return is disguised. It helps reduce the cost of investments, but haphazard, fumbling policies killed the spirit of investment. In addition to that, the lack of oversight made the cost of these investments much greater than the real amounts to which the Sudan was bound, and the Sudan is laboring today under the burden of paying the commitments for them. This applies to all the loans that have been imposed on us. These loans were not long-term ones for the most part but rather were medium-term, some instalments on them being due before the completion of construction.

2. Hundreds of millions of pounds have been spent on industrial projects whose planning was in error and which were not studied but rather were dictated by the rush to acquire massive commissions. Some of them have not yet seen the light of day although the payment dates have fallen due; indeed, perhaps they never will see the light at all and they will represent a pure loss; examples are the Malut sugar, Qadu textile and fertilizer [projects] and some projects which were completed a long time ago but have not yet been put into operation, such as the Port Sudan spinning plant, which, it became clear, after it was completed, no one had planned for, with no one thinking where its operating capacity would come from. Some years later the capacity was provided, but it became clear that it needed large amounts of water which were not available in the area.

There is the Abu Na'amah jute project which was abandoned as soon as it started operating as a result of mistakes in design and planning, and there are projects which have started to operate at very low capacities, such as the 'Aslaya sugar and Sannar sugar [projects], compelling the Sudan to spend enormous sums from other loans "to repair them" though they are still new. There is the Friendship Palace Hotel, which is operated at a loss, and regarding which two ministers were sacrificed because of their objection to it.

3. There is a large proportion of such short-term debts, most of which are paid out in a single year, which the Sudan incurred to meet the great gap it was facing in the balance of payments each successive year.



4. There are funds which were stolen without any embarrassment, such as the transaction for the helicopters which the palace bought for the armed forces without consulting with it; they objected to them on grounds that they were not fit for use and subjected the pilots' lives to danger because they were left over from World War Two and no one in the world uses them today, though they were bought on grounds that they were new. It appeared that they were requested a number of times but ultimately the order was issued by the commander general that they were to be delivered, and they are still sitting out in the open, unused, of no use even as scrap.

These are just examples, as I have pointed out, by way of example and not exclusively.

#### The Production Situation

##### A. Agricultural Output

###### 1. Cotton:

Production declined to the point where in 1980-81 it came to just 45 percent of production in the early seventies (even though the two al-Rahad and al-Suki projects were added), as a result of the terrible neglect of existing projects and the squandering of money on new projects with no feasibility, finally compelling the Sudan to spend hundreds of millions to repair the cotton projects.

###### 2. Peanuts:

Production in 1983-84 came to half the 1975-76 production.

###### 3. Sesame:

There was no change in production in the course of the past 15 years.

###### 4. Corn:

Although the area farmed increased more than twofold, from 4 million feddans in 1972-73 to 8.7 million feddans in 1983-84, corn production did not exceed 2 million tons on the average over the past 15 years.

###### 5. Wheat:

The acreage allocated to wheat declined to approximately half in 1983-84 from its level in the mid-seventies.

##### B. Industrial Output

###### 1. Sugar output:

In the government's four mills, production does not exceed 45 percent of capacity; in spite of our long-standing experience in this area, the equipment for the Malut sugar [project] has been imported since 1979, and a start

has not been made on installing it yet. Perhaps it will not be installed at all, and the loss will be total.

## 2. Oils:

The capacity available is about 1.5 million [tons of] oil seeds and that being used is less than 20 percent, because of the deterioration in production of seeds, fava beans and sesame, compelling the Sudan to import oils some years. It consistently had large surpluses for export.

## 3. Textiles:

Productive capacity is 300 million meters and exploited capacity is 80 million meters, that is, only about 27 percent. This sector is now dying and needs a rapid transfusion.

## C. The Transportation Sector

The railway's capacity has declined from about 3 million tons or less in the seventies to less than 1 million in 1983-84, in spite of the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on it in this period.

## 3. Economic Indicators

1. A decline in gross national income and per capita income, while plans and programs say that the rate of growth of national income will be 6 percent a year in 1985-86 and that per capita income will increase by a rate of 3.2 percent.

2. Constant decreases in the exchange rate of the Sudanese pound to the point where it has reached one-tenth its value in the early seventies.

3. The decline in investment as a result of economic policies which have had a negative effect on savings in general. The government, for its part, does not save, but rather suffers in its budgets from a constant deficit and resorts to seeking loans from the banking system to pay its budget deficits. The private sector has refrained from saving as a result of the consistently high rates of inflation, which are depriving savings of their purchasing value. To make things worse, erroneous banking measures which were applied recently have deprived investment of the incentives which were given to it for savings on its behalf. For example there are more than 5 million pounds in the post and telegraph savings fund and their owners do not know what to do with these savings, now that the interest on them has been cancelled. With these erroneous policies, the government has impelled the Sudanese to be a consumer people spending all their income and saving nothing.

The relationship between savings and investment is an organic one; therefore there will be no real beneficial investment unless it comes from real savings.

4. The lack of internal balance over the years, reliance on the quest for loans from the banking system and the printing of currency to the point

where the level of inflation from 1970 to 1984 has come to 1,400 percent, that is, an average annual rate of 100 percent.

#### 4. Joint Investment: The Arab Authority for Development and Economic Investment

This authority, which all the Arab countries had agreed would be spearhead of development in the Sudan and was established in 1976, to be the optimum model for the injection of Arab capital and for the natural Sudanese potential for achieving self-sufficiency in food for the Arab world -- this authority, which was established with initial capital of more than \$500 million, which had been planned to attract no less than 10 times this amount from Arab investors, governments and individuals between 1976 and 1985, and on which preliminary studies and plans were done by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development in 1976:

The investments in this authority, which it had been hoped would be the spearhead for economic development in the Sudan, have not exceeded 100 million pounds less, and even these skimpy investments are suffering from neglect and the losses which have resulted from the faltering economic policies of the government of the Sudan in the past era. This has prompted them to stop expanding their activities and seek investment areas outside the Sudan.

#### 5. The Company of the Emirates and the Sudan

This is also suffering from death agony as a result of wrongful policies and mismanagement over the years. It could have been a model to be followed regarding joint Arab investment.

#### The Kuwaiti-Sudanese Company

It had been hoped that this would be a model for joint investment serving the Sudan and the Arab nation, but, most unfortunately, it is now dying and is on its way to liquidating many of its activities as a result of faltering policies and mismanagement.

#### Investment Policies

The situation in this context has not been better than the points I mentioned regarding the development plans. It is well known that the creation of a proper atmosphere for investment will not occur just through the issuance of a law and the grant of benefits; rather, in the first place, it requires stability in economic policies and general political stability. By reviewing what has happened in the past 16 years, we find that nationalization, expropriation and sequestration, which took place in a haphazard fashion, have resulted in the flight of tremendous numbers of investors and the many changes in economic policies in short periods have led to a lack of confidence among investors, especially foreign ones. What has made the matter worse has been the atmosphere of chaos which the previous regime created during the emergency trials, through its blatant attack on Sudanese employers, who exerted and still are exerting great, estimable effort to move the wheel of development in the country forward. Some people, in the course of

this, have been compelled to flee to other countries in search of the proper atmosphere for investing their resources, in spite of their belief that their country is more deserving of these investments than others.

[5 Jun 85 p 3]

[Text] We are continuing herewith the publication of the second and final section on the economic situation, from the talk by the minister of finance.

#### The Dissolved Agencies of the Regime

Among the practices which led to the deterioration of the economic situation was the orientation of large resources by the bygone regime toward its repressive and political agencies in order to protect itself. Herewith we will review the status of these agencies over the period of just a year.

##### First: The State Security Agency

The budget approved for the current year comes to 34.3 million pounds; 17.1 were spent up to the date of its dissolution, leaving 17.2 million pounds, in addition to an amount estimated at 4 million pounds from revenues for identity cards which the agency arrogated to itself outside the budget. This sum does not reflect this agency's total spending, since there is revenue from investment activities in the area of trade in particular and from the income of consulates, taxes on expatriates and revenues from foreign sources. The committee formed for this purpose is tabulating these. We will declare them as soon as the committee has finished its task.

##### Second: The Office of the President

The approved budget for this year came to 2.3 million pounds.

An additional amount of 1.8 million pounds was also approved for this. Thus the total comes to 4.1 million. This is the status of disbursements from the budget. With respect to other revenues, which we know nothing about so far, we will declare these as soon as the investigating committees have finished determining them.

##### Third: The Socialist Union

The approved budget came to 2 million. There are additional approvals for the sum of 300,000 pounds. That is, disbursements were greater than the approved budget, as was the case with the office of the presidency.

##### Fourth: The National People's Assembly

The amount approved was 3.5 million pounds and that was increased through additional approvals to 3.9 million pounds. With respect to the regional people's councils, the sum estimated for their expenditures was 1 million pounds. Half that amount was spent up to the date of the uprising, and we are now seeking to learn the real magnitude of spending in the various regions.

## Fifth: The Salaries of Ministers and Ministers of State

The salaries of ministers and ministers of state are estimated at 2.6 million pounds, of which approximately half had been spent by April 1985. In addition, there were savings in allocations to services, as a result of the ministers' exemptions, estimated at 400,000 pounds.

These agencies' real disbursements are under review and investigation, as I have mentioned, and I will provide a detailed statement on the magnitude of all their activities after the committees have finished their work. It is worth pointing out here that ascertaining the magnitude of the assets these agencies possess, particularly the security agency, and ascertaining the foreign revenues which had been obtained by the palace and the [security] agency without the knowledge of the competent agencies will enable us to disclose the facts in full, and we hope that that will take place as soon as possible.

## The Economic and Financial Situation Now

First, the foreign situation:

I had previously presented to your venerable assembly the details of the foreign situation. Here I will content myself with presenting a summary of it:

### 1. The situation up to 30 April 1985:

	Millions of Pounds
A. Debts due international and regional organizations	278.4
B. Commitments of the Bank of the Sudan to foreign banks	141.4
C. Other instalments due and the allocations of loans and deposits	1,348.2
Total	1,768.0
2. Instalments that must be paid between May and December 1985	1,314.5
Total loans which must be paid in 1985	3,082.5
3. Commitments which must be paid between 1 January and 30 April 1986	114.3
Total commitments up to the end of the transitional period	3,196.8



4. To that should be added the essential requirements during the transitional year	1,435.0
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Total	4,541.8
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6. Less available revenues from exports, foreign aid and trade for which provisions have not been made	1,373.0
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6 [sic]. Total deficit which revenues must be provided to cover in the transitional period	3,268.8
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The total that must be provided up to the end of the transitional year will come to \$3.3 billion, assuming that we reach an agreement to reschedule the debts due in 1985 with the outer world. If that is not possible, the total deficit will come to \$5.3 billion.

Second, the Fiscal Situation for 1984-85

In millions of pounds:

1. Revenues	1,854
2. Expenditures exclusive of debt service	2,816
Deficit	962
3. Service of debts	2,448
Deficit	3,410
4. Less available resources from aid	1,505
Total deficit	2,905
Less the scheduling of debts	1,285
Deficit that is not covered	620

There are a number of observations which must be underlined. These are:

1. Our internal revenues will cover only 65 percent of our expenditures if we exclude the service of debts from expenditures. If they are added, this proportion will not exceed 35 percent.

2. Rescheduling will reduce the deficit by 38 percent.

3. Foreign subsidies in the form of grants, aid and the rescheduling of debts will cover 80 percent of the deficit. This reflects the extent of our

reliance on the outer world; since we have not yet scheduled the debts and the flow of grants was not at the desired level, this budget does not reflect the true picture of the situation.

4. There is a deficit estimated at 620 million pounds which it will be necessary to provide the necessary resources to cover. Approximately one quarter of this (150 million) will be covered by indebtedness to the banking system.

5. General treasury revenues from profits and personal income taxes are estimated at about 320 million pounds a year. After their abrogation and the application of the tithe and the social justice tax, it is not expected that receipts will exceed 30 percent of this amount, on the basis of rates of payment.

6. It is also worth pointing out that the estimates of the cost of increasing wages and salaries come to 350 million pounds a year, and it is necessary to meet these from real revenues in order to avoid indebtedness to the banking system, which will lead to inflationary pressures harmful to the whole economy.

7. It should also be observed that the regions still rely greatly on the general treasury to subsidize their budgets and there is a lack of clarity about the relationship between the center and the regions regarding financial matters; as a result of this, it is difficult to administer public funds in a proper manner. The regional government law of 1980 deprived the ministry of supervision and oversight over spending in the regions.

As is clear from these figures, the current budget suffers from a deficit of 620 million pounds; by adding the cost of increased wages, for which the sum of 350 million has been estimated, the deficit comes to 970 million. A drop of a single piaster in sugar, bread, oil and soap prices and a drop of a pound per gallon of gasoline and 50 piasters per gallon of kerosene will raise this deficit to 1.2 billion pounds. We do not now have any real resources for meeting this, and we will have committed the same mistake the bygone era committed if we resort to covering that by printing more currency, especially when we realize that surplus currency in the economy at present is close to 4 billion pounds.

#### The Broad Outlines of Our Policy for Economic Reform and Arresting Deterioration

The above are brief features of the diagnosis of the ailments the Sudanese economy is suffering from, which can be summarized by the crushing gap between our revenues and commitments on both the foreign and domestic fronts. It saddens me that this is an extremely gloomy picture. We have inherited this deteriorating situation as a result of faltering policies over 16 years. Personally, were it not for my unlimited confidence in our economy and resources, which have caused it to persevere through all this folly for all this period, I say, were it not for my confidence in the ability of our economy and my confidence in the great Sudanese people who have unleashed two people's revolutions in 20 years, my unlimited confidence that these great people will be able, through their determination, insistence and

confidence, to transcend the economic ordeal which they are going through today in a short time -- were it not for this confidence, I would not have assumed the burdens of this position at this grave turning point.

In addition, the great Sudanese people have laid the foundation stone for stopping the economic decline through their upheaval, and eliminating the regime means first of all that we have stopped the bleeding, the laxity, the plunder and the ostentatious spending of the agency's repressive agencies and the flaccidity and pomp in its constitutional agencies and its corrupt entourage.

#### First: Self-Reliance

We must face the situation bravely, insistently and with determination. First, and before everything else, we must rely on ourselves in the first place in correcting the course of our economy and bearing the difficulties which face us, so that we can gain the world's confidence in us and encourage the outer world, brothers and friends to help us transcend this ordeal.

Our self-reliance has manifested itself in the following priorities which we have set our eyes on from the first day of the people's revolution:

#### First: Famine and Warding off the Drought

As the venerable council knows, this humanitarian issue occupies the thoughts of all the people and also the international community. It is no secret to anyone that the concealment of the facts by the bygone regime in this regard was the main reason the situation reached this point. There is no one who considers it reasonable that the situation should have brought the Sudan, with its tremendous resources, especially in the area of food production, to what we are going through today. The challenge which has faced us is not just in the provision of food; rather, we must outrace time and sent all quantities on before the severity of autumn increases.

The grain situation may be summarized by the following:

Total grain consumption requirements in 1985	3.6
Quantities available at the beginning of 1985	2.0
Deficit at the beginning of 1985	1.6
Quantities of grain which have arrived or for which commitment has been made under American subsidies	1.2
	0.4 [sic]
Subsidies from the fraternal Libyan jamahiriyah	0.1
Other countries and organizations	0.075
Total	0.175
Shortfall up to the end of 1985	0.225

The shortfall in grain up to the end of 1985 is estimated at 325,000 tons, which will be covered by local production and aid.

What is required of us now is to mobilize all the bodies concerned to send existing quantities to the consumption areas, so the problem will not become aggravated beyond bounds during the autumn period, when it will not be possible to ship any materials to the affected areas. Here I would like to praise the exceptional efforts which some friendly and fraternal countries are making.

#### Second

Lest we beg for our forces the coming year as well, we have directed all available resources toward guaranteeing the financing of basic agricultural accessories for the coming season. In addition, the financing of fertilizer, insecticides, bags, bales and oil has been provided from the aid available, as stated in detail in my memorandum bearing on the foreign situation.

#### Third

The effort to attract the savings of Sudanese working abroad to finance our essential needs.

We have actually started consultations with them in our recent visits to Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Gulf and have started to adopt some measures and policies necessary to attract these savings. We will pursue further mutual thinking with them during the conference which is to be held in the near future, so that the measures and policies will be in keeping with our brother expatriates' aspirations in a manner which will realize their personal ambitions and aspirations and their overflowing enthusiasm to participate in saving their country.

#### Fourth: Our Foreign Relations

The ruin which has loomed over the Sudanese economy and the heavy legacy we have inherited are in their current magnitude too great for the strength of the Sudanese people by themselves, and, since this is the situation, they must convince the outer world to help them. Rapid movement is necessary on all levels to stimulate interaction with the outer world, and this requires the following:

1. First of all, attainment of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (I have explained the importance of this to the venerable council in my memorandum on the foreign situation).

I will travel to Washington next Monday to negotiate with the fund for this purpose.

2. Strengthening our relationship with the World Bank for the sake of further support (I explained the importance of this in detail in my memorandum above).

3. The mobilization of our brothers and friends to extend us a helping hand.

#### Fifth: The Domestic Front

As a result of the features of the domestic situation mentioned above, which have been characterized by the printing of currency, the disbursement of unreal revenues, decline in production and the squandering of revenues on luxury spending and agencies of security and repression, this crushing inflation which the people are suffering from has come about.

We are committed, by virtue of declared government policy, to reducing the sufferings by which the Sudanese people are being tormented, and our means for realizing this are concentrated on the following focal points:

1. Increasing and supporting production, since increases in production are the practical, basic way out for alleviating the people's sufferings. We have started this mission and are trying to direct all our resources and work to breaking the severity of the bottlenecks which prevent the increasing of production and guarantee that it is abundant.
  2. Providing real revenues for subsidizing basic commodities, in order to reduce the severity of inflation. We will not agree to proceed along the same road as the previous policies, which depended on currency and the printing of currency to increase certain cash incomes, resulting in greater inflation and more severe suffering. To this end we will depend only on real revenues. This will be feasible for us only when the general government budget is prepared and presented next September, after the overall picture of the financial situation, the overall revenues available and the total necessary spending become apparent to us. At that point, but not before that, we will be able to advance a group of measures to reduce the suffering.
  3. We will work to reduce the government's expenditures as far as possible, guide government performance with respect to the central government and public institutions, and subject regional government to strict financial oversight.
- Regional government is not an objective in itself but rather is an instrument for serving the people, offering them services and developing their regional resources. However, the application turned out to be a disaster for the people, all resources ended up being spent on inflated political and executive agencies which are parallel to the agencies of the central government, and necessary services have been lacking, because all the money available has gone for salaries.
4. Seeking to stabilize the exchange rate of the Sudanese pound in the free market by attracting savings, guiding imports and confining them within the limits of maximum needs, in order to reduce the cost of production and subsequently concentrate prices.
  5. Reviewing tax laws in order to realize the government further real income from the affluent, guide the general performance of existing agencies and support them so they will be more competent in collection.



6. Reviewing and guiding the banking system in order to confirm that it is carrying out the general policies of the government and serving the higher interests of the Sudan.
7. Providing incentives for savings and working to attract them through renewed, encouraging incentives.
8. Reviewing all the financial agencies and financial institutions the government administers with the goal of raising their competence and confirming that they are making an effective contribution to supporting the general budget and stopping the drain of accumulated losses the government is paying for.
9. Concentrating in development on raising the competence of existing projects and modernizing them, and remedying the ailments that have afflicted them.
10. Concentrating and unifying supervision over foreign financing to avoid faltering and squandering which has occurred in this regard.

It is apparent from the above situation that the crushing state the Sudanese economy has reached requires the joining of efforts of the whole Sudanese people, with all their national groups, and requires detachment, sacrifice and self-abnegation. The remedy requires an orientation which is national in character, and no one can do that no matter how much wisdom, learning and expertise he may be endowed with. Therefore, I have decided to seek the aid of a consulting team of noble Sudanese scientists and experts to offer advice and counsel, and have asked the union grouping for cooperation in recommending some names. I will infuse these with some personalities I know, so that through the joining of efforts we will be able to transcend the ordeal in the near future, almighty God willing. It is God who brings success.

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CSO: 4504/403

SUDAN

SPLA RADIO COMMENTARY VIEWS GOVERNMENT MILITARY MOVES

EA122018 (Clandestine) Radio of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army  
in English 1300 GMT 12 Jul 85

[Text] From a special commentary entitled: The Sudanese Revolutionary Armed Struggle is Invincible--The long-awaited act of aggression directed against the people's revolution by Siwar al-Dhahab's military regime has now begun after months of scheming and plotting following the theft of the people's revolution. The forces of Uthman Abdullah have now moved against the Sudanese People's Liberation Army [SPLA]--the vanguard of the people's revolution. Over 10,000 peace-loving Sudanese citizens, who have pledged to defend Sudan's soil against foreign enemies, are now being driven against their own fellow countrymen by the generals in a major military gamble that may claim the lives of most of these citizens. They are being asked to risk their necks by these selfish generals who stole the people's power and are obviously determined to consolidate themselves even if it means rivers of blood flowing in Sudan.

From the onset, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army-Sudanese People's Liberation Movement [SPLM] have been quite aware of the designs of the generals. Since they came to power to stay, it would have been too simplistic to imagine that they could have been persuaded by methods other than the relentless prosecution of popular revolution to give up the stolen reins of power. Consequently, it was quite well known that all the time, the generals were talking peace and dispatching teams of special envoys to foreign capitals in quest of the so-called peace, but a big military move was in the making.

Because the 2 May regime, as a natural extension of the successive ruling minority clique regimes in Khartoum, cannot bring itself to face the unpleasant idea of being unseated and replaced by a people's government, it has deliberately hypnotised itself into a kind of trance where it conveniently regards the popular national revolution, ushered into existence by the SPLA-SPLM, as a southern movement. Stemming from this erroneous premise, it has tried to bring the SPLA-SPLM to the table of negotiations for the purpose of hammering out possible regional concessions that the movement would find acceptable.

The most disturbing thing that threatens to jolt Siwar al-Dhahab and his gang out of the world of illusions and fantasies into the world of reality is that the frequent defections into the SPLA-SPLM by members of the government Armed Forces have assumed another dimension. People from different parts of the Sudan have found the appeal of the SPLA-SPLM as a truly national revolutionary movement irresistible and hence are now joining it in increasing numbers. All patriotic and revolutionary forces of Sudan have declared their support for the movement.

The attempt of the military regime to preempt mass defections among some members of its armed forces into the SPLA by disarming them will surely backfire. If the government genuinely believes that the SPLA-SPLM has no cause to fight for, then why does it not convince government troops of that so that they can fight willingly rather than desert the Army and join the SPLA? The SPLA is fighting to put an end to the monopoly of power by the minority. It fights so that this power is placed in the hands of those who deserve it, that is the overwhelming majority of the Sudanese masses. This is the noble truth which the SPLA stands and for which it fights. With this truth it will always continue to attract into its ranks the sons of this nation.

The force that has now engaged the SPLA in southern Upper Nile and Equatoria Administrative Areas had been carefully assembled in Juba by Siwar-al-Dhahab and his war manager, Uthman Abdullah. This process which started soon after the power takeover of 6 April, betrayed the generals' true intentions despite their peace gestures. The force that numbers 10,000 or so, is extremely impressive in size and moreover equipped with the most destructive arms imaginable. But what the military administration seems oblivious to is the fact that the SPLA possesses in its arsenal a weapon which even the most advanced technology in the world cannot produce.

It is the ultimate weapon--the weapon which swept away Numayri from Sudan's political scene and ironically installed Siwar-al-Dhahab in power. This weapon is none other than the invincible will of the overwhelming majority of the Sudanese masses. Imbued with this will and the determination to restructure Sudan for the benefit of all its people, even a handful of SPLA troops will find the strength to resist any enemy force no matter how large or well-equipped it is.

Siwar al-Dhahab's present military campaign is calculated to score a major military victory over the SPLA. He knows very well that the military option, which he had persuaded Numayri to adopt, will get him nowhere. He believes that if he could inflict a big military defeat on the SPLA, the movement would be brought to its knees and placed in a situation where it would become more amenable to peace talks. This strategy again shows how seriously Siwar al-Dhahab and his group underrate the SPLA-SPLM. Even if he were to succeed in his present operation, would he be able to restart oil exploration and drilling in those areas in war zone one where oil had been locked up by the SPLA? Would he be able to ensure the regular and smooth flow of military supplies to his garrisons in the south? Or for that matter will he be able to guarantee the safety of the

air space over war zone number one? Assuming that he could do all that, what about SPLA operations in war zone number two in the northern part of Sudan?

With SPLA's capability to strike at any time and in any part of the Sudan, can the military regime in Khartoum keep in check attacks on targets too near to it for its comfort without sacrificing military advantages gained elsewhere? Over and above all, what would a military mean to the SPLA-SPLM, which is in essence a national revolutionary movement that by its very nature is committed to a protracted struggle? It would mean an ordinary setback, a stumbling block to be overlooked in the course of arduous revolutionary struggle for justice and equality in Sudan.

The power of the SPLA-SPLM stems from the unconquerable will of the Sudanese masses. The military regime has turned all its attention to the SPLA, not knowing that the SPLA is merely the armed component of the people's revolution. The regime, in its desperation, has become almost blind to the grave danger that lurks very close to it in the form of the patriotic and revolutionary elements of the Armed Forces who, like the SPLA-SPLM, are inspired by the will of the masses. One of these days, in the midst of its preoccupation with the SPLA, the military government is going to find itself thrown out by these elements with the backing of the true revolution makers--the broad Sudanese masses in the streets of Khartoum.

Again Siwar al-Dhahab and company commit a grave error when they think that by disarming elements in the Army who come from such areas of the Sudan as the west and the south, they would have undermined the SPLA-SPLM. If the government continues to do this, there will come a point in time where it will find itself without an Army for the simple reason that the SPLA-SPLM, as a national movement, is going to embrace everybody in the Sudan. The overwhelming majority of Sudanese people are deprived and neglected and they happen to be everywhere in the country--in the north, south, west, and the east.

Another thing which we should never lose sight of is that most of the patriotic and revolutionary officers in the Sudanese Army, who have pledged their loyalty to the SPLA, are members of the elite class that has been enjoying the privileges of our society for the last 29 years. However, they have chosen to rebel against the present system of exploitation and hence are the regimes most formidable enemies. The majority of them come from the relatively well-developed areas of the Sudan and therefore have a vested interest in the status quo. Yet they are sworn to its destruction.

Surrounded by enemies on all sides, Siwar al-Dhahab's regime will never survive indefinitely and his operations against the SPLA are only intended to defer that day when the masses will make him pay for his crimes against the people.

Another thing which the military government in Khartoum may not know is that the balance of political and social forces within the Army has shifted considerably in favor of the progressive-minded elements. A sizeable part of the army officers and men now consider the ideas of Siwar al-Dhahab and his associates about government as inherently unjust and archaic. These elements could be counted on to end the tyrannical and oppressive system of the generals. They can be assured of the firm support of the SPLA, which will continue to deal blows at the military government so as to soften and prepare it for the people's slaughter house just as it did with Nunayri.

For the soldiers, who have been brought to fight the SPLA and are now doing so around Mongalla, now has come the time for them to make their contribution to the revolutionary struggle of their fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters all over the country. History has already recorded their heroic stand last April when they defied Siwar al-Dhahab by refusing to comply with his orders to suppress demonstrations by force of arms. The SPLA-SPLM leader, Colonel Dr John Garang, now calls upon them once again to discharge their sacred duty towards the country and fellow men by deserting their positions and coming over to the SPLA or by mutinying and overpowering their commanders.

It is worth recalling that the SPLA-SPLM leader, Col Dr John Garang, has repeatedly assured members of the Sudanese Armed Forces that it is not difficult for them to dispose of the 2 May system of Siwar al-Dhahab which happens to be weaker than his predecessor's system. Col Dr John has said that if the soldiers could again rebuff Siwar al-Dhahab as they did last April, then they will certainly bring to an end another era of military dictatorship in Sudan. A lot of unnecessary suffering and bloodshed would therefore be forestalled and, above all, the patriotic Sudanese soldiers, who would carry out the sacred duty of removing Siwar al-Dhahab, would have earned themselves the honor and privilege of having erased a dark chapter from our glorious history.

CSO: 4500/162



SUDAN

# REBELS CLAIM 73 KILLED IN NASIR ATTACK

EA161814 (Clandestine) Radio of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army  
in English 1300 GMT 16 Jul 85

[Excerpt] Radio SPLA [Sudanese People's Liberation Army] has received more details of the operations currently being conducted against Nasir Military Garrison in Upper Nile by SPLA forces. the attacks which are being carried out by SPLA troops are under the command of Lt Col William Nyuan Bany, SPLA high command member, member of the SPLM [Sudanese People's Liberation Movement] Executive Committee, and Zonal commander of central and western Upper Nile administrative areas, and these started on 8 July 1985.

According to our correspondents dispatch, 73 enemy soldiers in Nasir Garrison have been killed since the start of the attacks and the enemy has now been forced by the destruction of all its buildings, including the officers mess within the garrison, to withdraw to the nearby premises of (?umm) Kiir primary school. Other enemy soldiers are reported to have fled to Ulang near Nasir. Our correspondent added that a six-wheeled Magirus army truck carrying 12 soldiers was completely destroyed by a mortar shell, besides an APC and the fuel store in the garrison. Capt James (Opau), Lt James (Gatluk), Sgt (?Paul) Lual and military militia officer (Kok) Riak led the attack on Nasir, the correspondent said.

On the other hand the same correspondent informed us that one of the 19 POWs released earlier by the SPLA high command had been slightly injured. It is to be recalled that the POWs who had been handed over by Lt-Col William Nyuan Bany to the commander of Nasir Military Garrison last month are still being kept by government forces in Nasir and have not been evacuated as the case was supposed to be.

The official SPLA-SPLM spokesman has repeated that the SPLA-SPLM absolves itself from all responsibility with regard to what may befall the released POWs and has noted that their relatives will have the government of the generals in Khartoum to blame for the present predicament of the POWs who are now trapped in Nasir with government forces and whatever subsequent fate they may suffer.

CSO: 4500/162

SUDAN

BRIEFS

STATEMENT ISSUED ON SOUTH--Khartoum, 14 Jul (SUNA)--The alliance of representatives of the General Federation of Trade Unions and union branches in the southern region today issued a statement on the situation in southern Sudan. The statement is signed by the national forces in the south represented by the Southern Sudan Political Association, the Sudanese African Congress, the National Alliance for Southerners in Equatoria, the Sudanese African National Union, and the federation of students of universities and higher institutes. The statement demands a conference of all national political forces of both parties and trade unions in order to reach a unified stance to be adopted in the forthcoming conference on the south, which will seek the restoration of stability and security by taking steps to reach a cease-fire. The statement notes that the deteriorating security and political situation in the south can be overcome by unifying the southern forces' positions on specific principles on which negotiations could be held with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1442 GMT 14 Jul 85]

SPLA-SPLM FORCES PUT ON ALERT--The commander-in-chief of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army [SPLA] and chairman of the Executive Committee of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement [SPLM] has sent a message of encouragement to Major Arok Thuon Arok, member of the SPLA high command, and the forces under his command in Southern Upper Nile and Equatoria Administrative Areas. According to the official spokesman for the movement, the SPLA-SPLM leader, Colonel Dr John Garang, is said to have exhorted Major Arok and his forces to mobilize fully all the available resources in order to repulse the current enemy onslaught that aims at forcing open land, air, and river routes between Juba-Bor on the one hand, and Lakal-Bor on the other. Hinting at the far-reaching repercussions of the outcome of the present engagement with enemy troops on the course of the Sudanese people's revolutionary struggle, Col Dr John reminded Major Arok that his present stand is not only to deny the enemy its immediate objective but to defend the precious revolutionary gains which the masses of the Sudan have entrusted to the SPLA forces for safe keeping. In a related development, a report from our correspondent in central and western Upper Nile Administrative areas under the zonal command of Lt Col William Nyuan Bany, member of the SPLA high command and member of the SPLM Executive Committee, says that Lt-Col Nyuan Bany has put his forces, that are adjacent to Major Arok's forces, on full alert. [Text] [(Clandestine) Radio of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army in English 1300 GMT 12 Jul 85]

NUMAYRI'S DEPARTURE PLANS--Khartoum, 16 Jul (SUNA)--The Sudanese People's Liberation Army [SPLA] Radio yesterday cited its correspondent in the Middle East as saying that deposed President Numayri is now preparing to leave Egypt for Pakistan within the next 2 weeks. The radio said that the deposed president's presence in Egypt has led to very cool Sudanese-Egyptian relations due to the Egyptian authorities' refusal to return him to Sudan for trial. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1430 GMT 16 Jul 85]

PEOPLE TO RETURN FROM ETHIOPIA--Khartoum, 10 Jul (SUNA)--A group of 160 persons will arrive here tomorrow from Ethiopia, the chairman of the Returners National Committee stated to (SUNA). The total of returners are thousand persons and they will arrive till Monday. The People's Armed Forces will disarm the returners and deliver a report in this respect to the Cabinet within a couple of weeks, the chairman added. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 1720 GMT 10 Jul 85]

FLIGHTS SUSPENDED TO JUBA--Khartoum, 17 Jul (SUNA)--All the Sudanese Airlines flights to Juba were postponed due to the inefficiency of Juba airport navigation equipment caused by the rainfall which makes the landing of planes very difficult and fraught with unpredictable dangers. This was announced by the Sudanese Airlines Cooperation General Director Sa'id Ahmad Muhammad who denied any other reasons for the stoppage of the flights, adding that the scheduled flights will be resumed immediately after the repair of Juba Airport navigation equipment. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 1730 GMT 17 Jul 85]

CSO: 4500/162

WESTERN SAHARA

RESULTS OF POPULATION CENSUS DONE IN 1974

Paris LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE in French Jun-Jul 85 pp 97-112

[Article by Maurice Barbier, political science lecturer at the Nancy-II University and author of two books: "Le Conflit du Sahara occidental" and "Trois Francais au Sahara occidental en 1784-1786" (publisher: L'Harmattan): "The Population of West Sahara According to the 1974 Census"; continued from page 80]

[Text] In presenting the main results of the census of the Sahraoui population, we shall distinguish five aspects: age and family status, distribution by tribe, geographic distribution, occupations and level of education. The results concerning residents will be briefly presented in the same manner. Finally, we shall review the main characteristics of housing.

1. Age and Family Status


The population distribution by age group shows that the Sahraoui population is very young. Out of a total of 73,497 Sahraoui, 33,210 or 45.18 percent are under 15, and 40,988 or over half of the population (55.76 percent) are under 18 (see Table 4).

The distribution by age group is not evenly staggered for various reasons. First, the true age of most Sahraoui, especially adults, is not well known, which may account for the size of the 70-and-over group. The 34-39 age group is less numerous than the next group, for it includes those born between 1936 and 1941, which are fewer due to the Spanish civil war. The relatively small size of the 14-19 age group could apparently be explained by the fact that it is abnormally reduced to the benefit of the 19-24 age group, due to various benefits that can be derived from belonging to the latter.

The family status of the Sahraoui is given in Table 5. In this respect, appreciable differences are observed between men and women. There are far fewer single women than single men, because women usually get married at a younger age than men (between 14 and 21 in most cases). The discrepancy between the number of married women and married men--i.e. 143--is accounted for by the existence of polygamy, which nevertheless is rather limited. There are fewer divorced men than divorced women (293 versus 1,266) because men

Table 3. The Haratin [Negro Semi-Sedentary Farmers] in West Sahara

<u>Category</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Sahraoui	3,018	1,377	1,641
Residents	31	12	19
Aliens	32	22	10
Total	3,081	1,411	1,670



Population by Age Group (In Thousands)

Key:

1. Years      2. 70 and over      4. Women      5. Men

Table 4. The Sahraoui Population by Age Group

<u>Years</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
0-4	12,295	6,385	5,910
5-9	11,814	5,981	5,833
10-14	9,101	4,717	4,384
15-19	7,790	4,126	3,664
20-24	8,434	4,325	4,109
25-29	4,622	2,525	2,097
30-34	4,263	2,172	2,091
35-39	2,692	1,490	1,202
40-44	3,213	1,559	1,654
45-49	1,965	1,127	838
50-54	2,521	1,304	1,217
55-59	948	625	323
60-64	1,276	617	659
65-69	538	355	183
70 and over	2,025	1,028	997
Total	73,497	38,336	35,161



Table 5. Family Status of the Sahraoui

<u>Category</u>	<u>Single</u>	<u>Married</u>	<u>Widowed</u>	<u>Separated</u>	<u>Divorced</u>
Men	26,482	11,228	332	1	293
Women	<u>20,452</u>	<u>11,371</u>	<u>2,070</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1,266</u>
Total	46,934	22,599	2,402	3	1,559

Table 6. The Sahraoui Population by Tribe

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Reguibat Lgouacem	20,276	27.58
Reguibat Sahel	18,247	24.82
Izarguien	7,984	10.86
Ouled Delim	5,382	7.32
Tidrarin	4,842	6.58
Ait Lahcen	3,540	4.81
Arosien	2,858	3.88
Ahl Berikallah	1,810	2.46
Idegob and other southern tribes	1,387	1.88
Ahl Ma el Ainin	943	1.28
Yaggout	771	1.04
Ait Moussa	619	0.84
Ait Baamram	609	0.82
Toubalt	542	0.73
Miscellaneous northern tribes	536	0.72
Filala	494	0.67
Escarna	483	0.65
Ouled Bou Sba	428	0.58
Tendega	415	0.56
Ouled Bou Aita	356	0.48
Foicat	347	0.47
Mejjat	292	0.39
Menasir	169	0.22
Imraguen	167	0.22

are more likely to remarry than women. Similarly, and in part for the same reason, widowers are far fewer than widows (332 versus 2,070).

## 2. Distribution by Tribe

Table 6 gives the distribution of the Sahraoui population by tribe, with the percentage of the total population. It shows that there are eight major tribes: the Reguibat Lgouacem, the Reguibat Sahel, the Izarguien, the Ouled Delim, the Tidrarin, the Ait Lahcen, the Arosien and the Ahl Berikallah. Together, they total 64,939 inhabitants, i.e. close to nine tenths (88.35 percent) of the Sahraoui population. The Reguibat alone (Lgouacem and Sahel) count 38,523 people, i.e. over half (52.41 percent) of the Sahraoui popula-

tion. The largest fraction of the Reguibat Lgouacem, the Boihat, consists of 8,731 people, i.e. close to one fourth of the Reguibat (22.66 percent) and over one tenth of the total population (11.87 percent). For the larger tribes, the Spanish census breaks down the population into fractions, as these represent social structures more important than the tribe. But it thus masks the preponderance of the four major tribes (Reguibat Lgouacem, Reguibat Sahel, Izarguien and Ouled Delim) which, with 51,889 inhabitants, represent close to three fourth (70.60 percent) of the native population. In addition, there are 15 or so smaller tribes of less than 1,000 people, representing no more than one tenth of the population.

### 3. Geographic Distribution

The geographic distribution of the Sahraoui population is characterized by three traits. First, because of the size of the territory (266,000 km<sup>2</sup>) and its desertic nature, the average population density is very low: 0.27 inhabitant per km<sup>2</sup>. In addition, over four fifths of the population are sedentary (60,246 inhabitants, i.e. 81.97 percent), whereas nomads number only 12,428 (16.90 percent). Finally, the population is concentrated in and around towns, especially in El Aioun, Smara, Villa Cisneros, Guelta Zemmour and Aoussert.


The main tribes are located as follows (see map):

- Reguibat Lgouacem: Seguiet el Hamra and north of Río de Oro;
- Reguibat Sahel: center and east of Río de Oro;
- Izarguien: northwest of the Seguiet el Hamra;
- Ouled Delim: southwest of Río de Oro;
- Tidrarin: northwest of Río de Oro (between Cape Bojador and Villa Cisneros);
- Ait Lahcen: El Aioun, Villa Cisneros and Arghub;
- Arosien: center and north of Río de Oro;
- Ahl Berikallah: south of Río de Oro.

The sedentary or sedentarized population is essentially found in and around the towns. There are three main towns of over 5,000 inhabitants: El Aioun, Smara and Villa Cisneros, which total 40,660 inhabitants (41,207 if residents and aliens are included), i.e. over half of the population (55.32 percent). El Aioun, the territory's capital, counts 28,010 inhabitants (28,499 with the residents and aliens), i.e. over one third of the population (38.11 percent). It includes three main groups: some Reguibat Sahel (7,091), some Reguibat Lgouacem (5,313) and some Izarguien (6,003). Smara has 7,280 inhabitants (7,295)<sup>1</sup> belonging to two major groups: Reguibat Lgouacem (4,115) and Reguibat Sahel (2,264), so that the town is nearly 100-percent Reguibat. Villa Cisneros has 5,370 inhabitants (5,410), the main group consisting of Ouled Delim (1,676).

There are 8 smaller towns with between 1,000 and 2,500 inhabitants, totalling 13,581 people (18.47 percent of the population). These are:

- Guelta Zemmour: 2,490 (2,500), which is almost entirely a Reguibat town (Reguibat Lgouacem: 1,134; Reguibat Sahel: 1,124);



### Location of the Sahraoui Tribes

The map shows which population predominates in each area.

- Aoussert: 2,448 (2,473) with two large groups of Ahl Berikallah (554) and Reguibat Sahel (891);
- Tifariti: 1,778 (1,814), nearly all Reguibat Lgouacem (1,534);
- Arghub: 1,714 (1,732), over half of whom are Ouled Delim (913);
- Bir Enzaran: 1,398 (1,400) with three major groups: Reguibat Sahel (391), Arosien (386) and Ouled Delim (276);
- Mahbes: 1,396 (1,411), nearly all of whom are Reguibat Lgouacem (1,183);
- La Guera: 1,298 (1,405), nearly half of whom are Ouled Delim (684);
- Jdiria: 1,058 (1,067), nearly all of whom are Reguibat Lgouacem (651) and Reguibat Sahel (331).

Finally, there are 10 centers or villages of less than 1,000 inhabitants:

- Hagounia: 870 (872) with a large group of Izarguien (334);
- Tichla: 841 (913) over one third of whom are Ahl Berikallah (317);
- Daora: 656 (670), nearly half of whom are Izarguien (323);
- Bou Craa: 616 (620), with three major groups: Reguibat Lgouacem (127), Reguibat Sahel (126) and Arosien (124);
- Bojador: 590, over two thirds of whom are Tidrarin (399);
- Haouza: 530, nearly all of whom are Reguibat Lgouacem (421) and Reguibat Sahel (75);
- Bir Gandus: 291 (294), over half of whom are Ouled Delim (155);
- Miyec: 270 (278), one third of whom are Reguibat Lgouacem and one third Reguibat Sahel;
- Gleibat el Fula: 215, two thirds of whom are Reguibat Sahel and one third Reguibat Lgouacem;
- Aguenit: 156 (161), half of whom are Reguibat Sahel.

The Sahraoui population is therefore urbanized to a very large extent, since most of it (55.32 percent) resides in towns of over 5,000 inhabitants and nearly one fifth (18.47 percent) in centers of 1,000 to 2,500 inhabitants. Overall, nearly three fourths of the population (54,241 people and 73.80 percent) live in 11 towns of over 1,000 inhabitants. This is extremely important for two reasons: on the one hand, it has made it possible for tribes to meet and mix; on the other hand, it has generated a feeling of belonging to a single community and has then helped the emergence of a national consciousness under the influence of nationalist movements, in particular the Front Polisario.

We should add that 1,742 Sahraoui officially live outside the territory, in particular in Mauritania (1,230), in Morocco (249), in Spain (173) and in the Canary Islands (61). Obviously, the census contains no information on those who fled or were expelled to neighboring countries for various reasons.

#### 4. Occupations

Table 7 indicates the occupations of the Sahraoui, and the grand total per occupation, including residents and aliens. The two most numerous occupational groups are by far herdsmen (7,959) and unskilled workers (5,424), which reflects fairly well the economic level of the territory and the social structure of the population. Three other occupations assume some importance: the military (army and police) (1,341), merchants (959) and vehicle drivers

Table 7. Occupations of the Sahraoui

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Grand Total*</u>
Farmers	14	13	1	17
Chioukh	226	226	0	227
Merchants	959	956	3	998
Vehicle drivers	705	703	2	708
Office workers	186	180	6	192
Teachers	139	137	2	145
Herdsmen	7,959	7,488	471	8,159
Koranic justice	38	38	0	38
Craftsmen	107	102	5	111
Military	1,341	1,338	3	1,353
Skilled workers	353	352	1	362
Unskilled workers	5,424	5,404	20	5,500
Fishermen	148	148	0	169
Health	119	112	7	120
Tailors	15	14	1	18
Religious services	23	22	1	25
Employees	320	285	35	326
Industrial workers	329	329	0	360
Service workers	142	140	2	152
Schoolchildren	4,822	3,754	1,068	4,885
Students (university level)	905	820	85	915
Occupation unknown	5,471	2,818	2,653	5,471
Retired	228	214	14	229
No occupation	43,486	12,705	30,781	44,384
Mid-level professions	11	11	0	11
Higher professions	27	27	0	27


\* Including residents and aliens

(705). The age-group distribution for these five occupations reflects the social changes that have occurred fairly rapidly (see graph): herdsmen are mostly middle-aged; unskilled workers, the military and vehicle drivers are occupations of young people, and their expansion is a sign of the economic evolution of the territory; as for merchants, they are fairly evenly distributed among the various age groups, with small variations between groups.

The small number of skilled workers (353) and industrial workers (329) shows that industrial development is still only beginning. Other occupations involve still smaller numbers, especially farmers (14) and fishermen (148) despite the territory's potential especially as far as fisheries are concerned. Similarly, the number of people working as teachers (139) or in the health sector (119) appears very small compared to the needs in these two fields; it contrasts with the number of chioukh, which number 226.

Men retain a monopoly on occupations, except for herdsmen which include 471 women out of a total of 7,959, i.e. 5.91 percent. The number of people without occupation (the inactive population) is very high per se (43,486) but it





Number of Men by Age Group  
for the 5 Principal Occupations

Key:

- |              |                     |             |
|--------------|---------------------|-------------|
| 1. Herdsmen  | 2. Unskilled worker | 3. Military |
| 4. Merchants | 5. Vehicle drivers  |             |

includes mostly women (30,781) and youths under 15 (10,512). Men over 15 without occupation (the unemployed) number only 2,193; but over two thirds of them (67.16 percent) are in El Aioun (1,247) and Smara (226), although these two towns represent less than half the total population (48.01 percent). Over half of these people (57.18 percent) belong to the three largest tribes: the Reguibat Lgouacem (357), the Reguibat Sahel (560) and the Izarguien (337), which together represent 63.27 percent of the Sahraoui and form most of the population of El Aioun and Smara.

It is possible to discover the preferred occupations of the main tribes by indicating the occupation to which most of them turn. The Reguibat (Lgouacem or Sahel) are the most numerous, in absolute value, in nearly all occupations except among fishermen and vehicle drivers; in the latter occupation, the Izarguien take the lead. The Reguibat Lgouacem are mostly herdsmen (2,069), unskilled workers (2,002), soldiers (379) and vehicle drivers (122). The Reguibat Sahel are mainly herdsmen (2,496), unskilled workers (1,114), soldiers (438), merchants (235) and vehicle drivers (101); the Izarguien, unskilled workers (544), herdsmen (453), merchants (207) and vehicle drivers (146); the Ait Lahcen, unskilled workers (252) and herdsmen (187); the Aro-sien, unskilled workers (234) and herdsmen (219); the Ouled Delim, herdsmen (593), unskilled workers (358) and soldiers (164); the Tidirarin, herdsmen (697) and unskilled workers (343); the Ahl Berikallah, herdsmen (434).

## 5. Level of Education

We should distinguish the problem of children and adults' schooling and that of the level of education of the population as a whole.

### a. The Schooling Problem

For Sahraoui children aged 5 to 14, Table 8 gives the number of schoolchildren by sex and by age group, and the percentage attending school.<sup>2</sup> This corresponds approximately to primary education which in principle lasts from age 6 to age 13. We note that only one fifth (20.37 percent) of the children go to school. That proportion is markedly higher for the 10-14 than for the 5-9 age group, which reveals a trend toward postponed schooling, especially for boys. Nearly one third of the boys (30.51 percent) go to school, versus only one tenth of the girls (9.75 percent). Thus, the rate of schooling of boys is triple that of girls.<sup>3</sup> Curiously enough, the figure given by the census for schoolchildren aged 5 to 14 is markedly lower than the figure given in a UN report on primary education in 1974 (for ages 6 to 13): 6,059 (5,150 boys and 909 girls).<sup>4</sup>

Table 9 gives the number of schoolchildren and students (university level) by sex and by age group, for ages 15 to 29.<sup>5</sup> A little over one tenth of all adolescents (12.99 percent of those 15 to 19) go to school, but they include 9 times as many boys as girls (910 versus 102). Very few pursue their studies after age 20 (365), and they are nearly exclusively men (346).

The census does not provide a breakdown by secondary, higher or vocational studies. In the tables on occupations (pages 78-80 [not included]), it does give the number of "students": 905 (820 boys and 85 girls). But the

Table 8. Schooling of Sahraoui Children 5-14 Years Old

Category	5-9		10-14		Total	Percent
	Years	Percent	Years	Percent		
Children, total	11,814		9,101		20,915	
Schoolchildren, total	1,978	16.74	2,283	25.08	4,261	20.37
Boys	5,981		4,717		10,698	
Schoolboys	1,465	24.49	1,799	38.13	3,264	30.51
Girls	5,833		4,384		10,217	
Schoolgirls	513	8.79	484	11.04	997	9.75

Table 9. Sahraoui Schoolchildren and University-Level Students Aged 15-29

Category	15-19		20-24		25-29		Total
	Years	Percent	Years	Percent	Years	Percent	
All together	7,790		8,434		4,622		20,846
Schoolchildren and students	1,012	12.99	325	3.85	40	0.86	1,377
Boys	4,126		4,325		2,525		10,976
Schoolboys and male students	910	22.05	307	7.09	39	1.54	1,256
Girls	3,664		4,109		2,097		9,870
Schoolgirls and female students	102	2.78	18	0.43	1	0.04	121

Table 10. Level of Education of the Sahraoui Population

Category	Total	Percent	Men	Percent	Women	Percent
Illiterate	41,969	68.57	17,464	54.65	24,505	83.77
Can read and write Arabic	9,150	14.95	6,565	20.54	2,585	8.83
Can read and write Spanish	886	1.44	708	2.21	178	0.60
Can read and write both Arabic and Spanish	7,123	11.63	6,386	19.98	737	2.51
No information	2,074	3.38	828	2.59	1,246	4.25
Total	61,202		31,951		29,251	

"student" category is quite extensive and ill-defined, so that these figures are meaningless. According to the above-mentioned UN report, secondary schools (14-17 age group) had only 111 students in 1974 (108 boys and 3 girls).<sup>6</sup> According to the same source, 75 Sahraoui were studying in Spain, 52 of whom in higher-education institutions.<sup>7</sup> In 1974, there were also 194 students in two vocational training centers, and 450 in an Arabic studies center. It is impossible to compare the census figures with those of the UN report, for they are not based on the same data.

Table 11. Level of Education by Tribe

Tribe	Population Over Age 5	Can Speak and Write:					
		Arabic	Percent	Spanish	Percent	Both	Percent
Reguibat Lgouacem	17,006	2,476	14.55	74	0.43	1,319	7.75
Reguibat Sahel	15,308	2,082	13.60	125	0.81	1,621	10.58
Izarguieu	6,451	696	10.78	142	2.20	1,158	17.95
Ouled Delim	4,534	809	17.84	128	2.82	677	14.93
Tidrarin	4,067	544	13.37	52	1.27	355	8.72
Ait Lahcen	2,888	245	8.48	103	3.56	537	18.59
Arosien	2,295	292	12.72	47	2.04	226	9.84
Ahl Berikallah	1,628	468	28.74	16	0.98	75	5.22
Miscellaneous southern tribes	1,172	278	23.72	14	1.19	154	13.13
Ahl Ma and Ainin	769	207	26.91	18	2.34	150	19.50
Yaggout	639	77	12.05	18	2.81	72	11.26
Ait Moussa	500	84	16.80	10	2.00	123	24.60
Ait Baamran	484	59	12.19	38	7.85	139	28.71
Toubalt	423	119	28.13	13	3.07	75	17.73
Miscellaneous northern tribes	451	44	9.75	27	5.98	97	21.50
Filala	407	98	24.07	3	0.73	80	19.65
Escarna	398	38	9.54	3	0.75	36	9.04
Ouled Bou Sba	344	95	27.61	1	0.29	74	21.51
Trendega	365	276	75.61	0	0	10	2.73
Ouled Bou Aita	270	42	15.55	14	5.18	49	18.14
Foicat	283	29	10.24	6	2.12	36	12.72
Mejjat	230	66	28.69	10	4.34	30	13.04
Menasit	145	13	8.96	3	2.06	9	6.20
Imraguen	145	13	8.96	21	14.48	21	14.48
Total	61,202	9,150	14.95	886	1.44	7,123	11.63

## b. Level of Education of the Population

Table 10 gives the level of elementary education of the Sahraoui population, from age 5. Over two thirds of the population (68.57 percent) are entirely illiterate, the proportion being larger for women than for men (83.77 percent versus 54.65 percent). A little over one fourth of the population (28.03 percent) can read and write Arabic or Spanish or both. Nearly one sixth (14.95 percent) have mastered Arabic, but only a little over one tenth (11.63 percent) know both languages. The proportion of men who have mastered only Arabic is twice that of women (20.54 percent versus 8.83 percent). Above all, about 8 times as many men as women have mastered both Arabic and Spanish (19.98 percent versus 2.51 percent). Very few men, and especially very few women, know only Spanish (respectively 708 and 178).

Table 11 gives the level of elementary education of the Sahraoui population, from age 5, by tribe. Mastery of Arabic only, representing an overall percentage of 14.95 percent, is especially high among the little Tendege tribe (75.61 percent); quite high among the Ahl Berikallah, the Ahl Ma el Ainin, the Toubalt, the Filala, the Ouled Bou Sba and the Mejjat (ranging from 24.07 to 28.74 percent); average among the larger tribes (Reguibat Lgouacem, Reguibat Sahel, Izarguien, Ouled Delim and Tidrarin: ranging from 10.78 to 17.84 percent); and relatively low among the Ait Lahcen (8.48 percent). Knowledge of Spanish alone, which overall is 1.44 percent, is rather high among two smaller tribes, the Imraguen (14.48 percent) and the Ait Baamran (7.85 percent); low among the Reguibat Lgouacem (0.43 percent) and the Reguibat Sahel (0.81 percent) and nil among the Tendege and the Ouled Bou Sba.

Simultaneous knowledge of Arabic and Spanish, accounting for an overall percentage of 11.63 percent, is relatively high among a few smaller tribes (Ahl Ma el Ainin, Ait Moussa, Ait Baamran, Filala and Ouled Bou Sba: ranging from 19.50 to 28.71 percent); it is rather good among the large Tekna tribes (Ait Lahcen, 18.59 percent; Izarguien, 17.95 percent) and among the Ouled Delim (14.93 percent); it is poor among the Reguibat Lgouacem, the Reguibat Sahel, the Tidrarin and the Arosien (ranging from 7.75 to 10.58 percent), and really low among the Ahl Berikallah (5.22 percent) and the Tendege (2.73 percent).

## 6. Residents

As we saw, the census provided a separate category for residents, i.e. individuals of Saharan origin having a resident's card. They are not Sahraoui under the law, but in fact they are very much like them and can be assimilated to them ethnically and sociologically.

There are 857 residents (460 men and 397 women). Over two thirds (582, i.e. 67.91 percent are single), a little over one fourth (227, i.e. 26.48 percent) are married, and the others are widowed (29) or divorced (19). They include 31 haratin [Negro semi-sedentary farmers] (12 men and 19 women). Over half of the residents (468, i.e. 54.60 percent) live in El Aioun. The rest live in or around the other centers: Villa Cisneros (44), Mahbes (41), Tifariti (39), Miyec (34), Smara (33), Tichla (33), La Guera (25), Aoussert (22) and Arghub (18). Of the 235 residents who work, half are herdsmen (120); the others are mostly unskilled laborers (45), merchants (23) or industrial



Table 12. Level of Education of the Residents

<u>Category</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Illiterate	591	80.51	270	69.05	321	93.58
Can read and write Arabic	80	10.89	61	15.60	19	5.53
Can read and write Spanish	2	0.27	2	0.51	0	0
Can read and write both Arabic and Spanish	<u>61</u>	8.31	<u>58</u>	14.83	<u>3</u>	0.87
Total	734		391		343	

workers (16). Of 278 children aged 5 to 14, 43 go to school (32 boys and 11 girls), i.e. 15.46 percent, a percentage lower than for Sahraoui schoolchildren (20.37 percent). There are also 6 "students," all boys.

Table 12 gives the level of primary education of the 734 residents older than 5. Four fifths of them (80.51 percent) are illiterate, a rate markedly higher than that of the Sahraoui (68.57 percent). The rate of illiteracy is higher among women than among men (93.58 percent versus 69.05 percent). When it comes to mastering Arabic, Spanish or both languages, the percentages are markedly lower than for the Sahraoui, and much higher for men than for women.

#### 7. Housing Conditions

As far as housing conditions are concerned, the census distinguishes three zones: the North, the Northeast and the South. It provides detailed information on the type and state or repair of buildings, on the utilities and services provided (water, electricity), and on the owners. Tents and temporary shelters were not included in the census. This information is given in Table 13, which also indicates specific conditions in the three larger towns: El Aioun, Smara and Villa Cisneros.

The total number of housing units can be estimated to exceed 10,000, some buildings accounting for several units. Since the sedentary population numbers about 60,000, there is an average of 6 people per housing unit. Over four fifths (85 percent) of these housing units are in the North zone, and nearly all of these in El Aioun. Two thirds (66 percent) of the multifamily buildings are in the South zone, especially at Villa Cisneros; and one third in the North zone, all of these (except one) at El Aioun; there is only one in the Northeast zone, at Smara. Two thirds (66 percent) of the buildings are in a good state of repair, but one fifth (20 percent) present deficiencies; the latter proportion, which is about that of the North zone, increases to 42 percent in the Northeast zone and drops to 11 percent in the South zone. About 100 buildings are in a poor state of repair, half of which are in the South zone and the other half in Smara.

Over half (56 percent) of the buildings have running water, but this proportion varies a lot from one zone to another: 63 percent in the North (65 percent at El Aioun), 23 percent in the Northeast (35 percent at Smara) and 39 percent in the South (80 percent at Villa Cisneros). Nearly three fourths

Table 13. Housing Conditions

<u>Category</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>North Zone</u>	<u>N.-E. Zone</u>	<u>South Zone</u>	<u>El Aioun</u>	<u>Smara</u>	<u>Villa Cisneros</u>
I. Type of Building							
1. For housing							
- single-home	5,599	4,730	493	376	4,448	273	19
- single-home + professional uses	969	780	93	96	774	86	23
- several homes	521	176	1	344	175	1	229
2. For non-family housing (hotels, residences, barracks, hospitals)	116	52	14	50	48	5	27
3. Not for housing (stores, movie theaters, religious buildings, factories)	<u>722</u>	<u>445</u>	<u>154</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>398</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>57</u>
Total	7,927	6,183	755	989	5,843	467	355
II. State of Repair							
- in ruins	1			1			
- bad	103		48	55		46	7
- deficient	1,656	1,226	318	112	1,169	154	98
- good	5,288	4,267	294	727	4,033	229	231
- no information	879	690	95	94	641	38	19
III. Utilities and services							
1. Running water							
- yes	4,467	3,903	175	398	3,797	163	286
- no	2,663	1,589	564	510	1,405	292	55
- no information	797	691	16	90	641	12	14
2. Waste-water drainage							
- yes	5,108	4,548	142	418	4,442	132	341
- no	1,991	944	598	449	760	324	
- no information	828	691	15	122	641	11	14
3. Electricity							
- yes	5,792	4,686	615	491	4,446	338	341
- no	1,212	760	136	326	700	129	
- no information	923	747	4	172	697		14
IV. Owner's Type							
- government	2,298	1,801	244	253	1,636	57	172
- other organization	738	642	7	89	550	6	63
- European	291	248	12	31	248	12	29
- Muslim	4,086	2,983	492	611	2,900	392	91
- no information	514	509		5	509		

(73 percent) of the buildings have electricity, but this proportion varies from zone to zone: 76 percent in the North (76 percent at El Aioun), 81 percent in the Northeast (72 percent at Smara) and 50 percent in the South (96 percent at Villa Cisneros). A little over half (51.5 percent) of these buildings belong to Muslims (especially in El Aioun and Smara) and a little under 4 percent to Europeans. Close to one third (29 percent) belong to the Spanish government, and 9 percent to other organizations. The proportion of buildings belonging to Muslims is markedly higher in the Northeast (65 percent) and in the South (62 percent) than in the North (48 percent).

#### Conclusion: Significance of the 1974 Census

The census made in West Sahara in 1974 has certain limitations and probably includes some errors. The census may well not have covered the entire Sahraoui population and, in particular, it did not cover the Sahraoui refuged in neighboring countries. The information provided concerning age, level of education, place of residence and the number of children are not always accurate, either due to ignorance, or due to a lack of candor. Some categories are ill-defined, like "students," or cleverly designated, like the haratin. There are also material errors, in particular wrong additions (e.g. page 53).

Yet, in spite of its defects and deficiencies, which remain minor, this census has an undeniable value and provides a satisfactory basis to know the territory's population in 1974. It offers a dual, historical and sociological, interest because it makes it possible to carry out a serious sociological study of the Sahraoui people at an important point in its history, when it was to choose its fate freely through a referendum. As we know, this did not happen since Spain decided not to organize this consultation and, in November 1975, yielded to the claims of Morocco and Mauritania.

Certainly, in recent years, there has been renewed talk about a referendum in the territory: at its Nairobi and Addis Ababa summits, in June 1981 and June 1983 respectively, the Organization for African Unity clearly declared itself in favor of this method to solve the Saharan conflict. Obviously, however, demographic conditions have changed a lot since 1974 since, following the annexation of the territory by Morocco and Mauritania, a large part of the Sahraoui population fled to camps in Algeria while many Moroccans came and established themselves in West Sahara (at least in part of it, the "useful triangle"). In any case, therefore, a referendum could be considered only after a new census of the Sahraoui population living in the territory or refuged abroad. In both cases, this would be a difficult operation which could not be successfully carried out without total loyalty, which would presuppose a sincere agreement among the parties involved and international control by an impartial organization appointed by the OAU or the United Nations.

Obviously, demographic conditions have changed a lot since 1974 due to shifts in population, the war (during which people were killed or made prisoner) and also due to natural events (births, deaths). However, the 1974 census constitutes a good point of reference, which may be very useful if a new census is organized: on the one hand, it will prevent the parties from making

false or exaggerated estimates, which does not mean that they cannot take into account any changes that occurred; on the other hand, it may make it possible to measure accurately the demographic and sociological evolution of the Sahraoui people since 1974. Thus, it is not just of historical interest in learning about the past, but it can also be useful again in the future.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. For each town or village, the number in parentheses is the total population including residents and aliens, except when there are none.
2. We did not include the 0-4 age group represented by only 75 schoolchildren (46 boys and 29 girls) out of 12,295 children, so as not to distort percentages artificially. In the tables on occupations (Censo 1974, pp 78-80), the census gives markedly higher figures for Sahraoui schoolchildren: 4,822 (3,754 boys and 1,068 girls). But these figures include schoolchildren under 5 (73) and over 14 (621), which accounts for the discrepancies with the schooling table (page 100) which lumps schoolchildren and "students" together.
3. The graph on page 95 of Censo 1974, according to which there would be little difference between boys and girls as far as schooling is concerned, seems wrong, as well as the figures it gives.
4. See "Rapport de la Mission de visite des Nations unies au Sahara espagnol en 1975" [Report on the UN Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara in 1975], A/10023/Rev. 1, Vol. III, Ch. XIII, page 60.
5. We did not include the 14 schoolchildren or students over 30 years old.
6. See "Rapport de la Mission de visite des Nations unies," op. cit. page 60.
7. Ibid. page 61.

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CSO: 4519/158

BAHRAIN

COMMERCIAL BANK ACTIVITY FOR 1984 REVIEWED

Manama AL-BAHRAYN in Arabic 8, 15 May 85

[8 May 85 pp 26-27]

[Text] When our local economy entered its new stage after the oil price rise of 1973, the state spending programs began to serve as a thermometer for the level of growth and development of the activities of the various types of economic organizations, the foremost being the commercial banks. Since that time the banks have been in a state of continuous interaction with the goals and aims of these programs.

It is true that this interaction has not occurred as a result of "comprehensive prior planning" of the role of these organizations in the national economy. Rather, the laws of the marketplace--and these are the laws that govern the movement of the economy as a whole--have been responsible for regulating this interaction.

There is much evidence that confirms this assumption.

For example, the following confirms the interplay between the growth of the commercial banks and the rates of growth of government spending programs: In 1976 the total assets of the commercial banks rose by 55 percent. This large increase came wholly as a result of the impact of the growth in government investment expenditures, which saw an increase of 109 percent over 1975. In 1979 these assets registered a growth rate of only 3.1 percent when government expenditures fell 12 percent under the rate for 1978. Moreover, local capital was directed abroad in the wake of the rise in worldwide interest rates. In 1980 the growth rate for bank assets was 21 percent after the price of oil jumped again in 1979 causing government spending to increase by nearly 24 percent and oil revenues to increase by 50 percent. During the past 2 years, however, the commercial banks have recorded lower growth rates in light of the worldwide economic situation, the oil market crisis, and the decline of oil revenues for the states of the region.

However, if we examine the liabilities of the commercial banks as an indicator of the interaction existing between the growth of these banks and the growth of the economy, we need only take a quick glance at the primary source of financing for these banks, deposits in the private sector. It is noted that



these rose in general and in specific cases. Overall, total deposits rose from 129 million Bahraini dinars in 1974 to 650 million dinars in 1984, or a nearly six-fold increase during the past decade. This means that deposits registered an annual growth rate of about 60 percent over the past 10 years. Undoubtedly the growth rate of private sector deposits--and this is the sector that invests nearly all of its money locally--was caused by the increase in economic activity in all branches and parts of the private sector.

If we return to the assets of the commercial banks and deal with the banks' primary source of investment, and by this we mean loans and credits offered to the private sector, we find even greater confirmation of the kind of interaction existing between the growth of the commercial banks and the growth of government spending in particular and the economy in general. This growth is governed and partly regulated by the laws of the marketplace.

In pointing out this relationship, a report by the Bahrain Monetary Agency in the magazine AL-NAQD says, "Indicators of the sectoral distribution of loans reveal the presence of fundamental differences in the directions of commercial bank credit portfolios. This is attributable to the investment policy pursued by the commercial banks, which is aimed at profits and quick returns regardless of any other factor."

A rising demand for real estate and housing was predominant after the way was cleared for the establishment of foreign banking units, the flow of hundreds of foreign bankers to manage these units, and the simultaneous growth of other financial institutions when the government began to implement numerous housing projects. Faced with this demand the commercial banks stepped forward to play the primary financing role in satisfying the demand. Loans offered to the construction sector doubled in only 3 or 4 years, and this sector occupied the top rank in terms of credit offered to the private sector during the past 10 years. Its share of these loans hovered around a third of all credit offered.

The credit offered to this sector reached a saturation point in 1980 and after that year it began to decline. We note that the commercial banks began to move with the laws of the marketplace to fulfill another demand that began to increase gradually. This was a demand for personal loans, which were sought primarily to finance the activities of individuals in the area of speculation and transactions in financial instruments. This was the activity that characterized the first years of the 1980s and reached its peak in 1982 when the share of personal loans hit 21.3 percent of all loans, compared with 8 percent in 1976. However, during the past 2 years there has been an increase in the industrial sector's share of loans to 15.1 percent, compared with 9 percent in 1981. It is well known that this sector experienced an improvement and greater attention after the establishment of a number of huge joint industrial projects and the interest shown in setting up integrated national industries. Moreover, a number of other industrial projects were undertaken, such as the furniture factory owned by the Light Industries Company, etc.

The conclusion that we would like to make is that the status of the commercial banks is dependent on the status of the economy as a whole. Based on this conclusion, when we try to shed light on what the commercial banks achieved during 1984, we must not separate this achievement from the composite

achievements of national economic activity. At the same time, this realization will prepare us to understand the behavior of the commercial banks during 1984 and the coming years.

#### Sources of Financing...Redistribution in Interest of Long-term Planing?

In the area of sources of financing for commercial banks we must point out that the decision taken by the Bahrain Monetary Agency to consider the deposits of quasi-governmental organizations as government deposits rather than private sector deposits has certainly introduced some murkiness concerning the actual growth of private sector deposits in commercial banks for 1984.

These deposits registered a total decline of 20 million dinars from the 1983 figure, while it is noted that government deposits increased from 114 million dinars in 1983 to 240 million dinars in 1984.

This superficial change has affected local liquidity. Nonetheless, even if we assume that there has been growth in the private sector deposits column, it will not have been at the usual rates.

This is not based only on the current levels of economic activity. There are a number of other reasons for this, such as the flow of a portion of private money abroad for some months now in light of the rise in worldwide interest rates.

In addition to this, competition has stiffened in the commercial banking market, particularly since last year witnessed the opening of a new bank, the Saudi-Bahraini Bank.

Regarding the commercial banks, the increase in government sector deposits means a compounded decline in credit since these deposits are always subject to withdrawal.

Foreign liabilities also witnessed a substantial decrease amounting to 45 million dinars below the 1983 figure.

In the past these liabilities played an important role on a number of levels. First, foreign deposits increased when the commercial banks began to play a noticeable role in the offshore banking unit market with their own offshore banking units. In addition, they increased as a result of international financing activities which presented to the local commercial banks the opportunity to participate with other international commercial banks. The commercial banks also sometimes conducted banking activities with foreign assets.

In light of the decline in the rate of economic activity locally, regionally and internationally, foreign deposits have fallen by 45 million dinars, eliminating a part of the indebtedness of these banks to their foreign creditors.

Although capital and reserves witnessed a decline from 137.6 million dinars in 1983 to 131 million dinars in 1984, this does not demonstrate the fact of the cautious behavior that the commercial banks practiced this year in regard to the distribution of pure profits. A number of these banks converted significant amounts of their profit (e.g. the Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait, the National Bank of Bahrain and the al-Ahli Commercial Bank) into reserves allocated to cover loans of questionable collectibility.

This behavior is clear in an additional area, the area of other liabilities, which rose by 32 million dinars, totaling 76 million dinars in 1984. We believe that these include bank reserves that are not normally placed with general reserves or the legally required reserves, such as those required for questionable loans.

This cautious behavior also encompassed the distribution of profits this year. The largest national bank, the Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait, reduced its distribution to only 20 percent of profits in 1984 compared with 35 percent in 1983.

This behavior is not a result of the worldwide economic situation and the debt crisis of some of the countries of the world, countries to whom some of the national banks have provided loans. Rather, this is because these banks also have participated in financing the speculation and dealings of some individuals in stocks and other financial instruments. Some of these individuals were involved in speculation in the Kuwaiti Suq al-Manakh in one way or another.

Up to this point we have presented the changes that have occurred concerning sources of financing for the commercial banks during 1984. In the next part of the series we will complete this presentation by focusing on the areas of the investments of the commercial banks and the uses of financing obtained from the banks. Then we will present our general ideas concerning the trends that have affected the progress of the commercial banks during the past year and the tasks on the horizon that the banks will face during the coming period.

[15 May 85 pp 22-23]

[Text] In this part of the series we continue our discussion of the accomplishments of the commercial banks during 1984. We will deal here first with aspects of the uses to which the commercial banks' loans are put and the role of the Bahraini banks in particular in this field and the results that they have achieved. Then we will deal with the developments and tasks on the horizon for the commercial banks and the role that the Bahrain Monetary Agency will play in assisting the commercial banks to achieve their goals.

#### 1984--Commercial Banks Focus on Industrial Loans

The profitable assets that the commercial banks maintain still fall into two primary categories: loans and credits offered to local sectors of the economy and foreign assets.

The amount of loans offered by the commercial banks to the various branches of the national economy totaled 728 million dinars in December 1984. This amount represents more than half of the total assets of the commercial banks. It also represents an increase of 15 percent over 1983. This increase is twice as big as the increase in overall assets for the same year. Perhaps this is attributable to the fact that a transfer of resources of the commercial banks took place at a rate that was 100 percent higher than the total increase in assets for 1984. By analyzing these transfers, it is noted that the commercial banks converted a portion of their foreign assets to finance their lending to the various sectors of the economy as well as using deposits for this purpose. It is also worth noting that last year some new schedules were put into use for the categorization of commercial bank deposits, with the deposits of quasi-official organizations being included in the same category as government deposits, a development which affected our ability to discern clearly the actual growth in private sector deposits.

Returning to the distribution of credit offered by the banks according to economic sector, it is especially noteworthy that the industrial sector obtained the lion's share of credit offered in 1984. The share of the industrial sector was 61 million dinars, or 9.7 percent of the total in 1983, and this rose to 109.6 million dinars, or 15.1 percent of total credit offered in 1984, or nearly double the 1983 amount. Moreover, the increase (48.5 million dinars) represents 50 percent of the total increase in the amount of credit offered in 1984.

After industrial loans, personal loans occupy the second rank of loans offered in 1984. The value of these loans increased from 128 million dinars to 150 million dinars, which reflects the continued inclination of individuals to obtain this type of financing to improve their standard of living and meet their residential, commercial and consumption needs. After this comes the transportation and communications sector, where loans offered by the banks amounted to 20.9 million dinars after having been only 12 million dinars in 1983.

Concerning the traditional sectors of the economy, construction and business in particular, although these maintained the value of credit offered (in construction there was a marginal decline), nonetheless, the percentage of this type of credit declined tangibly. Regarding construction, its share of the credit market declined from 31.2 percent in 1983 to 26.4 percent in 1984. The business sector's share declined from 27.6 percent in 1983 to 24.4 percent in 1984.

Perhaps this reflects the levels of activity in these two sectors during the past 2 years in particular.

#### Decline of Commercial Bank Activity in Foreign Markets

As for foreign assets, although the value of Bahraini dinars invested in foreign assets is still large and occupies the second rank in terms of important assets after credits and loans for the commercial banks (their foreign assets amounted to 435.8 million dinars in 1983), nonetheless, 1984 witnessed a decline in the activity of commercial banks in foreign markets,



whether directly in the financial markets and foreign currency markets or through the offshore markets in Bahrain. The financial establishments began to take a cautious position toward the volatile developments in the price of the dollar and other foreign currencies. This, combined with the situation in the oil markets, the debt crisis, the policies of reducing government expenditures in the region, the shrinking labor opportunities in the region and the slow growth in the economies of the industrialized nations led the commercial banks in Bahrain to effect a reduction in their foreign assets from 470 million dinars to 436 million dinars and to use the difference in other activities, including the elimination of a portion of foreign liabilities, which, for their part, declined from 150 million dinars in 1983 to 105 million dinars in 1984.

It is noteworthy that the foreign assets of the commercial banks are represented by deposits in other banks--an activity that grew especially after the establishment of the offshore market in Bahrain--by deposits of the branches of foreign banks with their headquarters offices and by international loans to both regional and international borrowers, loans in which local banks participate.

#### National Banks Achieve Good Profits in 1984

It is worth noting that the commercial banks, despite the prevailing economic circumstances, earned satisfactory profits in 1984. This becomes clear when we look at the results of the three major national banks, the Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait, the National Bank of Bahrain and the al-Ahli Commercial Bank. Although some of them reduced the percentage of profits that they distributed to shareholders, it is believed that this was done to allocate larger sums to reserves, particularly to deal with loans whose collection was questionable.

#### National Banks Have Lion's Share of Market

Despite the unavailability of statistics for 1984 concerning the share of national commercial banks of total bank assets, the numbers for 1983 indicate that the share of the national banks (the National Bank of Bahrain, the Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait, the al-Ahli Commercial Bank and the Bahrain Islamic Bank) amounted to 62.1 percent of the total for all commercial banks, compared with a share of only 38.8 percent in 1978. Moreover, their share of deposits from other commercial banks rose from 42 percent in 1977 to 61.6 percent in 1983. In terms of loans and credit arrangements offered, the share of the national banks rose from 45.9 percent of the total in 1977 to 62.6 percent in 1983.

While we know that there is a balance between the size of the assets of the national banks and the loans they offer on the one hand and their share of deposits on the other hand, their share of total pure annual profits of all banks (with the exception of the Islamic banks) is tipped in their favor. This share amounted to 23 million dinars, and this represented 80 percent of the total profits for the commercial banks in 1983. This reflects the successful efforts of the national banks in the field of marketing, in reducing operating costs and in achieving higher returns on investment assets.



## Commercial Banks..Horizons for Development

What the commercial banks and especially the national banks in Bahrain have resorted to in 1984 is the same thing that the majority of commercial banks in the world have resorted to. They have reduced their international activities in order to focus on the local economy more extensively.

Here we want to record the noticeable growth in credit that the commercial banks have offered to the various parts of the national economy, in particular to the industrial sector. This reflects a course that contributes directly to the efforts to diversify the sources of national income. At the same time, we would like to stress the following tasks that the commercial banks and particularly the national ones must undertake.

--The banks must move toward directing an important part of commercial bank resources toward productive economic activities in industry and agriculture, and in return reduce the size of what is offered to the real estate and business sectors. This would contribute to satisfying the large need of these former sectors for financing and expansion and would lessen the impact of inflation and speculation and the phenomenon of the deliberate squandering of money in dealings in secondary sectors.

--The banks must encourage the private sector to build strong industries and industries with the economic benefits of export or replacing imports. Moreover, they should encourage the private sector to experiment in new fields and particularly in industrial production in those areas that would integrate with the primary industries in Bahrain.

--The banks must work with the private sector in discovering and specifying the financing needs of the national economy, particularly in productive fields. This requires strengthening their technical and advisory capabilities, improving investment and project financing services, managing investment portfolios and improving various advanced and diversified customer services.

The conclusion is that the commercial banks need to overcome the conventional demands for financing and participate in creating demands for financing that are characterized by diversification, profitability and direct linkage with the efforts to strengthen the productive economy and lessen the inclination to consume and squander. These new demands will have strategic ramifications in the growth of the economy.

In addition, the monetary authorities and the Bahrain Monetary Agency can play a large role in pushing the commercial banks to make long term decisions in the interest of the national economy. This can be done through the use of monetary policy tools available to the agency either directly or indirectly. In addition, it can regulate the banking sector and take steps that prevent speculation. An example of this happened recently when the agency issued a resolution limiting the proportion of loans that can be offered to members of the managing board of the bank or to an investment company. Moreover, measures can be taken that encourage and prompt the commercial banks to employ Bahraini nationals, improve local management skills and eliminate the sizable foreign workforce.

IRAQ

## STUDENTS SIT FOR FINAL EXAMINATION

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 11 May 85 p 2

[Text]

Some 3,035,661 students from different parts of the country will, on May 25, sit for the first attempt of the final examination of the primary, intermediate and secondary schools, an official source at the Ministry of Education told Iraqi News Agency.

The source said that the number of male students to sit for the examination is 1,707,784 and the number of the female students is 1,327,877.

The official source added that the sixth year students of primary schools who would sit for the exams next Wednesday are 2,352,067 including 1,275,367 boys and 1,076,700 girls.

The official source put the number of intermediate school students who will take their examination on May 25, at 534,635 including 339,365 boys.

As for the students of the scientific and literary branches of the secondary

schools, who will also sit for the final examinations on 25 May, the figure put by the source is 148,959 students including 93,052 male students and 55,907 female students. The number of scientific branch students is 51,871 while of literary branch students is 22,614.

The official source said that reports have shown that the academic performance of scientific students for this year is much better than those of previous ones. This progress, the source said, is attributable to the stupendous efforts of the ministry in providing all schooling requirements and also to the patronage given by the political leadership in particular President Saddam Hussein to the educational sector.

He also said that rapid progress has been made by the Education Ministry in introducing the most recent methods of teaching in Iraqi schools so as to keep pace

with all the developments in education.

The source said that the ministry following up the academic achievements of students by improving the types of tests. Subcommittees in each education directorate have been formed to analyse those tests to overcome any shortcoming.

The official source concluded by saying that the education Ministry had carried out a number of researches and studies to stop the bad performance of students in English and mathematics subjects and to analyse the effect of vacant lessons on the results of the baccalariat examination for intermediate and secondary schools.

IRAQ

## KARKH WATER PROJECT FIRST PHASE COMPLETE

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 15 May 85 p 2

[Text]

**The first phase of the experimental operation of Karkh Water Project, with a total capacity of 1.35 million cubic metres, has been completed, Director General of Water Establishment, Mr Adnan Jabir said.**

He said that the capacity of the project's first phase, which will start production during the July celebrations, is 450 thousand cubic metres per day. The residents of the areas of Kadhimiya, Shula, Hurriya, Khadhra, Aamel, Bayya, Ridhwaniya and Abu Ghraib will benefit from this project, he said.

Dr. Jabro also added that the project's capacity would be doubled with the operation of the second phase in 1987 to meet the need of all residential areas in Karkh till the year 2000.

The Director General said that the project would supply some residential areas in Risafa by using water pipes across the Tigris river. He said that work would be completed in May 1986 to

supply the areas of Fahhama, Boob al-Sham, Sha'ab, Ur, Burok, Sumer, and Saddam city and additional quantities would be pumped to the areas of al-Rasheed, Jumhuriya, Battawiyen and Bab al-Sharqi.

Karkh Water Project, which is implemented at a cost of ID 400 million, is one of the largest projects in the world in terms of capacity. The project has the longest pumping line. It has a diameter of 2.30 metres and is made of stainless ductile pipes which cannot be affected by weather conditions.

The project is a complete system in terms of purification, pumping and storing water. Unlike other projects, it can purify water of the Tigris river whatever dirty it is.

The project includes 14 pumping stations, eight primary refining basins in each operational stage in addition to a number of secondary refining basins

and a number of filters.

Moreover, the project includes purification centre, primary and secondary water drawing stations, sterilization tank, pumping and chemical treatment stations in addition to 80 kilometres-long two lines of pipes with diameters of 2.30 metres and 2.10 metres. The project also includes ground tanks with a total capacity of 450 thousand cubic equipped with pumping stations controlled by a computer as well as a net work of water supply pipes made of ductile at a length of 200 kilometres.

IRAQ

PTT TO COMPLETE 50,000 LINES BY END OF 1985

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 25 May 85 p 2

[Article by Nahida R. Ramla]

[Text]

By the end of 1985, six new electronic telephone exchanges with a total capacity of 50,000 lines will be in operation. The total capacity of these exchanges could expand to 60,000 lines, distributed all over the country.

Engineers from the State Organization of Post, Telephones and Telegrams (PTT) will complete a ground network with a total capacity of 222,250 lines to link the various telephone exchanges in Iraq.

Under the new plan, Najaf and Babylon electronic telephone exchanges each with total capacity of 10,000 lines, will be put into operation by the end of this year. This is in addition to Mahmoudiya, Abi Ghreib, Ghazaliya and Juneina exchanges.

The first quarter of the year saw remarkable development in the quality and the quantity telephone services. As the new exchanges, with their new equipment, have been introduced to improve communications be-

tween provinces and also between Iraq and world.

For the first time in Iraq, the latest technology of electronic postal system and the laser communication lines have been introduced. The old telephone exchange in Baghdad and some of the provinces have been replaced by new highly advanced ones. This is in addition to operating nine electronic telephone and postal exchanges with a total capacity of 79,000 lines.

In Baghdad, two new electronic telephone exchanges have been opened in Al-Fida' town and Al-Khansa' in Khamaliya area. The first has a capacity of 20,000 telephone lines that could be expanded to 40,000 lines linked with modern ground network with a total capacity of 52,600 lines.

In Nineveh province, Tele'far and Abi Tamam electronic exchanges each with a capacity of 10,000 lines are in use both being linked to a microwave sys-

tem, a central cable and a communication centre.

With regard to other provinces, Kirkuk electronic exchange and postal system has been opened with a capacity of 11,000 lines extendable to 30,000 lines. In Babylon, province Mseyiab and Iskindiriya electronic exchanges have a capacity of 10,000 lines linked to modern ground networks. They are also linked with the national communication, microwave and central cable.

In Muthanna province, Samawa electronic exchange has been opened with a capacity of 10,000 lines but could be expanded to 30,000 lines.

A number of telephone exchanges have been developed and improved by introducing the electronic post system and sophisticated equipment. Among these exchanges are Kadhi-miya exchange with a capacity of 24,000, al Ma'moun exchange with a capacity of

32,000 lines and the new Baghdad's exchange with a capacity of 27,000 lines. Also opened recently is a new post and telephone exchange in Karkh, part of Baghdad for national and international communications.

The digital electronic exchanges are the most recent ones. They have many different functions, even checking telephones automatically.

The project of northern integration into the central cable has been recently started at a total cost of ID 25,000. It provides telephone and telegram communication between the northern provinces in addition to television and radio broadcasting for Sulaimaniya, Ta'mim, Arbil Nineveh and Dohouk provinces with a total capacity of 2,400 telephone lines extendable to 30,000 lines in addition to two television channels and six radio channels.

On the level of Arab cooperation, the Baghdad -Amman microwave project was opened last March. Initially it provide 120 channels for telephone and telex services. It will also enable the exchange of TV and cultural programmes between Iraq and Jordan, and could be extended to 960 channels.

CSO: 4400/199



IRAQ

## SADDAM DAM UPS GRAIN YIELD

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 12 Jun 85 p 4

[Article by Cleala Khoshaba]

[Text]

Saddam Dam (Ninveveh province) to which the Tigris River was diverted in 1984 will help change the rain-fed area in al-Jizeera into a flow-irrigated one. This added irrigation system, is expected to bring closer the target of self-sufficiency of agricultural products.

When completed, Saddam Dam should bring irrigation water to more than two million donums of fertile land of al-Jizeera, north-west of Iraq.

The Dam is 3,600 m long and 100 m high. It forms a lake "Saddam Lake" which has an area of 450 sq. km. It is second to Al-Tharthar lake, the biggest man made lake in Iraq. Saddam Lake is to be the main source of water for al-Jizeera Irrigation Project.

The water provided by the lake will be used for three areas: the Northern, Southern and Eastern Jizeera lands.

Work recently started in the Northern Jizeera area by the Chinese National Company for Construction Works. And feasibility studies are at the final stage to start work on the other two areas, the Eastern and Southern Jizeera.

The Northern Jizeera farming area is 80 km. north-east of the city of Mosul, in Rebee's sub-district. The land in this area is a plateau through which El-Murr Valley, a natural drain, passes. Wheat and barley are

grown in the rain-fed land of the Northern Jizeera Land. The land is remarkably good for growing these two crops. Therefore, it has been decided to utilize 50 per cent of the land to grow grain crops in this traditionally rain-fed land. Animal production is also expected to be good. The project will consequently help achieve a more stable life for farmers, and in turn keep farmers on the land.

The total area to be irrigated is 240,000 donums. Water will be pumped up to the land by a pumping station of a 34 cubic metres/second, capacity. The contract to build the station was signed on March 18, by the representative of the Chinese National Company for Construction Works, Mr Su and on the Iraqi side by Mr Abdul Wahab Mahmoud, Minister of Irrigation in the presence of Mr Rao Cheng, the Chinese Minister of Urban and Rural Construction and the Chinese Ambassador to Iraq.

The area has a 58 km. long lined canal and a parallel canal 50 km. long in addition to lined sub canals with a total length of 420 km.

The aim of the Southern al-Jizeera irrigation Project, 70 km. West of Mosul city, is to turn a rain-fed area of 500,000 donums, to flow-irrigated wheat and barley area.

The Eastern Jizeera Irrigation Project, the third project, extends through Mosul, El-Sheikhan and El-Hamdaniya districts. It starts from Khursabad, north of Mosul city,

towards the southeast through the village of Baritli, Karamanlis and Qaraqosh. An area of 250,000 donums is to be turned into flow-fed land. Its nearness to the city of Mosul will make transport and marketing of crops easier. Also farmers here will lead a more stable life than elsewhere, which in turn will help them acquire some sort of good experience in their work. The stable life they are expected to have will make them more adaptable to change as a result of the Project. In the light of these advantages, a big yield is expected.

Among modern techniques used in the Al-Jizeera Irrigation Project is that of drip-irrigation. Experience has proved that this form of irrigation is suitable for areas where rains meet only part of crops' need for water.

This way of irrigation is ideal of watering crops like wheat and barley, if modern machinery and agricultural techniques are employed, high yields are assured. An area of 400 donums can be irrigated by one shrinkler for example.

The drip irrigation system needs little energy and drainage is considered unnecessary.

There is a constant cooperation with the University of Mosul as the change of the area into an irrigated one would involve a change in ways of planting crops and choice of variety.

A socio-economic study is undertaken by the Ministry of Irrigation covering anticipated change of the nomad people in the area and the requisites of preparing them for new socio-economic patterns of life.

**Translated from Arabic**

CSO: 4400/199

IRAQ

## RECORD WHEAT, BARLEY CROPS FORECAST

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 27 Jun 85 p 4

[Article by A. Kadhim Hashim]

[Text]

Comprehensive wheat and barley harvest operations are transforming the country side in many Iraqi provinces. In Meisan province, Director of the Agriculture and Agrarian Reform State Commission said work is going on to harvest wheat and barley over a total area of 208,000 donums. He also said the crops now being marketed at the marketing centres in various areas of the province are expected to total 20,000 tons at the end of the harvest season; an increase of 50 per cent over last year.

The Director added that special committees had been former to supervise the marketing operations and to provide various services for farmers such as transport and bagging-up crops. Meanwhile, preparations are going on to plant an area of 23,000 donums in Meisan Province with rice.

Besides seeds available with farmers for sowing some 140 tons of "amber" rice seeds were set aside for planting. The campaign to harvest wheat and barley in Wasit province, for which 177 combine harvestors have been employed, is about to finish. It covers an area of 588,177 donums.

The Director of the agricultural State Commission in the Province, said seven marketing centres distri-

buted among the districts and sub-districts now receive the crops direct from farmers all through the day. Encouraging facilities were rendered to the farmers including price fixing, transport and bagging, he said.

Wasit's wheat and barley planted areas are 408,750 donums under the supervision of the Commission in Wasit and 124,427 donums in Dalmaj Project.

In Nineveh Province Mr Anwar Saeed Al-Hadithi, Mayor and head of the Agricultural Council in the province, supervised the campaign to harvest wheat and barley grown over an area of five million donums.

Speaking about the campaign the Mayor said the season was good and a record harvest was expected,

thanks to the season's rainfall rate and the commendable effort by agricultural departments and farmers and large-scale employment of modern agriculture techniques. He said that 1,800 harvestors were in the fields.

Mr Al-Hadithi said the harvest operation covered more than 1.5 donums of barley and 250,000 donums of wheat. The eight marketing centres in various areas of the province received up to early June about 37,100 tons of barley and 3,106 tons of wheat. The campaign however would continue till the end of the first week of July.

In Arbil Province, committees were formed to follow up the harvest campaign. Ibrahim Mohammad Hassan, the Mayor of Arbil said a high committee was formed in Arbil, Makhmour, Kwaisanjak, Hareer, Defaka and Khiat to supervise marketing and provide farmers with required facilities. Harvest is expected to reach more than 60,000 tons of wheat and 30,000 tons of barley.

In Qadissiya province, the local Federation of Farmers Cooperatives met to discuss the wheat and barley harvest and marketing arrangements. Also measures were taken to grow rice in areas of Shenafiya, Ghammas, Salatiya and Mahannawiya. 185 harvesters were assigned to harvest the fields which cover a total area of 335,486 donums.

A good harvest is anticipated in the province Up to 9 June. 25,770 tons of wheat and barley were sent to the marketing centres and the seeds treatment factory in the areas of Bedeive, Afaq, Hamza, Shenafiya, Sumer, Ghammas and Shamiya.

In Sulaimaniya Province, a wheat and barley harvest campaign is in progress. An area of 1,027,705 donums is being covered. Six marketing centres in various areas of the province started receiving the grains from farmers under supervision of a central committee.

In the southern province of Dhiqar, the local federation cooperatives organized 55 voluntary work drives to harvest wheat and barley in Shatra, Rifaei, and Suq al-Shiyoukh. 847 tons of wheat and 7,569 tons of barley were sent to marketing centres in the cities of Nassiriya, Shatra, Dawaya and Rifaei.

CSO: 4400/199

IRAQ

## RAILWAY AUTHORITY COMPLETES 35-KM LINE

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 6 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by Akram Dhanoun]

[Text]

**The railway authority completed building the third and fourth phases of the arch railway line connecting Mus-sayab, Kerbala, Najaf and Samawa. The project will be inaugurated on Sunday, to mark the 17 July Revolution celebrations.**

Mr Ra'ad Al-Umari, the authority's Technical Secretary General told the Baghdad Observer correspondent that the 35 kilometre long line starts from Al-Hachama station, situated on the Baghdad-Basra line and ends at an area on the same line to the south of Samawa city.

The main line has several branches leading to the ce-

ment factory and the grain silo in Samawa. It also includes a crossing station near Al-Attshan river in addition to 11 bridges and a new railway station in Samawa.

This modern station is the best and most modern one of its kind in Iraq. It is well-designed and equipped with all modern facilities. Technically speaking, it is one of the most advanced stations in the world. This station will replace the old railway station of Samawa.

Mr Al-Umari said that 460 residential units, situated between Samawa and the crossing station, were also completed as part of the project.

Another residential complex of 350 units was carried out in Samawa for the projects'


staff. Moreover a complex of factories and maintenance and repair workshops was implemented to enable the State Organization of Railways to carry out maintenance.

Mr Al-Umari added that the project had many advantages. It will allow for the possible growth of Samawa city. Moreover, two old and unsafe bridges, which were hindering the Baghdad-Basra line were replaced by two new bridges.

He said that carrying out the third and fourth phases would give green light to start operating the project's first and second phases. The first stage will connect Najaf,

Kerbala and Mussayab, while the Second stage will connect Samawa with Najaf.





CSO: 4400/199

ISRAEL

UN BUILDING POSITIONS ALONG BORDER WITH SYRIA

TA191334 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Jul 85 p 3

[Report by correspondent in the north Menahem Horowitz]

[Text] The United Nations has begun investing large sums of money in the construction of military positions for the UNDOF [UN Disengagement Observer Force] troops on the Golan Heights, along the Israeli-Syrian border.

Large quantities of equipment have been arriving on the Golan Heights and positions are being built as a buffer between the area controlled by Israel and that controlled by the Syrians. The IDF's liaison officer to the United Nations, Lieutenant Colonel Alex Schneider, yesterday noted that both Israel and Syria appreciate UNDOF for helping to ease tensions and solve problems. Israel helps the UN observers on the Golan Heights with communications services and by erecting lookout positions. Israel also allows free passage between Israel and Syria to enable UN personnel to travel from one country to the other.

CSO: 4400/205

ISRAEL

CALL TO RENEW TIES WITH THE USSR

Tel Aviv KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew 12 Jun 85 p 44

[Text] Ronald Reagan is not the only one who cannot afford to ignore the changing of the guard in the Soviet Union. Israel, too, cannot afford to do so.

It is superfluous to repeat the argument, which is probably correct, that there is no chance for peace in the region without the participation of the USSR. It is just as obvious that without the global agreements, which the Soviets now want, they will be less flexible when it comes to a limited cooperation on Middle Eastern matters.

The problem is that in the past there were two obstinate parties -- Israel and the USSR. Now there is a third: Ronald Reagan. Of the three, Israel should show the initiative by trying to arrange a Peres-Gorbachev meeting.

True, it is the Soviet Union which broke relations with Israel, not the opposite. It is also true that there is a lot of bitterness in Israel vis a vis. the USSR, resulting from treatment of Jews there. It is also true that at different periods the lack of relations between the two countries was rather convenient for Israel, inasmuch as it opened up other options.

But today things are not as convenient as they used to be. For a long time Israel acted in a Middle East void of a Russian presence as if there were no Soviet Union. But this was just an illusion. A superpower like the USSR must be present in the Middle East, and it must be so according to their ways and means.

Since many Israelis visited the USSR during the no relations period, in various delegations and meetings, a modified Israeli initiative, today, may turn out to be quite welcome. It could certainly arouse some interest. It may even be the case that the Russians have been waiting, perhaps for a long time, for just such an initiative.

The completion of the withdrawal from Lebanon and the status quo with the Syrians at the present lines could constitute good timing for this kind of an initiative.

How exactly this can be accomplished is a matter of technique. But technique is an outcome of content and approach. Therefore, content and approach should dictate the technique.

The publicity given by TASS to the telegram sent by Israel's president to Gorbachev on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, proves that similar initiatives may end up with positive results.

The problem is that the current Israeli foreign minister is not the right person for this sort of initiative. It is very doubtful that he either wants it or believes in it. Thus the finger points to Shimon Peres. In his position, both in Israel and internationally, he can very well afford to voice interest in renewing the dialogue between the two countries, and even in resuming relations.

Without ignoring the drawbacks that resumption of relations with the Soviet Union -- and the rest of the Eastern Bloc -- may entail, the advantages cannot be overstressed. And they are numerous: political, military, cultural and Jewish-oriented. Resuming relations with the USSR may facilitate emigration of Jews from there to Israel.

This initiative -- and perhaps a series of them -- should be undertaken, without fear of losing face. The initiative, or initiatives, should be undertaken in a sophisticated and consistent manner, while waiting for any reaction, direct or otherwise. Even if there is no immediate response, these initiatives are good investment for the future. One may even say, for the not so distant future.

The whole world hopes, although with understandable caution, that the change of guard in the Soviet Union will contribute to normalization of inter-bloc relations. Normalization does not mean just avoiding a cold war. It means actually warming up relations.

The USSR is showing more and more openness to Western influence. At the present time this can be observed on the economic scene. But the way of life and quality of life are also open to change. In response, the Soviet Union should be given the opportunity to influence the West, inasmuch as it can. Increased Soviet tourism to Western countries and vice versa will contribute to an exchange of information and to moderation.

The USSR needs the West no less than the West needs the removal of the Soviet threat. The Russians need the West for economic, cultural and information purposes. The degree of openness that the new Soviet leadership has shown will create openness in their society as well, in all aspects.

Israel has much to offer and a lot to gain from some Westernization of the USSR and (a somewhat lesser) "Easternization" of the West. With one condition -- that she acts soon or, or a change, on her own initiative.

8646  
CSO:4423/51

ISRAEL

S. AFRICAN BLACKS WANT TIES WITH ANTI-APARTHEID GROUPS

TA260735 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 26 Jul 85 pp 1, 22

[Report by Roy Isacowitz]

[Text] Tel Aviv--Nobel Peace laureate Bishop Desmond Tutu and other prominent black South African leaders are eager to establish links with sympathetic Israeli bodies, notwithstanding their bitter condemnation of Israel's cozy relationship with the South African Government.

Shimshon Zelniker, the head of social studies at the Labour Party college Bet Berl, told THE JERUSALEM POST yesterday that practical steps for assisting South Africa's black community were already under consideration in the Histadrut and allied labour movement institutions.

Zelniker conferred with Tutu and the other leaders in Johannesburg recently, in what is believed to be the first such meeting between the most prominent black spokesman and a well-connected Israeli. He was accompanied by Ruth Bar-On, a resident of South Africa and head of the Council for Soviet Jewry there.

Zelniker's visit, while ostensibly private, had the blessing of Labour Party Secretary-General 'Uzi Bar'am and the highest levels in the Labour Party and the Histadrut. It was also coordinated with the Israeli Foreign Ministry. The visit was made possible by funding from the Los Angeles-based Centre for Foreign Policy options, after senior U.S. political figures had obtained Tutu's consent to meet with an Israeli delegation.

Tutu and Zelniker met for five hours at a private residence in Johannesburg towards the end of last month. Among the other prominent blacks present at that and subsequent meetings were Dr. Nthato Motlana, the unofficial leader of the Soweto community, and Debra Mabilets, head of the women's section of the South African Council of Churches.

Zelniker said yesterday that the level of hostility to Israel of South African blacks had reached "unbelievable heights." On the moral level, the black leaders he spoke with were unable to understand Israel's insensitivity to apartheid, which they see in the same terms as Nazism. Practically, they lambasted Israel's "collaboration" with South African government and the passive support of apartheid demonstrated by most South African Jews.



Tutu, said Zelniker, was unable to grasp the failure of Israelis to see the analogy between apartheid and fascism. He spoke of his "abhorrence of the Jewish monopoly of the Holocaust" while Jews failed to realize that apartheid too was leading to a holocaust.

The black leaders criticized the behavior of South African Jews towards blacks. Mobiletsa, who heads the association of domestic workers, said that Jewish housewives' abuse of their domestic help had contributed to the severing of the previously constructive connection" between Jews and blacks. [no opening quotemarks as published]

Tutu and his colleagues also drew the analogy between the racial situation in South Africa and Israel's treatment of the Palestinians in the West Bank.

Nevertheless, Zelniker said that his interlocuters were very eager to establish links with sympathetic organizations such as the Histadrut, which has consistently refused to have any dealings with the South African regime. They maintained that it was the Israeli Embassy in Pretoria, and not themselves, that had broken off contact between the Israeli government and the black community.

Metlana and others said that they would like the contact with the embassy to be reestablished, and expressed their willingness to visit Israel.

The black leaders responded very positively to proposals that avenues for bilateral contact be opened up, Zelniker said. Under consideration at the moment are the training of black unionists and women activists in Israel and the possibility of Israeli participation in the establishment of urban cooperatives in black areas.

Zelniker reported back to senior Foreign Ministry, Labour Party and Histadrut officials on his return to Israel.

CSO: 4400/205

ISRAEL

ISRAEL, ARGENTINA SIGN MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON COOPERATION

TA191124 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 19 Jul 85 p 3

[Report by agricultural affairs correspondent David Mosheyoff]

[Text] Agriculture Minister Arye Nehamqin, Industry and Trade Minister Ari'el Sharon, and Argentine Agriculture Minister Lucio Draciano Reca last night signed a memorandum of understanding on behalf of both countries in the field of agricultural, commercial, and industrial cooperation.

The agreement was signed in two separate ceremonies at the Dan Hotel in Tel Aviv, at the end of a 1-week tour in which the Argentine minister visited various agricultural projects in Israel.

The memorandum of understanding on agriculture states that the two countries will examine cooperation in the fields of efficient use of irrigation and applied research on water-soil-plant relations, planning and development of air areas in northwest Argentina, and in the development of agroindustrial projects by recruiting groups of entrepreneurs in both countries which would carry them out. In the framework of this cooperation, Agriculture Minister Nehamqin was invited to visit Argentina.

The memorandum on the commercial and industrial spheres discusses cooperation on economic issues, mutual purchases, and the expansion of cooperation in those fields.

The DAVAR correspondent has learned that Israel is striving to attain a trade balance with Argentina. Israel imports \$40 million worth of goods from Argentina and exports \$25 million worth of non-military items to it.

CSO: 4400/205

ISRAEL

ANALYSIS OF PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE

Tel Aviv KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew 19 Jun 85 pp 14-15, 42

[Text] Had Member of Knesset Muhammed Mi'arri been a more talented and astute politician, he could have been suspected of maneuvering the Knesset committee to limit his immune status. His position as a victim of the Zionist establishment can only help him among his supporters. In an interview with KOTERET RASHIT he admitted, as if reluctantly, that restricting his immunity was indeed helpful, politically. But he did not plan it. If events can be properly reconstructed, it all started with one of those little mishaps which happen to almost any new member of Knesset.

The Knesset committee was to discuss limiting Mi'arri's immunity at the request of Member of Knesset Mikha'el Eytan (Likud). Eytan based his request on pro-PLO statements attributed to Mi'arri in a report on the memorial ceremonies for Fahd al-Qawasimah in East Jerusalem. Member of Knesset Tawfiq Ziyad (HADASH) also spoke on that occasion, and Eytan requested that his immunity be limited as well. The Knesset committee invited the two. Ziyad showed up, said what he had to say, and the committee voted not to restrict his immunity. The Alignment objected to it.

Mi'arri did not show up. This probably happened because he never received the invitation. No one knows what exactly happened to it. It may have gotten lost between corridors; perhaps it was filed away somewhere or stuffed into a pocket; perhaps it was not even mailed. Be that as it may be, Mi'arri did not appear. The committee rescheduled the hearing for 2 weeks later. In the meantime King Husayn's peace initiative started and Geula Cohen accused the Alignment of adopting the positions of the Progressive List. She lost interest in Mi'arri himself. "We have to deal with all kinds of other small and large Mi'arris, Jews and other members of Knesset who more or less talk like him," she is quoted as saying. Most Alignment members on the committee, in their anxiety to disprove her, voted for restricting Mi'arri's immunity.

Mi'arri told them specifically that he objected to hurting any innocent people, whether the terrorists are Palestinians or Israelis. The members of the committee were not satisfied. They very much wanted to punish him. "The American Mafia was not arrested for murder," the chairman, Member of Knesset Mikha Reiser (Likud) said, as quoted by the Progressive List. "It was arrested for evading income taxes. Now, after erosion of the Alignment's

positions, we are going after the Progressive List, for every violation -- even technical ones -- in order to stem the erosion."

Therefore Mi'arri was asked to condemn PLO terrorism. Period. Mi'arri insisted on his right to condemn any form of terrorism. At one point the committee was ready for a compromise: that he would add condemnation of Jewish terror, i.e., the underground on the West Bank. Mi'arri insisted on his phrasing. The difference between Palestinian terror and Israeli terror against Palestinians is, according to him, that the former employ Katyusha rockets and the latter use planes. According to him he condemns both.

Had he given in to the committee at that point he might have avoided the restricting of his immunity, but he would have lost his position as leader of the Progressive List for Peace. His people would not have forgiven him such a condemnation of the PLO. RAKAH condemns him as it is. As if he equated the struggle of the Palestinian people with the Lebanese war. But Tawfiq Ziyad told the committee something very similar. Had Mi'arri known of the committee's invitation on time, before Husayn's initiative, he may have been spared all this. At best he would have emerged a local hero. At worst, as an amateur whose 10 months in the Knesset had not taught him all the parliamentary rules. "We are still in boot camp," said his colleague Maj Gen (Reserves) Matityahu Peled.

#### Divided Just like the Jews

Recently rookies Mi'arri and Peled proposed a vote of no confidence in the government. It is difficult to remember the reason they cited. They proposed it and left the hall, content with themselves, and headed to one of the lounges. They were told that a bell would summon them to the vote. Maybe it did and they did not hear; perhaps they heard and did not make the connection; it could be that they did not know that the bell could not be heard where they were. One way or another, they were late for the vote. By the time they arrived, running, to vote "aye" it was all over. It would have been over in any event, but RAKAH, in its papers and meetings, will never forgive them this embarrassment.

The two parties are at each other as only true believers can be. They accuse each other vehemently of treason, lies, theft and adultery, as if they were opposing Orthodox Jews in Me'a She'arim. RAKAH is caught between its loyalty to the PLO and that to Syria. The Progressive List supports 'Arafat and reminds its followers that Syria was behind the murder of Palestinians in Lebanon. It does not seem that this increases the number of its supporters. But RAKAH takes the Progressive List seriously, perhaps too much so. Ten months after its establishment the Progressive List seems like an Arab edition of DASH -- an amateur confederation, divided within itself even before its establishment, without a clear policy and without leadership.

The original idea seems plausible. The new Arabs (KOTERET RASHIT, #105) who were born and raised in Israel are Israeli more than ever -- in their way of life, in their thinking and in their willingness to live as a minority in the State of Israel. At the same time they are more Palestinian than ever before, among other reasons because as Israelis they have the confidence to express

their national identity and their desire for the establishment of a Palestinian state, side by side with Israel. This, for them, does not create a conflict with their identity as Israeli Arabs.

The Progressive List for Peace was to translate this thinking into a political organization which would not require its members to be loyal to the communist ideology and to RAKAH's pro-Soviet line.

It is now obvious that the Arab public in Israel is divided no less than the Jewish population. This may even be one of its Israeli characteristics. The national Israel-Palestinian consensus is not enough to unite them into one movement. There are Arab hawks and doves. There are religious and secular Arabs. Some are Moulim, others are Christian. Some are poor, some are rich, farmers and urban dwellers, laborers and independents, aristocrats, liberal and conservative, socialists and capitalists, right and left.

In the course of the years RAKAH has learned largely to gloss over the differences among its members. It forced on them the fiction that they are all communists. RAKAH has a very well oiled machine and a lot of money, tradition and experience. The Progressive List has, at most, what Amnon Rubinstein (Shinui-HADASH) described as "some political experience," a lot of goodwill to start something new, no money, no organization, trying to cooperate among all kinds of groups and splinter groups based on local and family ties. Most of them joined the Progressive List because they were disappointed, and often disgusted, with RAKAH. Some joined because they could not reconcile themselves with the Zionist parties. Most represented the middle class, from the Social-Democrat center to the liberal, national and even religious right. At one time they represented 30 different organizations, the committee of 31 of the movement, which at that time was not even a party. Some of them left immediately as a result of the discussion of whether or not to run for the 11th Knesset, or to wait until they were better organized. Some left after the elections because of the demand to change to a real party. Others will probably leave soon as a result of the debate over the ties with their Jewish sister party, The Alternative, another loose organization of all kinds of world reformers, leftists of all flavors, very radical not only on the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also on world affairs.

This is the basis for a lot of conflict between the Jewish and Arab members in the joint party. The Jews demanded a struggle to separate state and religion. The religious Arab members objected. The Jews demanded a struggle for women's rights, including abortion. The Arabs did not agree.

#### Lack of Attraction

Member of Knesset Peled estimates that others will leave. He means former members of SHELI, Walid Sadiq of Teibe and the members who will leave with him.

Sadiq told KOTERET RASHIT: "I am in [the party] and I like Mati Peled very much. In principle I am for Jewish Arab cooperation. But what we need now, tactically, is an Arab party, for peace, non communist, popular, which will be



an Israeli party in the full sense of the word, and will not need the support of a Jewish party."

Sadek says that Mati Peled, the former major general, the Zionist, keeps Arab voters away from the party and fails to attract Jewish members. Sadiq wants a stronger emphasis on the Palestinian identity of the party and is not happy with the emphasis the Jewish members put on the 1967 borders. He wants negotiations on everything, including the border and enabling the 1948 refugees to return. According to him this issue will be central to the founding committee, about to convene in several weeks. For the time being it is not clear what kind of a committee this will be. The Jews talk about a founding convention for the party and are seeking ways to maintain their position. Today the movement works on the principle of equality for Arabs and Jews in Knesset representation and in the budget. It is very difficult to convince Arab voters that this is a good arrangement.

The Jews are apparently willing to give in on the idea that internal ballots ought to be along national lines. They seem willing to agree to a one man one vote principle, but will not give in on their position in the management of the party. Kamal Dahr, an attorney from Nazareth, says that a founding convention for the joint party is not really the issue, but the founding of an Arab party is. He assumes that the conventioners will approve the continued cooperation with The (Jewish) Alternative. It is not clear how the delegates to the convention are to be elected, and who of them will be allowed to vote. Member of Knesset Mi'arri says that the Progressive List has 45 offices which will send delegates. But many of these offices are nothing but village home groups. Mi'arri is probably right in saying that the movement does not really exist. It is not clear that he is right when he qualifies this by "still," as if his movement were in the process of being established. One problem facing it is Mi'arri himself. Another problem is Peled.

Mi'arri, an attorney from Haifa, known for his expertise in real estate, is a dry kind of person, lacking the charismatic qualities of a leader. Shortly after he was elected to office he told KOTERET RASHIT that he was going to follow all parliamentary rules meticulously, without any gimmicks (KOTERET RASHIT No 91). He kept his word. His presence in the Knesset is almost unfelt. He complains that the media ignores him. For the time being he did not supply it with any reason not to ignore him. Says attorney Kamal Dahr: "Mi'arri ought to continue. Until we replace him."

Peled is considered one of the more industrious members of the Knesset. He devotes much time to proposed legislation. He has made intelligent statements. He is somewhat aloof, part arrogant, part shy. He does not stir emotions. It does not seem that he learned much from Uri Avneri, one of the leaders of his movement. Until Sarid's days there was no one like Avneri who succeeded in selling his party and its positions to the media. As a politician Peled interests no one.

#### Accomplishments and Disappointments

Several months ago Peled failed when he believed that 'Arafat would soon supply him with information on the Israeli MIA's in Lebanon. He hastened to

announce it and for a moment it seemed like a real accomplishment that he brought back with him from the meeting with 'Arafat. 'Arafat, to date, has not kept his word.

Said Peled to KOTERET RASHIT: "The promise was made. The fact that it was not kept is a bad disappointment for me." According to him the man who has the information refused to hand it over to 'Arafat when Ahmad Jibril stood to gain so much from releasing the POW that he held. Why did the Progressive List not wait until 'Arafat kept his promise? Peled: "'Arafat said that it was all arranged and that we could make the announcement."

Prime Minister Peres says that the Progressive List will not change the PLO. The PLO will change the Progressive List, which will forever be loyal to the PLO, like RAKAH is to the Kremlin. Peled: "They do not change us and we do not change them. In the 9 years of contacts that we have had with them we have maintained that there is a basis for negotiations between Israel and the PLO. As the years have passed there has been an increasing willingness within the PLO to negotiate with Israel."

Mi'arri: "Our most important accomplishment to date is that today the question of whether or not to negotiate is a legitimate question, for or against, even within the Jewish public. This was not so before we became members of the Knesset."

They have not held internal elections or a count, they hold no party cards, they have no organization, no vehicles and only five salaried employees. They debated for a long time whether to participate in the Histadrut elections. When they decided to do so they found out that they were not familiar with the rules or with the financial and political give and take that they required. They did not know how to organize and campaign and did not know how to make sure that they were registered in time. When they found out that thousands of their supporters were not even eligible to vote it was too late. RAKAH filed 20,000 objections. The Progressive List submitted 200. RAKAH enlisted thousands of vehicles and workers and printed boxfuls of posters. The Progressive List might as well have been absent altogether.

They are proud that they revealed the fact that there are not enough Arab worker councils and that there are no Arab members in the agricultural council. The Histadrut concurred that it is true and that it should not be so. But the voters remained unimpressed. The List succeeded in joining four worker councils, but did not have enough members to qualify for the convention. The required number was raised prior to the elections, perhaps in an effort to keep them out. Says Member of Knesset Peled: "We found out that the elections to the Histadrut are one big mess. We were not surprised."

Many of the Progressive List's supporters, farmers, young people and white collar workers, are not member of the Histadrut and the List did not see fit to encourage them to join. Says Mi'arri: "Makabi's Kupat Holim is better." He himself is not a Histadrut member.

RAKAH condemns them for supporting Shlomo Hillel for Knesset chairman. Hillel was minister for police on the first Land Day, infamous for being so bloody.

RAKAH itself once supported his candidacy for Knesset chairman, after Land Day. But now it accuses the Progressive List as if it betrayed its people. The Progressive List maintains that it supported Hillel as part of a deal in the process of which Umm-el-Fahm acquired the status of a city. The Progressive List is proud of this accomplishment. KOTERET RASHIT wished to know how Umm-el-Fahm reciprocated. "Not very well," the Progressive List admits. But they would not disclose the exact details. Their files, so they claim, contain only the figures that were published in the press and the results for Umm-el-Fahm were not published.

'Uzi Burshtein, the very professional RAKAH spokesman, was very willing to supply the figures: In the Knesset elections RAKAH received 2,084 votes and the Progressive List 1,366. In the Histadrut elections RAKAH had 808 votes and the Progressive List received 60.

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CSO:4423/51

ISRAEL

POLL EXAMINES SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH PALESTINIANS

TA181349 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 18 Jul 85 p 13

[Text] Nearly half the public (approximately 49 percent) believe that the Israeli Government should agree to negotiations with a Jordanian delegation only if it comprises Palestinians whose participation is approved by the Israeli Government. Approximately 13 percent support negotiations without being particular about the identity of the Palestinian notables who would participate. Compared to May, there is a slight tendency on the part of the public to moderate its stand on the participation of Palestinians in negotiations.

These findings emerge from a public opinion poll which was conducted by the Modi'in Ezrahi Research Institute under the direction of Dr Mikha'el Etgar, and commissioned by MA'ARIV.

The interviewees were presented with the following question: "Recently there is talk of including Palestinian notables in a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to hold negotiations with Israel. What, in your opinion, should the Israeli Government's position on this be?" [The responses are given in percentages below]

	June 1985	May 1985
To oppose negotiations with a Jordanian delegation which would include Palestinian notables	33.3	36.1
To agree to negotiations with a Jordanian delegation only if the participation of Palestinians is approved by the Israeli Government	48.9	45.8
To agree to negotiations with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation without being particular about the identity of the Palestinian notables who would participate in it	12.7	11.8
No response	5.1	6.3

Two questions were posed which examined the public's attitude toward Judaea and Samaria:

1. "Are you in favor of a peace accord with Jordan which would obligate Israel to concede territory in Judaea and Samaria?"

	June 85	May 85	April 85	March 85
Prepared to give up all of Judaea and Samaria	15.6	14.0	14.8	16.6
Prepared to give up certain parts of Judaea and Samaria	34.4	32.5	33.9	33.6
Unwilling to give up any territory	46.7	48.9	49.4	43.5
No response	3.3	4.6	1.9	6.3

2. "In exchange for a peace accord with Jordan, are you [as printed]

	June 85	May 85	April 85	March 85
Prepared to evacuate all settlements in Judaea and Samaria	20.7	22.4	21.9	25.7
Prepared to freeze only new settlements	27.8	23.7	28.3	26.9
Not even prepared to freeze new settlements	35.0	40.3	36.7	31.8
Other answers	4.5	[figure indistinct]	3.0	3.0
No response	4.1	4.3	2.5	4.3

The results show that the public's attitude toward Judaea and Samaria in June remained relatively stable. Fifty percent of the public are prepared to concede territory, while approximately 47 percent are opposed to any concessions. In contrast, only about one-third of the public is prepared to give up the settlements, while more than one-third is even opposed to freezing the settlements. Approximately a quarter of the interviewees are willing to agree to a freeze on new settlements only.

The poll was conducted between 11-24 June from a representative sample of 1,241 adult Jews in Israel, excluding inhabitants of kibbutzim, Judaea and Samaria, and the Golan Heights.

CSO: 4400/203



ISRAEL

ZAKH ON CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION, PERSONAL ACHIEVEMENTS

TA111247 Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew 10 Jul 85 pp 13, 13, 14

[Report by 'Eran Shenkar on interview with Colonel Freddy Zakh, head of the Judaea and Samaria Civilian Administration and deputy coordinator of government activities in the territories "during the last week of his term in office"; in his office]

[Summary] Colonel Zakh reviewed the past 12 months and noted that "the exacerbated division within the PLO led to a continued drop in its power and to the waning of its influence in the region." This has resulted in tension among the various factions and increased Jordanian influence in the political, social, and economic spheres, partly due to Jordan's initiative as a result of this friction. Zakh says that the Mubarak initiative, the Husayn-'Arafat accord, and the U.S. involvement in regional affairs have led to increased local interest in the political processes in the region and to greater personal involvement among broad population strata, and he claims that many inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria currently realize that they are about to miss the last chance to solve their problems--realizing, too, that a peaceful solution is the only one and that a power struggle and terrorism will not solve anything.

Zakh notes that the economic crisis suffered by Israel has not been felt so drastically in the territories because "the Judaea and Samaria residents employed in Israel are a flexible work force and the small number of workers who were laid off was quick to find employment in alternative Israeli places, or in Judaea and Samaria." There are no signs of unemployment, and if there are, "in any case we have initiated a number of projects" which can be put into operation if necessary.

Zakh notes the increased tension not only among the Arab factions, but also between Jews and Arabs in the territories following the release of the terrorists as part of the deal that led to the return of three Israeli POW's from Ahmad Jibril's hands. "Although the press did not mention it, part of the local Arab population was not satisfied with that release, because some of the people who were released were involved in the murder of local Arab personalities." They are being watched over closely, but so far, Zakh maintains, no one has returned to active hostile activity.

Zakh says that the open bridges policy with Jordan has proved its worth, bringing into Israel "more than \$53 million" last month alone as a result of the more lenient financial policy. It was difficult to stem the flow of funds from the outside into the hands of hostile elements, but now, he claims, the coffers of the hostile bodies, Jordan, and the Gulf states are also depleted so that any flow of money "can only result in greater development."

Zakh does not foresee local council elections in Judaea and Samaria in the near future unless there is a "substantive change" that would guarantee democratic, free elections without the threat of PLO takeover, but that would also allow moderate elements who had thus far been intimidated to run, so that the population will elect its representatives according to purely municipal considerations. Zakh attributes the decline in the ability of the universities to serve as centers of pro-PLO activity to the greater involvement of the Civilian Administration in local affairs, in addition to the issuing of decrees curtailing the freedom of travel of suspects. As for the prospect of opening an Arab bank, Zakh said: "The local residents will then be able to enjoy the interest and consequently give an economic boost to the region."

Zakh notes that the last year did not witness the kind of large demonstrations we saw previously, and the disturbances of public order have been toned down, although the number of Molotov cocktail incidents has increased. ✓

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8 August 1985

## ISRAEL

## SECURITY FORCES UNCOVER HUGE CACHES IN ARAB SECTOR

TAO41530 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1400 GMT 4 Apr 85

[Text] 'Afula, 4 Apr (ITIM)--Huge amounts of illegal weapons are being held by people from the Arab and Druze sectors in north Israel. This assessment was made today by security sources following the uncovering of a sophisticated network which included merchants and buyers of weapons from the area of Wadi 'Ara and villages in the vicinity of 'Afula and Nazareth. These sources believe that the uncovered network is only the tip of the iceberg.

The ITIM correspondent notes that the sources of these weapons are Lebanon, IDF camps, soldiers who sell weapons, and burglaries of private houses (mostly pistols).

These weapons serve three main purposes: for revelries during weddings and other celebrations; for settling accounts in cases of fights between various clans; and for nationalistic purposes.

Recent investigations and the uncovering of weapons indicate that many people hide their weapons in the fields, caches, and deserted buildings. Only a few people hide their weapons in their houses. For this reason the police and security forces do not always manage to uncover the weapons. In the network uncovered in the area of Wadi 'Ara, Nazareth, and 'Afula there were quantities of hand grenades, pistols, assault rifles, Galil rifles, Kalachnikovs, as well as an Uzi which was stolen from the IDF.

To date members of the minorities, IDF soldiers, and citizens who sold weapons have been tried. It is believed that the money for financing the deals comes mainly from drugs.

Since the beginning of 1985, 28 people have been detained in these areas. They are suspected of selling and possessing weapons. Charges have already been submitted against 18 of them. Two of them are being tried by a military court, 15 by the Haifa district court, and 1 by the Nazareth district court. The suspects come from the villages of Umm al-Fahm, Jatt, Baqa al-Gharbiyya, Iksal, Yafa, Mu'awiya, and Nazareth.

The investigation which led to the apprehension of these suspects was conducted by the security forces together with the Police Valleys Subdistrict which appointed a special investigation team headed by Staff Sergeant Major Moshe Levi and Sergeant Shlomo Arbiv.

Recently weapons were also uncovered in Arab villages in the western Galilee after the police launched an investigation following instances of fighting between clans in these villages.

ISRAEL

ARAB WORKERS UNION MEETS IN E. JERUSALEM THEATER

TA071758 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1605 GMT 7 Jul 85

[Excerpts] The first convention of the Bloc of Unity of Laborers in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza strip was held in the Nuzha al-Haqawati theater in East Jerusalem this afternoon. The Israeli authorities wanted to prevent this convention. The commander of the Central Command, Amnon Lipkin Shahaq, instructed that the hall be closed for 24 hours. Our correspondent in Judaea and Samaria Arye Gus attended the convention.

[Begin recording] Only 200 youths filled the theater hall for the first convention of the Bloc of Unity of Laborers. The secretariat that was elected today sat on the stage, slogans were painted on the walls, and the crowd felt greatly satisfied despite the fact that the commander of the Central Command closed down the theater last Friday for 24 hours. A short introduction was followed by greetings, all in a nationalistic tone, with expressions of hope and demand for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and calling for the unity of the PLO, and slogans for the improvement of the workers' condition.

The leaders of the bloc convened a news conference today to emphasize their status as a professional union which does not have political leanings. In contrast, security sources claim that this workers' bloc is associated with the DFLP. The union's secretary general, 'Ali abu Hilal, rejects this saying his union is a professional one which wants to represent the people from the territories who work in Israel, who are discriminated against and who are not represented by the Histadrut.

The convention was then held, the police did not intervene, and were it not for the ban imposed at the end of last week it is doubtful whether the report on this convention would have made headlines. [end recording]

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ISRAEL

## NEW RADAR ON MISSILE BOATS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 17 Apr 85 pp 1, 8

[Article by Joshua Brilliant]

[Text]

ASHDOD. - The Israel Navy's missile boats will be equipped with a new radar device able to detect low-flying missiles.

The Automatic Missile Detection Radar (AMDR) was developed by the Israel Aircraft Industries' subsidiary Elta. The company here plans to display the device at the Paris air show in May.

Elta will also display a radar device that detects aircraft. It can be mounted on a jeep and operated by an infantryman after only 15 minutes of training.

The press was told yesterday that the AMDR is an important technological advance because sea-skimming missiles are among the most lethal weapons used against ships. It is time-consuming to detect them from the air, because atmospheric phenomena and other air targets also appear on radar screens. Detection from aboard ship is also problematic because the missile must be detected in little over a minute from the time it appears over the horizon before it hits the ship.

Elta maintains that the AMDR can detect a missile at a range of over 10 kilometres. It will automatically sound an alarm and track the missile, transmitting the information to the command and control station and other electronic warfare personnel.

Elta also plans to market additional components of its airborne intelligence gathering system which can be installed in a Boeing 707 or 737. The devices are designed to give a picture of the deployment of the enemy's field forces, their operational status and level of activity. By studying the data gathered in earlier sorties, operators can immediately note any changes.

The head of the IAI's electronic division, Moshe Or-Tas, said that during the last fiscal year it exported \$197 million worth of equipment, compared with \$119m. in 1983/4.

IAI President Shalom Nimrod Ariav said that in 1975 the company exported only 7 per cent of its products to developed countries, and 93 per cent to developing states. Last year, 70 per cent went to developed states, and the balance to the Third World.

The U.S. was the biggest client (\$33.6m.), followed by European countries (\$19.6m.), Asia and Africa (\$12.3m.) and Latin America (\$3.3m.).

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ISRAEL

NEW MUNITIONS PLANT IN NEGEV

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 24 Apr 85 Supplement pp 32-33

[Article by Liora Moriel]

[Text]

DRIVING through the Negev sand dunes, one has a feeling of endless space and infinite freedom. The black asphalt road cuts through light brown sand, and a quick eye may spot a tent hidden between the hills, a flock of sheep or a woman's black dress billowing in the wind.

Then, 16 kilometres south of Beersheba, there are a few trees breaking up the desert landscape before a sharp turn-off to the right. The road weaves through the scenery, seemingly without destination. But suddenly there is a roadblock and a guard post.

This is Ramat Beqa, 50,000 dunams - in size, about as big as greater Tel Aviv - cordoned off by a high fence. Inside, the road continues to the newly-opened munitions plant that manufactures nitroglycerine. It has taken 22 years to come into existence.

In 1963, Shimon Peres, then deputy defence minister, first suggested moving the ministry's munitions factories to the Negev. In 1976 as defence minister in Yitzhak Rabin's government, he once again pushed forward the idea. But a year later, when the Likud came to power, the scheme already approved by the government was dropped.

Soon after the present coalition government was formed, Arik Nissan, chairman of the Beersheba labour council, wrote to Defence Minister Rabin reminding him of the project.

Last December, Prime Minister Peres promised to move the munitions factories to Ramat Beqa from the populated areas of Ramat Hasharon and Nof Yam within a decade. The price tag: an estimated \$1 billion a year.

For many years, the people living close to these plants have called for them to be moved away, pointing to the dangers of an accidental explosion occurring in such densely populated areas. It was this pressure, and the desire to create jobs in the Negev, which led to the government decision to move the munitions plant.

"The prime minister's announcement will give us at least one thing that has not happened in the past 10 years," says Beersheba Mayor Eliahu Navi. "Areas will no longer be fenced off in the centre of the country for new munitions plants." BUT IT is clear that it will be a long time before all the plants in Ramat Hasharon and Nof Yam move south.

According to the Defence and Industry ministries the move will take eight years and cost \$10b. During intensive meetings with Peres, representatives of various ministries hammered out a plan to move the plants. At Peres's suggestion the government is trying to finance the

project by selling the government's Ramat Hasharon land. But with the size of the project and the price tag of \$250,000 per dunam, there haven't been any takers.

"It costs money to take these installations from the centre of the country," says a spokesman for the Defence Ministry. "Another problem is moving people and finding work for those who decide not to move with the factories."

Elhanan Ishai, the adviser to the prime minister on developing areas, told *The Jerusalem Post* recently that the plans for moving the factories south have been put on the back burner where they have simmered for years.

"Moving the whole lot means 4,000 jobs, but it also means a great deal of money, so we have decided to move bit by bit. Even so, we need help. The Treasury cannot be expected to finance the project alone," he says.

"The plan today is to move only installations now operating elsewhere to Ramat Beqa. We are not yet talking about Ramat Hasharon," he adds.

Despite the apparent shelving of the project, Ishai is optimistic. "I think we are positively on the way, with certain investments, to move these industries south." The latest idea for pushing the plan along is for the Canadian Jewish community (which has adopted Yeroham as a town for Project Renewal) to be a

partner with the Treasury for part of the transfer, Ishai says.

"The plan, to move only these installations, will create 150 jobs for the people of Yeroham during the four years of the transfer operations, and 90 permanent jobs when the plants are operational in Ramat Beqa."

THIS HARDLY meets the expectations of the Negev Forum, made up of the mayors and chairmen of its towns and local councils. The forum, at its last session, decided to push for the immediate transfer of all defence industries to the Negev.

The region, with unemployment running at 30 per cent in some places, sees the Ramat Beqa complex as nothing short of redemption. Therefore, while the move of the Defence Industries to the Negev is no longer imminent, nobody is willing to go on record and say so publicly.

However, it is now stated government policy that all the Defence Ministry's plants which deal with dangerous materials will move to Ramat Beqa.

"The factories in Ramat Hasharon and Nof Yam have become a danger to the population, while here in the Negev the safety factor is built in, because the area is far from population centres," says Nissan. "Today, with high rates of unemployment throughout the Negev, there is another good reason for the transfer: it will provide thousands of jobs."

Baruch Askarav, the spokesman for the Prime Minister's Office, believes in the plan because it will bring jobs to the area.

He also says that the high wages paid by the Defence Industries will eliminate the need for many social services to the region. The transfer will not only mean jobs, but good jobs over many years. It will also lead to new infrastructure and better roads, restaurants and gas stations, and other signs of prosperity.

MEANWHILE, THE Negev is stagnating, with no new industry in almost 10 years. "I date the stagnation from the time of Pinhas Sapir's death," says Mayor Navi. Sapir was

the finance minister who ruled over the land, deciding which industries should go where and forcing many of them to locate in the Negev if they wanted government help.

That was a decade ago. "You cannot repair the damage of 10 years in one," said Navi. "I know this, but my feeling is that the government is not really seeking a solution to the problems of the Negev."

Another major problem in the area is the continuing brain drain. In the past 18 months, 200 engineers have left Beersheba. Private high-technology companies have found it impossible to locate in Beersheba because high-calibre engineers have refused to settle in the region.

The only solution is for government action: either in the form of incentives - making Beersheba attractive to investors through tax breaks and long-term loans - or in the form of setting up its own shop in the area - such as moving the Defence Industries to the region.

But there is no guarantee that the munitions factories, even if they all locate in the Ramat Beqa immediately, will provide proper solutions to all the problems.

There is also the ecological consideration. If, as the citizens of Nof Yam have recently indicated in a letter to the ministers of defence, health, interior and transportation, an accident can mean an explosion spanning a radius of five kilometres, then there may be some danger of a major disaster should such a catastrophe occur in Ramat Beqa.

Although Beersheba and Yeroham are far enough away, the Ramat Hovav Industrial Park, where there is a large concentration of chemical industries as well as the national toxic waste disposal site, is only four kilometres to the north. There are also Beduin and army camps within a few kilometre radius.

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

INCREASE IN IMMIGRATION--During the first half of 1985, 6,987 immigrants and potential immigrants registered with the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. This is a slight increase of 3 percent, as compared to the parallel period last year, when 6,769 new immigrants and potential immigrants arrived. Between January and June this year, 938 new immigrants and potential immigrants arrived from Eastern Europe--of whom 232 were from the Soviet Union--a 26-percent drop compared to the same period last year, when 1,274 Eastern European new immigrants arrived. [Excerpts] [Jerusalem GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE in English 8 Jul 85 TA]

JUNE UNEMPLOYMENT--The number of jobless who qualified for unemployment compensation last month dropped for the third month in a row. But this trend is not expected to continue and Labour and Social Affairs Minister Moshe Qatzav told THE JERUSALEM POST "that the month to watch out for is September." The State Employment Service announced that 16,425 people were unemployed for six days or more last month compared to 17,991 in May. The 3,147 registered unemployed who refused job offers last month represented a drop of 78 from the May figure. However, employment officials pointed out that 3,030 jobs went unfilled last month, with 1,363 offers going to labour exchanges in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza District. There were 18,337 jobs offered in Israel last month, down from 19,486 in May. The total number of job-seekers who registered at Israeli labour exchanges last month (including those unemployed six days or more) was 39,500, compared to 40,780 in May. [Excerpt] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 8 Jul 85 p 3 TA]

W. BANK JEWISH SETTLEMENTS--The Jewish settlements in Judaea and Samaria--with the exception of Qiryat Arba--have set up an organization called the Association of Urban Settlements which also includes the Golan urban settlements. Our correspondent, Shalom Oren, explains that in the opinion of these settlements, the Council of Jewish Settlements in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip is preoccupied with political rather than urban affairs. In a few days representatives of the new organization and the council will meet to decide on the distribution of work between them. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 16 Jul 85]

INCREASED TRAVEL TAX--The Romanian Government has lodged an official complaint with the Israeli Government protesting the failure to implement the decision to reduce the travel tax on people flying to Romania. The Romanian complaint has not yet been answered. When Prime Minister Shim'on Peres visited Romania in March this year it was agreed that Romania would enjoy a preference in its tourist relations with Israel. After the visit the government decided that in the tourism sphere Romania would be granted a status identical to that of Egypt. On 19 May, when the government decided to increase the travel tax, it was decided that the tax of travellers to Romania and Egypt would be only \$200. This decision was applied to those traveling to Egypt, but the travel tax for Romania was later raised to \$300. The Romanian Tourism and Sports Ministry tried to check, via the Israeli Embassy, why the Israeli Government's decision had not been implemented. When the responses failed to satisfy the Romanian ministry an official complaint was filed. [By Arye Egozi] [Text] [Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 30 Jun 85 p 6]

BUILDING CONTRACTS IN CHINA-- The "Solel Boneh" [Histadrut building company] subsidiary company for overseas work is negotiating for concessions to carry out building projects in China. The company stands a very good chance of carrying out wide-scale projects in China. "Solel Boneh"'s subsidiary company for overseas work is active in many countries in Africa and South America. It is active also in countries which do not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, by means of various subsidiary companies registered in different countries. The contract with China was made through the "Reynolds" company, a "Solel Boneh" subsidiary registered in the United States, which is active in many parts of the world. This company has extensive experience in wide-scale projects. It is responsible for the planning and supervision, but hires local employees in each country. Ehud Shilo, director general of the "Solel Boneh" subsidiary company for overseas work, refused to confirm or deny the report. It has been learned, however, that he recently met Chinese figures in order to arrange the deal, which is to be guaranteed by U.S. banks. [By Avraham Dishon] [Text] [Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 25 Jul 85 p 2 TA]

BRANCHES FOR ARABS, DRUZE--The Labor Party is setting up two new branches: One Arab and one Druze. The decision was adopted with the consent of the party institutions and its leaders, and was reached following a unanimous vote by several dozen Arab and Druze party members. Those attending the meeting also called on the government to declare its readiness to negotiate with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that will include Muslim representatives of the Palestinian people. The negotiations, they said, should be based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as on the need to recognize the legitimate rights of the Jewish and Palestinian peoples and the attainment of a just and durable peace between them. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 21 Jul 85 TA]

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KUWAIT

CONTROVERSY OVER INTERPELLATION OF FINANCE MINISTER LINGERS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 18 May 85 pp 22-23

[Article by Sulayman Nimr: "Kuwait: A Democratic Climate?"]

[Text] Kuwait--The resignation of Kuwait's minister of justice, Shaykh Salman al-Du'ayj al-Sabah, in the wake of the crisis over his interpellation, and its acceptance by the head of the government, Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Sabah, is considered a victory in Kuwait for the democratic experiment which was reinstituted less than 3 months ago. This is despite the fact that some people--who in Kuwait are called enemies of democracy--are trying to portray the resignation as a victory for the National Assembly against the government. Nevertheless, all of the deputies who were contacted by AL-MUSTAQBAL, particularly the three who proposed the interpellation and led the campaign to impeach the minister of justice, agree that the resignation and its acceptance was a healthy democratic thing for the government. They also agree that political leaders took a short cut to solve the crisis that arose between the government and the National Assembly over the interpellation of the minister of justice. The deputies also unanimously agree that the amir of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad, who is widely quoted as having said, "We believe in democracy and freedom, both in principle and practice, so let us pursue democracy and freedom in every sense of the words," was personally behind an effort to avoid a political and constitutional crisis in Kuwait if the minister of justice had not resigned. According to a source close to the government, things were almost at an impasse when the heir apparent, Kuwait's Prime Minister Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah, after a session at which the minister of justice was subjected to heated questioning, was ready to send a letter to the amir in which he would ask for "the dissolution of either the government or the National Assembly because of the lack of cooperation between the government and the assembly." In Kuwait people are saying that the prince was afraid that dissolving the government would cause a crisis within the ruling family, while dissolution of the assembly would subject the country to a political crisis, and it would be said that he had not lived up to his promise to give the people of Kuwait political freedom. But the solution came from the minister of justice himself, Shaykh Salman al-Du'ayj, with the submission of his resignation. The resignation was advised by a "wise man" who said it would offer a way out of the crisis, the real cause of which--according to government circles--was a prior intention among some members of the National Assembly to rid themselves of a minister who was said to have been involved in the al-Manakh crisis, which had shaken Kuwait's economy.



A source close to the government said that after Kuwait's recent parliamentary elections, in the deliberations to form a government some National Assembly deputies demanded that any ministers who had any direct or indirect involvement in the al-Manakh crisis should be banned from participating in the government. This involved four former ministers. Among the members of the new government were two ministers who the deputies believed were involved in the al-Manakh crisis. They were Minister of Justice Shaykh Salman al-Du'ayj and Minister of Oil and Industry Shaykh 'Ali Khalifah al-'Arabi, who was minister of finance in the previous government.

"Therefore," according to the source, "the opposition in the parliament began to make preparations for deposing the two ministers by looking for any legal or constitutional oversights or offenses by the two ministers." The opposition found its opportunity to remove Minister of Justice Shaykh Salman when it obtained documents which indicated that the Small Investors' Fund--which had been created by the previous Kuwaiti government to compensate holders of post-dated checks worth less than 2 million dinars--had improperly written two checks for about 1.4 million dinars to the son of the minister of justice for his investment in the United Real Estate Exchange Corporation. The opposition demanded that the minister of justice be interpellated to find out the truth about the matter, on the grounds that his conduct had brought suspicion on a member of the executive authority who had exploited his position for personal gain. Although the legality and constitutionality of the interpellation were disputed, and its opponents said that it was illegal, the Kuwaiti minister of justice agreed to it. On 30 April Kuwait's National Assembly held its famous session at which it interpellated the minister. The opposition questioned the minister on two basic points:

1. The stock sale was not real because, according to the opposition, the minister's son, a minor, was not really a shareholder in the company; the stock had been bought for him without his being a shareholder. For this the opposition relied on a letter containing the information sent by the company's vice-chairman of the board to the minister of finance.

2. The United Real Estate Trading Corporation was a new public company and it was not allowed to buy or sell its own stock until it had been in business for 3 years. The sale under discussion had taken place before the statutory period had passed.

During the interpellation--in which the government gave its full support to the minister--the minister of justice failed to defend himself despite his famed judiciousness and legal and legislative expertise. Supporters of the minister who were at the interpellation said, "Many factors contributed to heating the atmosphere of the interpellation and to the minister's failure to defend himself. Among these factors was the interference of the public who attended and who were clapping at the deputies. Another was the lack of neutrality on the part of the president of the assembly who was one of the strongest supporters of the interpellation among those conducting the session. Another factor was the strong moral influence exerted on the deputies by the press." But despite all these factors the result was that the minister failed to defend himself, and he was attacked from more than one direction, including the press. This caused the deputies to demand that another session be held to

impeach the minister who was being interpellated. Thus began the crisis which ended with the minister's resignation, and the National Assembly ended the debate on this subject at the beginning of its session of 7 May, at which AL-MUSTAQBAL was present. The members agreed on a paragraph which read, "With the resignation of the interpellated minister the interpellation is concluded." The resignation of the minister of justice deprived the government of one of its most able ministers who was considered its legal and legislative brains. However, it is interesting that some have begun to investigate the constitutional legality of the interpellation. These people are of the opinion that the payment to the minister's minor son was legal and legitimate. Even more important is that after the minister's resignation a document emerged which was said to be a "correction" by the Ministry of Finance, which showed that checking the records of the legal accountants indicated that the minister's minor son was a shareholder in the company. But Deputy Hamad al-Jaw'an told AL-MUSTAQBAL the following:

"Why was the minister unable to defend himself before the National Assembly or refute the charges against him? This correction, which came 2 days after the minister's resignation, was very late. Furthermore, the correction, which says that the minister's son was a shareholder in the company on the basis of the records of the legal accountants, does not mean that the position of the minister's son is right."

Deputy Hamad al-Jaw'an, one of the three deputies who proposed the minister's interpellation, stated, "The National Assembly has two functions entrusted to it by the constitution. The first is legislative, that is, drafting and issuing laws together with the executive authority. The second is supervisory, that is, overseeing the operations of the executive authority. To fulfill our supervisory function we try to find defects in the government apparatus and bring them to the attention of the government. Therefore, our proposal to interpellate the minister of justice came after we had received abundant evidence which caused us to suspect that the minister's son had received the two checks from the Small Investor's Fund illegally. We are only exercising our constitutional right." Deputy Hamad al-Jaw'an denied rumors about political and personal reasons behind the interpellation by some who wanted to remove the minister. Deputy al-Jaw'an said, "Many deputies preferred not to have the symbols of al-Manakh participate in the new government which was constituted after the elections, but the interpellation had nothing to do with that. We are working to strengthen the democratic process in Kuwait through constitutional right. The interpellation was held and the minister was unable to defend himself. We did not intend, as some are suggesting, a confrontation with the government. Our method, in order to make the democratic process succeed, is to foster cooperation between the assembly and the government. As far as allegations of personal reasons are concerned, those who make such allegations are unable [to think of anything else to say] and are concealing their hostility toward our democratic processes in Kuwait. And I have no obligation to defend myself by saying that I have no [personal] connection with the minister."

Deputy Faysal al-Dawish, secretary of Kuwait's National Assembly, and one of those who basically had reservations about the interpellation, cuts off conversation about the legality or illegality of the interpellation by saying, "The minister's argument and answers to the interpellation are considered an acceptance by him and by the government of the interpellation regardless of whether it was legal or not."

Deputy Dr Ahmad al-Rubay'i, a unifying leader of the democratic movement--the group of Ahmad al-Khatib and Sami al-Munayyib--said, "Just as the deputies have displayed a keen political awareness in recent times, as well as during the debate over the interpellation, the government has also pursued a healthy constitutional course by firing the minister of justice after it had found that he no longer had the confidence of the assembly deputies."

But what about the phenomenon that some observers have noticed: the agreement between two opposing movements, nationalist and Islamic, in the interpellation of the minister of justice? Does this mean that there is an opposition alliance against the government? Deputy Mubarak al-Duwaylah, a leader of the Islamic religious movement in the National Assembly--the Society of Faithfulness movement, otherwise known as the Muslim Brotherhood--said, "The idea for the interpellation basically originated with Deputy Hamad al-Jaw'an, who contacted us and leaders of the leftist movement in the assembly [and urged us] to propose the interpellation jointly, in order to endow it with political and legal power, and to emphasize that our common concern was the interests of the Kuwaiti people." Mubarak al-Dunwayli emphasized that, "removing the minister was a popular demand because everyone had questions about his conduct during the al-Manakh crisis. Because we support the demands of the people we supported the interpellation. God knows that we took up the matter only because I believed that the minister had committed numerous offenses."

Now, after the crisis of the justice minister's interpellation and the uproar which surrounded it is over, does this mean that relations between the National Assembly and the government have calmed? Or does it mean that the opposition deputies will direct their anti-government campaign in such a way as to make a confrontation between the two sides unavoidable?

Deputy Mubarak al-Duwayli said, "I foresee many confrontations between the assembly and the government in the future, but I do not expect this to lead to political or constitutional crises."

Deputy Ahmad al-Rubay'i, a leader of the "leftist" opposition in the assembly, said, "If there is sufficient cause for interpellating any members of the government or its agencies we will do it because that is a constitutional right which we want to keep, and the government must accept that."

On the question of whether these confrontations will endanger the Kuwaiti democratic experiment, Dr Ahmad al-Rubay'i answered, "We believe that the way to protect democracy in Kuwait from any threats, both domestic and foreign, is to reemphasize the democratic process which the constitution has entrusted to the Kuwaiti people. If democracy is a flower in the middle of this barren desert, protecting the flower requires us to water it with the water of democracy so that it can grow into a big tree under which others may find shade."

But no one in Kuwait denies that by accepting the justice minister's resignation the government feels that it has sacrificed one of its most important ministers. Those who think that the resignation of the justice minister hurt the feelings of the government also say that the government is not ready to be hurt again. They are referring to another matter which was about to come up after the affair of the justice minister: the matter of Kuwait's ownership of the Santa Fe Corporation, an American company. The opposition says that there are unanswered questions about Kuwait's purchase of the U.S. petroleum company's stock. The previous government paid \$51 a share when the actual price per share was \$24. Some people have said that the opposition is preparing to interpellate Minister of Petroleum 'Ali al-Khalifah al-'Arabi to question him about this matter. But the opposition, which unequivocally denies that it has any intention of proposing an interpellation, at least wants the current situation to cool off, and seems satisfied that there is a question for Minister 'Ali Khalifah about this subject. The Kuwaiti minister actually answered Deputy Dr 'Abdallah al-Nafisi's question about the purchase of Santa Fe. He said, "The decision to buy the company was made on the basis of a detailed and thorough assessment of the company's situation in which two consulting banks participated." Minister 'Ali Khalifah's answer made it clear that certain individuals and organizations--whose names he mentioned--had traded in Santa Fe stock prior to Kuwait's purchase of the company, and that a U.S. investigation was under way to determine how information about the deal leaked out before it was ratified so that certain people were able to quickly buy the company's stock at the market price.

Thus, just as the Kuwaiti government "yielded" to public opinion and avoided a political crisis in the country, the opposition also "yielded" to Kuwaiti public opinion which demanded that the assembly not be satisfied with only its monitoring role, but that it should work with the government to devise legislation which will protect the people and promote their interests in improving the economic situation, which has been buffeted by the winds of the al-Manakh crisis which debilitated Kuwait's economic climate. The government is looking for a cure, but it needs the participation of the National Assembly to prescribe the right medicine.

Certain circles in Kuwait say that the assembly is still afraid to raise this problem which has still not been solved, despite the fact that the government which has spent about 2 billion dinars in an effort to end it.

Thus, it seems that the al-Manakh crisis, in turn, will affect the climate of democracy in Kuwait. It will either strengthen the democratic experiment or will cause it to fail.

9123

CSO: 4404/372



QATAR

VITAL SERVICES WILL NOT BE CURTAILED BECAUSE OF BUDGET DEFICIT

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 11 May 85 p 34

[Article: "Deficit in Qatar Budget Because of Expenditures"]

[Text] The state of Qatar's fiscal year 1985-86 budget has a deficit of 7,311,000,000 riyals (about \$2 billion). Estimated government revenues in the new budget amount to 9,737,000,000 Qatari riyals (about \$2.65 billion), while expenditures and obligations amount to approximately 17 billion Qatari riyals (about \$4.35 billion). Although the Qatari budget was devised realistically, and efforts were made to reduce and control expenditures, economic circles in Qatar foresee many new belt-tightening measures in the current year in order to reduce the budget deficit as much as possible. These circles point out that the government intends to lay off 3,000 civil servants. The public sector is suffering from a real deficit. There are about 27,000 civil servants in Qatar, a country with a population of approximately 65,000 people. Three years ago there were about 32,000 civil servants.

During the last 2 years, in which oil revenues began to shrink, the Qatari government began a realistic policy to reduce and control expenditures by focusing only on essential and basic projects.

In a statement on the new budget, Qatar's minister of finance and petroleum, Shakyh 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn Khalifah Al Thani explained, "Revenue estimates for the new budget have been made bearing in mind that we are working to reduce and control expenditures without disturbing the level of services and production and to encourage the private sector." The private sector in Qatar is currently suffering from the semi-stagnation which is affecting the public sector, which is completely dependent on public expenditures. The chief cause of this semi-stagnation is exaggerated economic fear among owners of capital. Minister of Finance and Petroleum Shaykh "Abd-al-'Aziz ibn Khalifah, pointed out that in the new budget the government has given special priority to public projects as the main driving force behind the economy. The sum of 3.8 billion Qatari riyals has been allocated for these projects and there are other non-budgetary projects as well. The total amount allocated for projects in the Qatari budget is approximately 5 billion Qatari riyals. The new budget seems to be content to allocate money for the completion of projects that have already been started, and not to undertake any new projects except for priority projects such as the north gas project, which is the biggest industrial project in Qatar, the liquid gas pipeline project, and the petroleum products distribution project.



In a statement on the budget Qatar's minister of finance and petroleum said, "All kinds of activities--housing, public construction, health care, education, road construction, transport, communications, electricity, water, sewers, agriculture, industry, security and defense--are receiving proper attention from the state, and appropriate sums have been allocated to each area.

9123

CSO: 4404/372

SAUDI ARABIA

DELEGATION VISITS DENMARK TO STUDY CIVIL DEFENSE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Jul 85 p 9

[Article by neb]

[Text] A delegation from Saudi Arabia has just concluded a visit to Denmark in order to view fire fighting and civil defense training. The visit took place against the background of a tender for a course drafted by the Danish Fire Fighting Committee, the Civil Defense Agency and the National Fire Inspection Agency, in cooperation with other public agencies and a number of private enterprises.

"The visit has been very successful," stated the director of the Danish Fire Fighting Committee, Ernst Nilsen. "The Saudi Arabians have great confidence in Denmark and the Committee, and therefore they have requested further presentations on the training," he added.

During their stay in Denmark, the delegation visited the Danish Fire Fighting Committee, witnessed the training of the Civil Defense Corps' officers school at Bernstorff Castle and the command center in Bernstorff Park. In Jutland the Saudis viewed exercises at the Central Jutland Civil Defense headquarters in Herning, the Off-Shore [Oil/Gas Fields] School in Esbjerg and the Civil Defense Technical School in Tinglev.

CSO: 3613/169

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

HAJJAH RURAL MARKET DESCRIBED

Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 6 Apr 85 p 3

[Article by 'Abd-al-Wali al-Shami]

[Text] When a person undergoes the rigors of travel, he cannot emerge from the stages of the trip without impressions which are actually like impressions found in books, although they make a stronger impact on the mind than what is read in books. If this were not so, people would not leave their homes, and office holders would not make field trips which are beneficial and influential, but rather the opposite.

When the president makes field trips throughout all areas of Yemen, these initiatives teach us to undertake the efforts to travel and come away from them with convictions that support academic information about the areas and elevate official decisions into the realm of implementation. For the one who is present sees what is missed by the one who is absent, as the proverb says.

The Assignment and the Goals

I left the capital of Sanaa and went to Hajjah. From Hajjah I toured through all areas of the province on a press assignment, covering 200 kilometers.

It is well known that when a person travels in any direction, he must have a specific goal. As a journalist, I aimed toward several goals, and this is what caused me to say a mission with goals. These included learning about the areas of Hajjah and the activities of its population and finding out about the projects and their various shortcomings. They included learning about modern developments that have been introduced into the lives of the people and their effects on the areas. They included consulting public opinion about the modernization that our political leaders, under the direction of President and Secretary General of the General People's Conference Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, are working to introduce into the local administration as a unique initiative aimed at getting rid of the traditional legacies. With the modernizations that the leaders are determined to introduce into the local administration and the progress in the achievement of the September goals, it suffices for the state that consciousness will spread in the thinking of the local administration. This administration has withstood many states raising

the question: Is it really a centralized administration or a decentralized administration? Many experts throughout the world pose this same question, and each translates it according to his liking and the strategies arising from his ties to political organizations and ideologies.

A certain amount of either centralization or decentralization can apply to the actual situation, but what is meant by the modernization of the local administration is turning away from the bad traditions which delay the conduct of affairs. One of the bad traditions is the expression "do it any old way" which was current in the era of the bygone imamate.

Modernization also means bringing together the various issues in one conscientious administration with unified costs rather than having conflicting areas of responsibility and increased demands that do not serve action or prepare a suitable climate for it.

One of the goals of my press tour through Hajjah Province was to learn about attention to aspects of agricultural activity for the citizens in the rural areas. This activity include agriculture and veterinary services for animal resources in Hajjah. Such matters naturally demand a great amount of detailed attention because they are a central part of life and the national economy.

Sometimes

Press work is sometimes just for the sake of investigation. The investigations usually aim at determining unknown issues, just like police and legal investigations. However, I believe that the extensive traveling of the journalist is of necessity a mission like that of the doctor or the mechanic, and commentary and press reports alone are not enough. The customary information about the life of our people is like structural cross-sections that must be drawn together by the journalist through observations, experiences of the social situation and familiarity with the geographical features that distinguish one region from others. This process will undoubtedly reveal more than one cross-section of life and more information that will allow the disease to be discovered and the treatment to be determined.

Sharas Market

On this past 23 March, I toured through Sharas market, which is located in Ukhdud among the Hajjah Mountains on a hill at the confluence of seasonal rain-fed streams. Normally when one refers to a market in the rural areas of our country, one means the weekly people's markets of the cities and countryside that have been known for a long time. One may also refer to a market patterned after the annual 'Ukaz market, which is dedicated to fulfilling food needs as well as to socializing among the Bedouins and competition among the poets with their year's poetical creations.

Some of our weekly people's markets take on many aspects of the 'Ukaz market. In addition, our weekly markets form an information center for new developments that affect the tribes and inform the citizens of their duties with respect to the state.

In this market, I saw in the faces of the people signs of confidence in life on their farms in spite of the shortage of rain in the past years. Moreover, the coffee being brought in on the day of the market was still Yemeni coffee in the bean or in the berry and I did not see any teapot in any retreat or cafe.

#### Wasted Resources

Unfortunately, I saw the hides of cattle and sheep slaughtered for market day scattered all over the market hill. No one saves these resources from ruining. Moreover, this market is well known as a commercial center from which large quantities of coffee beans, earthenware products, and cattle and sheep skins are exported to al-Hudaydah and al-Mukha'.

On this subject, the butcher asked me when he saw me taking a photograph, "Will these photographs be shown on television?" I told him, "No, in the newspaper AL-THAWRAH." He said simply, "When will my picture be on the magazine?" I told him, "Take it up with the office of the Hajjah Province information director, if newspapers and magazines are sold in the markets like everything else." Then we had a conversation about the discarded hides in the market. He said, "There were merchants who bought them and sent them to al-Hudaydah to fill ships going abroad. Today the predatory animals do not eat them, although at one time an agency of the municipality cleaned things up." I said: "Why doesn't anyone gather them up in the markets and sell them abroad as they used to do?"

He said, "Today merchants will not accept this kind of trade, believing it to be demeaning. If I were not so busy, I would take on this job. Although the profits are slow, workers are required to buy from the markets, and capital is needed for marketing, the business is very profitable." From this idea I learned the difference between small industries known for producing a quick profit in a matter of hours and heavy industries known to produce large profits over a period of years.

#### Agriculture Everywhere

Citizen Mahdi al-Khalidi from Bani Mawkhiz works as a farmer. He said that the farm on which he works is a coffee farm. However, it is an unfortunate thing that the people are attracted to growing qat, even on the roofs of houses. The reason is the guaranteed and fantastic profits realized from growing it and the fact that it can be grown at the lowest cultivation cost with minimal supplies of water.

On the other hand, the neglect of coffee growing is attributable to the lack of rain in its specific seasons, because most coffee growing land is sun-bathed land in the terraces of the mountains.

As for the growing of grain crops, it has not changed. However, it has fallen off to some extent because of a shortage of manpower that has not been made up for by light and heavy agricultural machinery. The farmer asked me to say to the government that it has become necessary to prevent the importation of tea, coffee beans in the berry, and foreign coffee.



I might add to his comment that the offices of the ministries and organizations should deal in coffee berries and beans so that consumption will develop and we can be proud of domestic production. Perhaps in this way, the coffee plant will become a symbol to the household supporting the economy of the kitchen.

Salih 'Ali al-Akwa', a car driver to and from Sharas Market, said the following: "I used to work as a farmer in Kahlan 'Affar Valley and now I am a car driver. I prefer farming to driving cars because agriculture is security against poverty, thank God. I still practice agriculture near my house to discourage myself from emigrating outside the country. The life issues are inside our country."

Finally, these are the beginnings of a series of trips early this summer to areas in Hajjah Province. Impressions and stories of these trips will follow.

8591

CSO: 4404/335

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

DEVELOPMENTS IN HAJJAH GOVERNORATE DESCRIBED

Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 19 Apr 85 p 3

[Article by 'Abd-al-Wali al-Shami]

[Text] The purpose of meetings with officials is to provide the full dimensions of the interaction between the views of the citizens and the views of the officials. Another goal is to bring out the facts and direct attention to the courses of events.

In my visit to Hajjah Province, I met with Muhammad Mash'uf al-Aslami, deputy governor of Hajjah.

The comprehensiveness of the meeting with him provided an opportunity to take the field in order to look into what he had discussed with me. Unfortunately, the officials with whom I met in the ministry departments in the city of Hajjah were reserved and evaded clear statements of the facts. The fact is that they were probably uninformed about the plans and programs of their ministries. For one reason or another, I learned that they have been given instructions not to make statements concerning anything they are asked about without differentiating between press activities that serve the nation and the citizens and activities that only take the darker aspects of their actions. In this way the ministry has monopolized its viewpoint so that the facts will not emerge. Its officials are just civil servants who do not have an opinion to offer on their activities. I observed this during my meeting with one of them who did not possess the least power to act but nevertheless was hesitant to talk. I do not know where the fault of the ministries or organizations lies except in their representatives in the provinces.

Return

We return to the conversation with Muhammad Mash'uf al-Aslami. I asked him: What is your assessment of the state projects in the province and the activities of the provincial officials? He replied:

"The state has focused its efforts on building and paving the road from 'Umran to Hajjah as a model, and paving the streets of the city of Hajjah which you see winding through the valleys of the foothills. In addition, many other

roads have been built in the province without the need for asphalt under present circumstances, except for the Hajjah--al-Khashm road project, which has been discontinued at this time. This road will have economic benefits because it links the mountainous areas and the plains of Tihamah. With regard to the other projects, there are model schools for the various academic levels, model schools for male and female teachers, the hospital that has begun operation in the city of Hajjah, the Maydi clinic, the hospital in Harad, and another hospital in al-Muhabashah. Also the water projects that have been completed play a role in stimulating life and settlement in al-Shahil, al-Miftah, and 'Abs. There are new projects in Washhah, Kashr, Khayran, Aslam, Aflah al-Sham, and al-Yaman, based on names currently in use. In addition, many artesian wells are being dug, including projects in 'Abs, Shaharah, Maydi, Khayran, and Kashr. However, work has stopped on some of these projects for technical reasons related to the drilling rigs, problems with the drilling contractors, and a lack of support by the cooperative organizations for such projects. These projects link the citizen to the land and ease his concern about variations in the weather which cause reduced rainfall and drought."

#### Rice

I asked Muhammad Mash'uf al-Aslami about the cultivation of rice, which became a matter of discussion from time to time following the visit of 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Ghani, prime minister and member of the Standing Committee of the province of Hajjah. He replied:

"The cultivation of rice is concentrated in four areas of the province of Hajjah: Aslam in al-Sharafayn district, Mastaba in Washhah district, and Jiyah and Aflah al-Sahm also in al-Sharafayn district. The prime minister observed this and gave a gift consisting of products derived from rice cultivation in these areas. The growing of this crop requires large amount of water and cheap labor. The procedure for growing begins in the nursery until the length reaches 2 meters. Then it is cut short and transplanted to the ground which has been prepared for cultivation. I should add that if the seedlings in 5-6 (labnah) are sufficient to plant 120 (labnah).

"Unfortunately, the growing of rice has declined for several reasons:

1. The emigration of labor.
2. Continual drought from year to year.
3. Rising wages of labor.
4. The availability of imported rice at a low price.

"It is known that the cultivation of rice requires encouragement from the state. It is a fertile area for projects of the Ministry of Agriculture. The citizens in the rice growing areas still preserve the seeds and large growing plots for rice. Many grow it as a matter of pride and to eat seasonal meals

for their own enjoyment. There is also the cultivation of mungo bean, which was an abundant crop once relied on by the Yemenites for hundreds of years. Its shrub resembles stalks of wheat. The cultivation of sesame and mangoes has dominated the area up to now. In former times we exported these two products to some sister states."

#### Foodstuffs and Smuggling

With regard to food prices, he said: "We have heard that some foods are being smuggled outside of the authorized channels. However, this matter was brought before the prime minister when he visited the area and he issued his instructions to the responsible agencies. Because of this, foods have become plentiful, especially in the remote areas. This is how smuggling was brought to an end."

I said: There is a question that must be asked, Muhammad. It concerns some of the security points along the Harad--al-Hudaydah road.

He said: "The fact is that checkpoints of this sort on roads between cities in any area must be established in the places that are the most important. We have heard what has been circulating with regard to this matter concerning the road through Sanaa, Ta'izz, Damt, al-Nadirah, and so on. With regard to the Harad road, the matter was brought to the attention of Lt Col Muhammad 'Abdallah Salih, deputy minister of the interior and member of the Standing Committee. He ordered that they be abolished except for three points. These were to be established between al-Hudaydah, Harad, and Hajjah because they are along trade routes, and were to be solely for combatting smuggled goods."

"The fact is that people who are not guilty of smuggling are not afraid of inspections. However, when inspection centers occur frequently and restrict the traveler, when the emigrant returning from abroad hates to bring his personal and household effects with him, and if there is an excessive number of security stations, this is attributable to the efforts of the officials responsible for security. I propose that conferences and meetings be held for officials of the remote areas concerning these matters to acquaint them with their duties regarding the raising of the various questions in the hearts of the citizenry before the agencies connected with the customs, taxation, and cooperative organizations. This may serve to prevent the occurrence of mistaken action by agencies that are not connected in any way."

"In addition, the emigrant returning home from abroad must be acquainted with the things that cannot be imported so that he will not be exposed to any problems in the areas of entry into domestic territories."

The essence of the conversation with Mr al-Aslami concerned the issue of the numerous barriers that came after the determination of the points of entry for goods as established by the Customs Bureau over a year ago along the borders of the republic. He said that we must study this issue in greater depth to free the traveler from the burden of inspection and questioning at every point of intersection of major roads.

#### Official in Customs

Regarding this last point, I might say that an official in the Customs Bureau said that during the coming month, a part of the government and the customs bureau will establish important controls and rules to ease the burdens of customs operations so that the return of the emigrant to his country will be made easier and the problems of smuggling will be brought to an end.

8591

CSO: 4401/335



AFGHANISTAN

MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON ELECTION LAW

LD230630 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0439 GMT 23 Jul 85

[Text] Kabul, 22 Jul (BAKHTAR)--The promulgation and implementation of the laws on local organs as well as the elections law of local organs of the state power and administration is a new system of giving vast masses of the people the opportunity to participate in the state affairs and the solution of local problems in the DRA.

This was stated by Muhammad Bashir Baghlani, minister of justice and attorney general of the DRA in an interview with a correspondent of daily HAQIQAT E-ENQELAB E-SOWR.

He added that elections form the first democratic principle in the laws.

Under the provisions of the laws, the councils of the representatives of the people in villages, districts and cities are to be elected directly by the citizens who have completed age 18.

The election of the representatives of the people for the locality councils would take place openly and on a multiphased basis in a direct and comprehensive manner. Everybody has equal voting rights in the elections. Since each persons, men and women, has only once the right for vote. [as received] The employees, officers and soldiers of the armed forces also enjoy the same right.

Mass participation in the elections indicates that any direct and indirect limitations against the citizens of the country with respect to race, nationality, tribe, sex, residence and the social status etc is prohibited.

The citizens of the DRA take part in the elections through the social organizations, the collectives of the working people and the meetings of the armed forces.

The nomination of the candidates by the social organizations, collectives, institutions and the offices have begun for membership in the composition of election commissions.

Article 16 of the Law on Elections and Local Organs of the State Power and Administration stipulates that election commissions will be formed in the provinces, districts, cities and the villages by the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council. The representatives in the composition of election commissions will be introduced by the National Fatherland Front (NFF).

The social organizations of the residential localities and the employees of the armed forces elect through open voting their candidates in the election commissions.

CSO: 4600/534

AFGHANISTAN

PAPER SEES PRC AS U.S. 'ACCOMPLICE'

LD230637 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0509 GMT 23 Jul 85

[Text] Kabul, 22 Jul, BAKHTAR--Commenting on Pakistan, being a purchaser of Chinese-made weapons, daily HEWAD writes that the supply of Chinese-made weapons and military ammunitions to Pakistan had a special place in the talks held between Zhang Aiping, the minister of defence of the People's Republic of China and Ziaul Haq, the military ruler of Pakistan.

The Pakistani militarists showed their deep interests for purchasing of Chinese-made tanks, and weapons. Thus, the military link between Islamabad and Beijing has entered into a new phase of their adventuristic collusion. Such a collusion as a major nucleus of threat to peace in the region has made the peoples and the countries of the region more wrathful than ever.

The promise of the minister of defence of the People's Republic of China to supply weapons and war ammunitions to the Afghan counter-revolutionary elements once again testified to the fact that China acts as an accomplice of Washington and executor of the suzerain policies of the United States.

The assertions of Chinese minister of defence explicitly shows once again the Chinese hostile position vis-a-vis the DRA. The military assistance of China to the bandits, terrorists, and saboteurs means a direct contribution by China aimed at undermining the national economy of Afghanistan and creating barriers in the way of the Afghan progress.

CSO: 4600/535

AFGHANISTAN

SOVIET, AFGHAN TROOPS KILLED IN SIEGE-BREAKING ATTEMPT

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 25 Jun 85 p 1

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Pakistan (IRNA)

— At least four hundred soldiers of the joint Soviet-Afghan forces were killed in an unsuccessful attempt to break the Mujahideen's siege of the township of Zurmat near Gardiz of Pakistan this week.

Mujahideen sources here said 35 Afghan Army tanks and personnel carriers of the joint forces were wrecked by the Mujahideen militants, while 200 government soldiers surrendered to the Mujahideen forces with their ammunition and weapons.

The township of Zurmat, 15 km. from Gardiz in the center of Paktia Province in Afghanistan is under full siege of Moslem Mujahideen fighters.

In related news the leader of Afghanistan's Islamic Movement, Mawlawi Nassrullah Mansur, condemned the current Geneva talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan and said it had little effect upon the struggle of Moslem Mujahideen in the future. The Afghan religious leader who was talking to IRNA here said the Soviets and Mujahideen members who are the two principal sides of the fighting are omitted in the talks and added the Moslem Mujahideen of Afghanistan would lead their holy struggle towards an eventual triumph.

Commenting on Washington-Moscow talks on the issue of Afghanistan the Afghan re-

AFGHANISTAN

KONDUZ AGRICULTURAL DETAILS REPORTED

LD142349 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1330 GMT 11 Jul 85

[Excerpt] Konduz Province is one of the best agricultural provinces and its peasants receive a great income from the sale of their agricultural products. Konduz Province has 220,000 hectares of agricultural land, 20,000 hectares of which is unirrigated with remainder irrigated for double-season production.

The head of the agriculture department of Konduz Province said to a BIA reporter: As a result of the cooperation of the relevant organs with the peasants, a total of 868,000 tons of agricultural products, such as grains, vegetables, fruits, and health plants were produced last year. The Spinzar Company of Konduz Province up to 15th Sowr of the current year [5 May 1985] has bought a total of 13,667 tons of cotton from the peasant cooperatives and cotton growers of the provincial capital and villages.

The peasants of this province have always taken advantage of the scientific experience of the agricultural officials for improving and enhancing their crops yields. Last year, 15,000 tons of fertilizer were used by the peasant cooperatives and peasants of Konduz Province. Also, more than 80 million Afghanis' worth of pesticides and insecticides were distributed to the peasants of the province. They borrowed more than 94 million afghanis from the Agriculture Development Bank on very easy terms last year.

The five groups of the land and water reform have sorted out an area of 63,000 jerib [1 jerib = 1/2 acre] corresponding to the first grade of the 4,188 land owners. Land title deeds have been given to 4,188 small land owners and landless peasants who have been without land for years.

During the current year, an area of 9,000 jerib of the 566 big land owners is going to be distributed. Also during the first quarter of the current year, 1,259 landless and small land owners have received land title deeds in the capital and the villages in Konduz Province.

The BIA correspondent reports that the implementation of the spring sowing campaign of 1364 has been followed successfully and the amount of the seeds distributed to the peasants during the beginning of the current year is twice that of last year.



There are 20 agricultural cooperatives for the peasants with a capital of 1.75 million afghani, and 5,800 peasants have been mobilized therein. The livestock cooperative is part of the above and through this cooperative, 15,000 Karakul pelts have been prepared and readied for export.

CSO: 4600/536

BANGLADESH

## MINISTER DISCUSSES LIBERALIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 9 Jun 85 p 3

[Text]

The DCMLA and Minister for Industries Air Vice Marshal Sultan Mahmud, said here yesterday that the government had offered some special facilities under the new industrial policy to encourage the entrepreneurs to set up industries in the less developed areas of the country, reports BSS.

The Minister was inaugurating the second meeting of the Consultative Committee for Ministry of Industries.

The meeting reviewed the progress of industries during the current year, problems standing in the way of development of industries and steps to be taken for the coming year to accelerate their promotion.

Mr. M.A. Sattar, President, Bangladesh Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Mahbubur Rahman, President, Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mr. M.R. Siddiqui President, Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Morshed Khan, President Bangladesh Chamber of Industries and presidents of various chambers of Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi presented papers at the meeting. In their papers they pin-pointed the difficulties retarding the process of industrialisation and suggested measures to overcome them.

Air Vice Marshal Mahmud told the meeting that the government facilities to the entrepreneurs for the establishment of industries in less developed areas included tax at reduced rate on the imported machinery, exemption of import licence fees, reasonable debt equity ratio, and exemption from the payment of income tax for a period of nine years.

The Minister said the government was thinking to liberalise the policy still further and sought the opinions of the entrepreneurs in this respect.

Explaining the salient features of the new industrial policy, Air Vice Marshal Mahmud said that the government efforts were continuing to encourage the foreign investors.

He reiterated the government's commitment to give more emphasis on the promotion of industries in the private sector and was happy to note that investments in this sector under the new industrial policy were encouraging. In this connection he pointed out that the government had in the meantime banned the import of certain industrial items and launched 'right of refusal system' to provide more incentives to the industries in the private sector.

The Industries Minister told the meeting that the government was keen to augment production of indigenous industries and to step up the volume of export.

He said that the primary objective of the industrial policy was to make the country self-reliant by increasing exports and establishing import substitute industries. The Third Five-Year Plan would be launched from July 1 with this end in view. The contribution of the industrial sector to the GDP during the Third Five-Year Plan period had been projected at 15 per cent, he added.

The Minister made it clear that the overall development of the country, solution of unemployment problem and increase in per capita income were not

possible if the country was not made self-reliant. This called for hardwork and initiatives on the part of all of us, he said and urged the entrepreneurs to improve the quality of their products, diversify exports and increase the volume.

Air Vice Marshal Sultan Mahmud drew the immediate attention of the entrepreneurs to the huge loans taken from Bangladesh Shilpa Rin Sangstha (BSRS) and Bangladesh Shilpa Bank (BSB). He told the meeting that the BSRS loans amounting to Taka 576 crore has remained outstanding. Of this, Taka 284 crore is overdue.

The total outstanding amount of BSB, he said is taka 349 crore of which Taka 207 crore is overdue.

Speaking at the meeting Dr Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir,

Managing Director, BSB, described the difficulties of the bank in its operation due to non-payment of outstanding loans by many of the entrepreneurs. The foreign loan giving agencies, particularly World Bank had intimated BSB that it would not offer credit anymore unless its recovery rate was raised to 50 percent.

He further said that although BSB has sanctioned 56 new projects it could not release loans to them due to shortage of funds.

The chairman of Power Development Board told the meeting the situation on this front would not improve until next year. The demand for power reached 930 m.w. during peak hours as against the supply capacity of 804 m.w. For load management load shedding would continue, he said.

CSO: 4600/1720

BANGLADESH

CABINET REVIEWS RELIEF, REHABILITATION PROGRAMS

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 12 Jun 85 p 1

[Text]

The Council of Ministers yesterday reviewed the relief and rehabilitation programmes in the cyclone and tidal surge affected areas and took some important decisions, reports BSS.

The meeting, presided over by President Lt. Gen. H.M. Ershad, decided that henceforth Urir Char and Char Nizam will be considered as a part of Sandwip and Manpura upazilas respectively.

Land settlement terms at the newly emerged islands including Urir Char and Char Nizam will be made on permanent basis to the inhabitants of these islands. The meeting also decided to set up a police outpost at Urir Char.

A decision was taken to build cyclone centres at the affected areas. Besides, a raised pucca room will be built on RCC pillar for each family as a part of rehabilitation programme for the cyclone victims.

Various interested non-government relief agencies will be earmarked specific areas for rehabilitation work. The damaged coastal embankments will also be repaired.

The meeting further decided that the orphans of the cyclone and tidal surge hit areas would be sent to orphanages and children's homes.

It was decided to take disciplinary action against officers of Health and Engineering Departments of Manpura upazila who do not stay at the places of their work and to ensure that they remain at their working places with immediate effect. It was also decided to increase allocation significantly for building infrastructure at Manpura upazila.

A decision to maintain steamer link between Bhola and Manpura and to regularise river communication with coastal island was taken at the meeting. Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Authority will take necessary measures in this respect.

CSO: 4600/1720

BANGLADESH

WORLD ORGANIZATIONS, NATIONS PLEDGE EMERGENCY AID

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 11 Jun 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] Bangladesh has so far received pledges of aid from 25 friendly countries and international organisations to the tune of Taka 40 crore 78 lakh till the first week of this month. The Bangladesh Red Cross has received pledges of assistance from sister organisations to the extent of Taka one crore 80 lakh so far.

Nearly Taka eight crore has also been donated to the President's Relief Fund by local agencies and individuals.

President H.M. Ershad recently said that the country would need about five crore US dollars (equivalent to Taka 150 crore) to rehabilitate the people in areas affected by the cyclone and tidal surge of May 24. According to a preliminary official estimate crops in 18 upazilas worth about Taka 86 crore were damaged due to the tidal surge.

Major donors of relief are: United States 5,50,000 US dollar, Japan 12 lakh US dollar, United Kingdom 50,000 pound sterling, Saudi Arabia 40,00,000 US dollar; EEC 3,75,000 US dollar, India one crore rupees, West Bengal one lakh rupees, Pakistan 6,25,000 US dollar, Australia Taka 35 lakh, Switzerland 7,60,000 US dollar, UNDP and UNDRO 30,000 US dollar each, Netherlands Taka 39,90,000, International Fund for Development of OPEC countries one lakh US dollar, USAID one lakh US dollar, Bhutan 20 lakh rupees, People's China five lakh US dollar, Algeria five lakh US dollar. Moreover, relief materials from the Soviet Union and Italy already reached Bangladesh. Medicine for the affected area donated by France and Hungary also reached here.

The British Government also announced donations of 50,000 pound sterling for rehabilitation programme in Noakhali by OXFAM, a voluntary organisation and an additional 10,000 pound sterling for CARE operations. The British Government also hopes to provide total assistance to the extent of five lakh pound sterling.

OIC Secretary General has appealed to member countries for donations. Besides pledges to Bangladesh, Red Cross include donations by South Korea, Canada, West Germany, New Zealand and Denmark.



A total of 13,50,935 persons in 26 upazilas of six districts with a total population of nearly 23 lakh were affected by the cyclone according to an official estimate.

The government has distributed till the first week of June cash relief of Take one crore 18 lakh only. Other relief materials do not include this figure. Bangladesh Red Cross relief operation also is not taken into consideration.

CSO: 4600/1720

BANGLADESH

PAPER REPORTS CONDITIONS OF WORKERS IN BAY ISLANDS

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 9 Jun 85 pp 1, 8

[Text]

The 24 land masses which surfaced in the adjoining Bay waters of Noakhali and Chittagong districts for the last 10 years are without any facility of human habitation.

According to the district administration, thousands of people were herded there by the city based jotdars in a particular period for farming.

Since these areas have no natural protection to save its inhabitants from tidal bore as the areas lack concerted efforts of afforestation and raising sea embankment has become an absurd proposition in the absence of any scheme from concerned circle. According to the source, allowing the people to live in the areas, very vulnerable to tidal bore is flagrant violation of the provision of human right.

These people are time and again made casualties to the sea storms as minimum security of their life were not ensured by their employers.

According to the district administration of Chittagong and Noakhali, these land masses are to be handed over to the forest department after its formation. But the influential jotdars are preventing the forest department from taking the possession of these charlands as they consider afforestation will further reduce their cultivable lands. The forest department are not allowed by the jotdars to go on with the scheme of afforestation which was necessary to consolidate the newly raised charlands.

About 12 jotdars own the newly raised charlands of Sandwip, Hatya, Sudharam,

Char Jabbar and Char Clerk. They all reside in the metropolis or the district towns.

During harvesting period they are found leading the convoys of trucks to the coastal areas for bringing farm produce from the charlands to the cities.

The condition of these people employed in the charlands are no better than those of agricultural slaves of medieval period.

The Urir Char, Vatirtek, Gangchil, Kalami and Baishakhi surfaced in the wake of massive cyclonic storm of 1970 and since then no scheme of afforestation could be launched by the Forest Department in the face of stiff resistance from the jotdars. Side by side Char Majid and Char Mujib which are under the control of the Forest department and in the process of afforestation averted the brunt of the cyclonic storm.

The inter district rivalry over the possession of the charlands have also confounded the situation. The influential people have grabbed the charlands with active assistance from the district officials.

There are ample instances that most charlands have been named after the district officials. Such as Char Ziauddin, Char Islam and Char Rashid. These have been done ostensibly to please the high-ups.

BANGLADESH

BRIEFS

OPEC LOAN REPORTED—Vienna June 13--The OPEC fund for international development will extend a 10 million dollar loan to Bangladesh to co-finance extension work on a major thermal power project under an agreement signed here OPECNA reported on Monday reports IINA. The Ashuganj project located about 70 km northeast of Dhaka forms part of the South Asian country's programme to develop electric power. A previous OPEC fund loan for the same project helped the installation of two gas-fired of 150 mw each including boilers, mechanical equipment and a 230 kv double-circuit as well as a 48 km transmission line. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 14 Jun 85 p 10]

CSO: 4600/1728

IRAN

**JAPAN RESCHEDULES PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT REPAYMENT**

**Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 13, 20 May 85 p 12**

**[Text]**

Mitsui and Company and a consortium of Japanese banks have agreed to reschedule an 86bn-yen (\$349mn) loan for the Bandar Khomeini petrochemical complex in southern Iran, in the first stage of what appears to be Japan's withdrawal from the project. Under the new arrangements, the Iran Chemical Development Company (ICDC) — a consortium comprising Mitsui and four subsidiaries — will now extend the repayment period from 1987 to 1992.

The rescheduling covers a \$500mn loan from ICDC to Iran-Japan Petrochemical Company — the Iranian partner in the project — originally due for repayment between 1982 and 1987.

Mitsui suspended work on the plant in October following Iraqi air attacks on the complex in which a number of Iranian workers were killed. Following the withdrawal, Iran suspended interest payments on the loan, which led Mitsui to make a 3bn-yen write-off for the half-year to last September.

Under the new timetable, the deadline for Iran-

Japan's repayments to Mitsui and Mitsui's repayments to the Export-Import Bank of Japan — the leaders of the loan syndicate — have been put back from 1987 to February 1992. Mitsui, who started repaying their loan in 1982, will repay 12bn yen a year and have had the interest rate reduced to just over 8 per cent.

**Majlis rejects amendment**

Last month, the Iranian Majlis rejected a proposal to amend the 1974 agreement establishing the joint-venture. Under that agreement, both sides hold 50 per cent of the equity. However, as Iranian financial involvement increased, Mitsui had hoped to reduce their shareholding accordingly. But with the continuing uncertainty as to when, or even if, the project will be completed, Mitsui are understood to be trying to reduce their exposure and withdraw from the project as soon as they decently can. The work was 85 per cent completed when Mitsui withdrew its workers in October.

**CSO: 4600/525**

IRAN

PREPARATION OF IRAQ, IRAN PIPELINE PLANS REPORTED

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 12, 6 May 85 p 7

[Text]

Iraq expects to announce next month the winner of the tender to build the second crude-oil pipeline from the Kirkuk oilfields to the Turkish Mediterranean coast at Yumurtalik. The 783-kilometre pipeline will cost about \$600mn to build. Bocas, the Turkish-Iraqi authority set up to supervise the project, has received five bids for the 558-km Turkish section, while at least six consortia have bid for the 225-km Iraqi section. The two countries are cooperating over the evaluation and technical negotiations, but will make separate awards.

Iraq is currently exporting about 1mn b/d of crude oil through the existing pipeline to Yumurtalik. The second pipeline, which will be built roughly parallel to the first, will take 500,000-600,000 b/d.

A four-man technical delegation from the Iraqi oil ministry was in Saudi Arabia last month for talks on the spur pipeline from Iraq's southern oilfields to the Petroline, which runs east-west across Saudi Arabia to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The work on the project is on schedule for completion by September and will carry about 500,000 b/d. Last month's talks also included plans for the second stage, which will raise the capacity of the pipeline to 600,000 b/d.

Thus, by the beginning of October, Iraq will have an export capacity of about 1.5mn b/d, which is already above the 1.2mn b/d Opec quota.

In addition, Iraq is reported to be considering building a second southern pipeline to Yanbu, parallel to the Tapline. This would serve separate loading facilities at Yanbu. The Brown and Root company of the USA is now preparing a feasibility study for the project.

Saipem of Italy — which is building the spur pipeline to the Petroline — is bidding for both the Turkish and Iraqi sectors of the proposed second pipeline. The Italian company is in partnership with Tekfen and Kutlutas, both of Turkey. Principal bidders for the Iraqi section include Mannesmann AG of West Germany and Spie-Capag of France (Spie-Capag are also working with Saipem on the southern spur pipeline). Other bidders include Hyundai and Samsung of South Korea, Brown and

Root of the USA, Tokyo Engineering of Japan, Cimintubi of Italy and British Pipeline Engineers and Contractors of the UK.

Iraqi planners are also reported to be looking again at plans for a 1mn b/d crude-oil pipeline to the Jordanian port of Aqaba. The plans have been suspended for more than a year because of the difficulty of getting Israel to undertake not to attack the pipeline and because foreign financiers are unwilling to back it without such assurances.

Even if all of these projects are completed (giving Iraq an export capacity of some 3.5mn b/d of crude oil) it is hardly conceivable that they would be used at full capacity. Rather, they should be seen as Iraq's recognition that the war with Iran is likely to go on for some time and determination that she will never again allow her economic vital interests to be jeopardised by dependence upon the Gulf shipping lanes.

Iran, too, is taking dispositions to improve its oil-export capacity because of the Gulf war. The government last week authorised study of a 1,200-kilometre pipeline from the head of the Gulf to the village of Jask, on the Gulf of Oman, about 150 kilometres south of the Strait of Hormuz. Approval for the project was granted two years ago.

The proposal is in response to Iraq's continual attacks on shipping entering the Iraqi-declared military zone. The attacks have made it impossible for Iran, which has no alternative outlets, to maintain its crude-oil exports from Kharg Island and other terminals at the Opec quota. Since March, Iran has operated an oil shuttle, carrying crude oil from the upper Gulf to Sirri Island, where foreign tankers are able to lift without risking coming under attack and without incurring high insurance premiums.

The estimated cost of the proposed pipeline has been put at \$3bn and there must be serious doubts whether Iran has the foreign exchange or the international credit rating necessary to implement it.



IRAN

COMMENTS ON CLERICS ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 12, 6 May 85 p 6

[Text]

Iran is reportedly softening its opposition to a negotiated settlement of its 54-month conflict with Iraq. This amid reports that anti-war demonstrations in Teheran two weeks ago resulted in the arrest of up to 1,000 protestors.

In an interview published by the Abu Dhabi daily Al-Ittihad UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar said he had detected some flexibility in Iran's attitude concerning a negotiated settlement of the Gulf war. Commenting further on his conclusions following a visit to the Iranian capital last month, Mr de Cuellar said he felt optimistic about the possibility of arriving at a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

However, as late as April 30th, Iran still insisted that a condition for its acceptance of a UN mediation role was a Security Council condemnation of Iraq. The Security Council's condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons last week was a step in the right direction, Iran's ambassador to the UN Mr Said Rajai Khorasani said. But he noted it still fell short of the full condemnation required by Teheran. Our goal, he added, remained that of ending Saddam Hussein's rule.

American officials reported meanwhile that both Iraq and Iran were massing troops along their common border. They said a new offensive by the Iranians against the Iraqi city of Basra was expected.

Iraq, on the other hand, has maintained its pressure on Iran's major oil outlet. On April 25th, it claimed its air force had scored direct hits on two ships south of the Iranian Kharg Island oil terminal.

Perhaps most disturbing to the Iranians is the increase in internal pressure to end the war. According to the Frankfurt-based Human Rights Organization, 1,000 Iranians were arrested last week during anti-war demonstrations in Teheran. Less than a week later Iranian President Ali Khamenei's sister, Badr al-Husseini, held a press conference in Baghdad confirming reports of a rise in anti-war protests. Mrs Husseini recently fled to the Iraqi capital to reunite with her husband, Ali al-Tahrani, an opponent of the Khomeini regime who has been in exile in Iraq for two years. She also told reporters that Iran's economy was on the verge of collapse.

The actions of his sister may jeopardise Ali Khamenei's chances of re-election during the presidential elections scheduled for June 22nd. Although he has not yet made public his intention of running again for the presidency, it was widely believed that he would be the leading candidate. Khamenei enjoys close ties with Ayatollah Khomeini and is usually described as a pragmatist. Judging by his public statements over the past three years of his presidency, Khamenei appears to be far less belligerent on the subject of the Gulf war than most of the present Iranian leadership.

CSO: 4600/523

LKAN

# ARTICLE RECOUNTS SURVIVAL UNDER MULLAH REGIME

Paris LE FIGARO in French 13, 14 Jun 85

[Article by Renaud Girard]

[13 Jun 85 p 4]

[Text] On that Friday morning--Friday is the day of prayer and rest in Iran--Tehran's streets radiated calm. The contrast with the rest of the week, when the downtown area is awash in traffic and noise, was striking. I was walking through Farah Park--no one uses the name "Islamic"--which was besieged by students engaged in endless discussions and families out for a stroll.

As I approached the university--the center for prayer--the streets filled with groups of women wearing the chador and men carrying prayer rugs under their arms. I checked the way I was dressed--loose-fitting trousers and a long shirt buttoned to the wrists, the principle being that neither flesh nor shape should be seen. I reached the first checkpoint manned by guardians of the revolution (or pasdarans), who asked to see my passport. Now the streets were black with people--the men occupying some streets and the women occupying others, with everyone settling down for prayer. Loudspeakers were broadcasting a speech. In order to get in, I tried my chances with a man about 40 years old. A merchant from the provinces, he described himself as "maktabi" (pious). He obligingly agreed to accompany me into the university itself. The crowd was pressing around the checkpoint, where I had to leave my camera. There was a second checkpoint that included a body search--a month earlier, a mojahed from the opposition had exploded a bomb, killing about 10 people.

Finally, we arrived within the holy of holies--the central square covered with large canvas awnings. At a distance of 100 meters, perched in a pulpit draped with veils, was Hojjatol-EIslam Rafsanjani, speaker of Parliament and the country's number one strong man after Khomeyni. He was delivering a speech denouncing the "errors" of the Bazargan government (the first Islamic government after the revolution, it was moderate in its leanings). The crowd (30,000 people in all), sitting cross-legged, interrupted the speech by raising fists and chanting the "takbir," a sort of incantation in which one repeats tirelessly: "Allah is greatest, Khomeyni is our leader; death to America, death to Russia, death to Israel."

Those Friday sermons can last for over 2 hours. The mullah who delivers the sermon--always one of the highest-ranking politicians--does not restrict his remarks to high politics. Rafsanjani recently told the crowd about a dream in which Ayatollah Beheshti, the former leader of the official party who had died in an attack in June 1981, had confided to him that he was concerned about the "martyrs" killed recently at the front. They were being held up at the entrance to paradise because their families were too self-seeking. His purpose in telling the story was to induce his listeners to relinquish voluntarily the indemnification of 2 million rials (1 French franc = 10 rials) to which they were entitled.

Then came the prayers proper. Being an infidel, I withdrew from the congregation and sat in the stands to watch the spectacle of those thousands of men prostrating themselves in perfect synchronization.

In Tehran on Fridays, the mosques are closed and the university is the only place open for public prayer. The regime benefits in two ways from those weekly mass gatherings: they keep the fervor of the Islamic militants alive, and, on the outside, they inspire fear in the silent majority. He who uses the mob to gain power will seek to use it to stay in power, even if that means gathering it by artificial means.

#### Blood-Colored Fountain

It was mobs nurtured on the Shiite propensity for martyrdom who provided the strength for the revolution in 1979. To suffer and die a martyr like Hussein (the prophet's nephew and only legitimate heir, he was killed by the Sunni line) has liberating value in the eyes of Shiites.

The authorities are more aware of that fact than ever, and they have incorporated the cult of martyrdom into official ideology. The Beheshte Zara Cemetery, martyrdom's shrine, is located a few kilometers outside Tehran. I went there on Thursday afternoon, accompanied by Ali and Mehdi, two young men from the working class neighborhoods whom I had met by chance 2 days earlier, when all three of us were being turned away from a restaurant reserved for pasdarans. The road was full of traffic--families traveling eight to a taxi or three to a motorcycle and buses chartered by the Foundation of Martyrs. The buses were covered with slogans and filled with chador-draped women going to visit the graves. The war with Iraq has caused the cemetery to grow considerably. There were many trees and a forest of Islamic Iranian flags. Every tombstone was surmounted by a glass panel protecting a picture of the martyr (in most cases very young), his last letters from the front, a photograph of Khomeyni, and a picture of the Mahdi brandishing the green flag of Islam from astride his horse. The Mahdi, or hidden imam, whose return is fervently awaited by Shiites, was the 12th and last imam in the prophet's line. He is said to have hidden himself and is expected to return someday to restore order and justice in the world.

The cemetery stretches out around a fountain whose water has been dyed red to symbolize the blood shed by the martyrs. Not far from the fountain, compact groups were crowding around funeral monuments to such revolutionary figures as

Ayatollah Beheshti or former President Raja'i. Everyone wanted to touch the tombs of the great martyrs, if only for a second. Little girls between 10 and 12 years old, brought there for an outing after school and covered from head to foot with the chador, started singing these words spontaneously and almost cheerfully: "Khomeyni, our imam, do not feel alone; Imam, we are with you; Imam, we would like to die for you." In Shiite country, the word "imam" has two meanings: as is true everywhere in Islam, it refers to the head of a mosque, but here it also means the holy spiritual leader from the early days of the Shiite community in the seventh century. Khomeyni took the title of imam officially in the first meaning of the word, knowing perfectly well that there would be a natural shift to the second meaning.

### Discontent and Repression

But outside the two official centers of fervor consisting of the university and the Beheshte Zara Cemetery, the popular enthusiasm that carried the Islamic regime to power in the beginning seems to have died out completely in Tehran. The most recent demonstrations marking the anniversary of the occupation of the U.S. Embassy did not attract more than 1,000 people. More than sullenness, it is discontent which has overcome all sectors of the population in the capital (which currently has nearly 8 million inhabitants). In the buses and jitneys, one hears people referring nostalgically to the days of the old regime, when life was "so easy." The shah is regaining surprising popularity. When people mention his name now, they no longer add, as they did in 1979, "may he go to hell," but "may God receive him in paradise."

A recent phenomenon, spontaneous demonstrations of discontent occur from time to time. The most serious occurred last 10 April in the working class neighborhoods in the southern part of the city that had just been bombed by the Iraqi Air Force. The spark that touched off the demonstration was reportedly the stopping of a young man for questioning. The inhabitants reportedly sided wholeheartedly with the young man and began shouting slogans hostile to the government and the continuation of the war. Five thousand people took to the streets to join the movement. A few days later, about 50 young participants, identified probably from photographs taken by informers, were quietly arrested by members of the committees and taken to Evine Prison. Since then, their families have heard no more about them. It is feared that most of them will face the firing squad. But those movements of popular feeling are not a major threat to the regime. The reason is that no free structure--party, trade union, or association--remains to channel discontent. And to deal with discontent, the regime has a vast and subtle repressive apparatus that inspires fear and mistrust everywhere.

The strength of this repressive system resides in the vagueness of its contours. No one knows exactly who is entitled to use force against others to suppress political offenses. One can be stopped for questioning at any time. I had that experience myself while walking through the Bazaar Mosque Square with Ali and Mehdi.

A bearded man performing his ablutions at the fountain motioned to us to come over. "What are you doing here?" "What do you want to see?" "Who is this



foreigner?" His hands still wet, he demanded my passport. I gave it to him, saying that I was a tourist. Explaining that he was a member of the neighborhood revolutionary committee, he magnanimously authorized us to continue our visit. But my hosts did not feel reassured, and we left the place immediately.

Unlike the regular uniformed police, the members of those committees, called "comitichis," are hated by the population. They are frequently former hoodlums who have taken up a new line of work. In the name of Islam, they have arrogated excessive powers of control to themselves. Parading around the streets in white jeeps, they interfere at the drop of a hat and have no hesitation about going into people's homes on the slightest pretext. They prosper from innumerable kinds of illegal traffic (drugs, smuggling, and so on). The Foundation of Martyrs, which supplies the black market with American cigarettes, provides them with a veritable army of informers through the small vendors. The minister of interior would like to see their role reduced or even to disband them and replace them with the police. But the comitichis have powerful supporters, one being Mahdari Kani, their former leader and now head of the political organization of mullahs. And although they are a nuisance, they are also useful. After arresting the antiwar demonstrators in the southern part of the city, they immediately launched a drive for Islamic morality in the city's northern middle class neighborhoods to shift the focus of the trouble. Their methods consisted of using gangs from the "lumpen proletariat" called "hizbollahis," whom they sent in by twos on motorcycles and armed with clubs to punish the slightest infringement of the Islamic dress code on the northern sector's streets. Then, to restore calm among those undisciplined troops, the latter were reminded in a speech at the university the following Friday that no one can make an arrest unless he is duly authorized by Islamic justice.

An intellectual in northern Tehran told me that since the state of law is flouted every day, "people are longing more and more for the return of a secular police force and a secular system of justice." But he has no illusions, because "if it took their weapons away from the committee and the pasdarans, the regime would be sawing off the branch on which it is sitting."

#### Repressive Apparatus: Clergy and Pasdarans

The regime in the Islamic republic is no longer supported by the majority of the population. But it can count on the support of two very solid networks for propaganda, control, and repression: the clergy and the pasdarans.

#### Clergy

There has never been an organized clergy under a centralized hierarchy in Iran. Every village and every neighborhood has its mullah for leading the prayers. Those individuals, often appointed by family tradition and more or less versed in religious studies, have complete freedom in choosing a spiritual leader from among the great scholars known as ayatollahs (literally: "signs of God"). The clergy (about 150,000 strong) used to owe their financial independence to the levying of the Islamic tax and, especially, the income from their vast landholdings. It was because of his agrarian reform plans in the 1960's that the shah provoked the implacable hostility of the clergy.



Since the revolution of 1979, vast temporal power has been given to the mullahs. The replacement of secular courts with Islamic courts has made many of them judges paid by the government. At the head of every important government department is a mullah as the personal representative of the imam. That mullah is responsible for supervising the activities of the secular director. In addition, the network of mosques has become the main structure for decentralized power and the best tool for ideological supervision. The mosques do not limit themselves to spreading the government's messages--they also interfere in every area of social life. Even if he wanted to, the ordinary citizen could not bypass an institution which investigates every person who becomes involved in the slightest official procedure (for example, by applying for admission to the university, applying for a job, and so on) and which is also in charge of distributing the "couponis"--the ration coupons that are necessary not just for rice and meat but also for the refrigerators and automobiles assembled in Iran under license.

The regime is in the process of providing the clergy with a powerful centralized political organization. The best example of this is the simultaneous transmission to all mosques of the Friday prayers from Tehran. The mosques are encouraged to state ahead of time which subjects they want to have mentioned in those broadcasts. Some clergy--notably most of the six grand ayatollahs--have difficulty concealing their hostility toward this movement for integration into the state apparatus. The same people are worried about an excessive personality cult centered on Khomeyni and tending surreptitiously to make him into the Mahdi in person. But the great majority of the mullahs, aware of where their new interests lie, are grateful to the regime for having placed them in such high positions, and they continue to support it.

#### Corps of Pasdarans (Guardians of the Revolution)

With nearly 400,000 well-trained men equipped with the most modern weapons--including tanks--the corps of pasdarans is a formidably powerful praetorian guard for the regime. Three-fourths of its members are at the front, where they fight in various army units. It is an elite corps, and one joins it for life. Recruitment, with strict requirements, is now carried out among the best "besij" (young volunteers for the front) and members of the revolutionary committees on the recommendation of a mullah. Becoming a pasdaran provides a young man from the rural area or Tehran's working class districts with access to a social status (good pay and privileges of all kinds) that would not be open to him in any other way. The corps has its own barracks, stores, and lycees.

All the political groups have managed to place their men among the pasdaran cadres. The tie that binds them together is their indestructible loyalty to the imam. But on the day that Khomeyni dies, it is not impossible that they will tear each other to pieces to gain power. Whether as a means or as an obstacle, the pasdarans will be constantly in the path of anyone trying to take power after Khomeyni.

[14 Jun 85 p 2]

[Text] Early this May, when I stepped off the plane from Dubai to discover Tehran, the war was scarcely making itself felt there. The interminable checks at the airport (customs, police, and pasdarans) were the work of a finicky but peaceable bureaucracy. There were few soldiers on the streets, which were humming with traffic and trade. During conversations, there were very few remarks about the conflict, which many people feel is coming to an end. The only indication of war is the lack of public lighting at night.

It is true that the war has had little effect on Tehran's inhabitants so far. General mobilization has not been decreed, and the victims (200,000 dead in 5 years) are mostly the besij (young volunteers) and the pasdarans (guardians of the revolution), who are volunteers and are recruited mainly in the rural areas. Military service in the traditional army does include a stint at the front, but many young men are able to avoid it by serving in a cushy job or failing to register.

It was not until the Iraqi air raids on Tehran early this spring that the inhabitants really became aware of the war. Exaggerating the danger (three or four 250-kilogram bombs dropped on a huge city), one-fourth of the population then undertook a giant exodus to spend the night in the countryside. A young taxi driver told me that he preferred to spend the nights on the roof of his home with buddies "so as not to miss the fireworks from the antiaircraft guns."

When bombs fall on the northern part of the city--an area of private homes and parks--they claim few victims, but the Iraqi Air Force has succeeded several times in hitting the working class districts in the southern part of the city, where population density is very high. The exact number of victims is unknown (probably totaling between 200 and 300), but a story is making the rounds in southern Tehran: "Two hundred victims of the bombing raids showed up at the gates of paradise. The porter told them: 'I'm sorry, but I only have room for 40, since that is the figure announced in the official communique.'"

Ali and Mehdi, two young residents of southern Tehran whom I had met by chance a few days earlier, were guiding me to one of the places recently bombed. We did not stay there more than 10 minutes, because since the antiwar demonstrations, the neighborhood has been closely watched by the pasdarans. The bomb literally blasted away an area 80 meters in diameter, leaving no trace of the fragile three-story houses. Workers from the "crusade for reconstruction" were clearing away the rubble and rebuilding the first walls--the blemish represented by those ruins must be erased as quickly as possible. The authorities have covered the fronts of buildings around the worksite with wide banners proclaiming in Persian: "War, war, war until victory," "We are not afraid of war," and "Khomeyni, we are with you." Triumphalism is being displayed all the more because authorities know that disenchantment among the working class inhabitants of the southern neighborhoods is on the rise.

#### Disenchantment of the Underprivileged

Ali, 22, is the son of a small "maktabi" (pious) craftsman in southern Tehran with rural origins. Although a member of the huge class of "underprivileged,"

whose defender the regime claims to be, he complains bitterly. "It is impossible to have a simple life here any longer, and that is all I want. I want freedom: to be able to talk to a girl on the street without getting arrested, to be able to buy food at the normal price without going to the mosque, and to drink alcohol without risking the whip."

He has a technical diploma but is unemployed, so how does he manage to live? "I buy things in Turkey and then sell them on the black market at three times what I paid for them. I once found a job in a ministry, but the pay was almost nothing." The high cost of living is one of the main causes of discontent in Tehran. The real standard of living among workers and low-level state employees in nationalized industry has been reduced by over half since the revolution. A minor government employee earns 40,000 rials per month, but a kilogram of rice can cost as much as 700 rials on the open market, while a kilogram of meat can cost 2,000 rials and a package of American cigarettes 750 rials. A double market has been established: on the one hand, there is the official market in staples, access to which is gained through the ration coupons, and on the other, there is the black market, where prices are six or seven times higher but where everything is available.

What about the war? In Ali's opinion, "it is unjust, because Iran has recovered all its territory. Khomeyni is squandering on the war the only two resources Iran has: its young people and its petroleum." How does he explain the passion of the *besij*, the young volunteers for the front? "They are too young to have experienced the good life under the shah, and they have been brainwashed." Does he believe that there will soon be a change of regime in Iran? "No, it is too strong, and people in my neighborhood cannot imagine that they are being swindled by the mullahs."

The fact is that while the "underprivileged" all complain about the high cost of living, the regime has been able to offer them all the necessary compensations. The mosques guarantee a minimum for the poorest families through the distribution of ration coupons. The families of martyrs are entitled to all kinds of benefits (indemnities, special stores, pilgrimages to Mecca from where they return laden with household electrical appliances that they sell for seven times the price, and so on). And above all, it is from among the "underprivileged" that the *pasdarans* and members of the committees are recruited en masse. They are the apples of the Islamic republic's eye, and it has given them all kinds of powers and privileges. If the "underprivileged" of southern Tehran revolted, they would have to fight their own cousins.

To an even greater extent than the underprivileged, the big losers from the revolution are the intellectuals and the middle class. One electronics engineer, a senior executive in a state-owned firm, bitterly regrets the two sheep he sacrificed for Khomeyni's return to Iran: "My monthly salary under the shah was the equivalent of \$3,000, but now it does not exceed \$500, and I have to rent out my house to make ends meet."

His wife, a university professor, adds, however: "We suffer especially from a life that has become so dreary. I used to lead a full life, and now I simply feel empty. I take antidepressants, like most of my friends. Every time I

teach a class, I am afraid of being reported by a student for saying too much or because my dress is not Islamic enough. I must constantly watch what I say, and the chador is very unpleasant to wear, especially in the summer. We all live at home, turned in on ourselves as though in a prison. We always see the same friends." The change is especially hard on this new middle class, which had learned to enjoy a European style of living under the shah: no more movies, no more weekends at the beach or the ski resort, and no more trips abroad. But the most distressing thing for the couple I talked to was the "brainwashing to which our 12-year-old son is subjected at school: he has put up a picture of Khomeyni in his room, and he cannot help criticizing us when we drink alcohol at home."

Mas'ud, an intellectual living in northern Tehran, is a sociology professor who was compulsorily retired. He summed up the new society for me in a few words: "The notion of the citizen and personal freedoms--and I am not even talking about political freedoms--no longer exists. If you are not in the 'Umma' (community of the faithful), you no longer have access to anything--to work or to the means of satisfying life's material needs. You are excluded from society."

Among the middle classes and the intellectuals who progressed thanks to the growth of industry and services under the shah, many are considering emigration. Two million Iranians already live in exile in the United States and Europe, where they have frequently done well. But as one talented professional photographer told me: "It is they (the mullahs) who should leave, not us."

While the regime has destroyed all forms of personal freedom, it is not attacking the right to own property, which is sacred in Islam. The revolution was carried out with the more or less open support of the big bazaaris [rich merchants], most of whom have come out winners. That middle class of merchants criticized the shah because they were not getting their share of the petroleum cake, which was being spent primarily on big projects (dams, electric power stations, the railroad, and so on). There are no more big projects today, but just as much is being imported (petroleum brings in \$1.5 billion every month, and only \$500 million of that is being spent on the war). And the bazaaris have been able to get control of the flow of civilian imports.

Iran is a nation of shopkeepers (one shop for every 18 inhabitants, compared to one for every 450 in the United States) who benefit very unequally from the gold mine represented by imports.

The best off are those who have contacts with the mullahs in power, without whom it is very difficult to obtain the innumerable authorizations needed for imports. Corruption is even more widespread than it was in the days of the shah. One of the most important people in the regime, for example, has a reputation for charging a great deal (commissions of 20 percent) for his undeniably efficient services. Those mullahs have grown rich, but they continue to lead Spartan lives. They keep their millions of dollars invested in Switzerland or Cyprus in preparation for possible reverses in their political fortunes, to pay their praetorian guards, and, according to some Iranians in the opposition, to finance terrorist activities abroad.



The business middle class, which was able to survive the purges of 1979, is not unhappy in Tehran. Prospering in an environment that protects capital and does not encourage competition, it is enriching itself rapidly and does not hesitate to use its wealth to throw sumptuous receptions. I went to one of them. The property was surrounded by windowless high walls with only one modest front entrance. Once inside, however, I felt that I had entered another world. There were vast English-style lawns, a swimming pool, women dressed in the latest Paris fashions, music, and waiters serving vodka, white wine, and whiskey "specially bottled for Iraqi Army" [in English in the text].

The owner of a flourishing transportation firm drew on his opium pipe and told me: "You can find anything in Iran." A fervent supporter of Khomeyni because of "the stability guaranteed by his charisma," the man said he was a "convinced Moslem" but "too occupied with business to have time to attend Friday prayers."

How long will Iranian civilian society accept a religious government which no longer satisfies anyone except the fringes, the lumpen proletariat, and the top merchant middle class? Khomeyni exercises a control over Iran that no one after him will. But there is a strong possibility that in the internal struggles for power following his death, there will be a brutal awakening of all the discontent and frustrations built up by a regime that has become discredited by its chaos and its inequalities.

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IRAN

ISTANBUL PAPER: MONARCHISTS CONTINUE STRUGGLE AGAINST KHOMEYNI

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 3 Jul 85 p 2

[Article: "The Monarchists Continue the Struggle Against Khomeyni"]

[Text] As the fifth year of the war between Iran and Iraq comes to an end, periodically showing signs of escalation as well as other disturbing comparisons, Khomeyni is being forced to combat many difficulties, with a surprising and incredible will, in spite of the fact that years ago it was claimed that he was terminally ill and that the struggle for succession among his close associates has already commenced.

Today it is an undeniable fact that the Ayatollah Khomeyni is Iran's absolute and sole ruler, who imposes his will on all and who defies the entire world if necessary, remaining resolute and uncompromising toward all, without bending his principles or retreating from his orders by a single inch. After securing the Shah's departure from Iran, he first liquidated the latter's close associates, then the leftist Tudeh Party, and then in turn those organizations which had helped Khomeyni in the struggle to seize power in Iran. Using the most ruthless means, he also purged many of his own associates -- the gallows are still doing a brisk business in Tehran; he also crushed the movement seeking Kurdish autonomy, as well as the Baluchi, and a number of separatist elements, while at the same time continuing the war against Iraq, without even considering the possibility of holding talks even for a day with the aim of bringing an end to the war, even during the most fateful and deadly days of combat.

Another dangerous fire smoldering in Iran is the longing for a monarchist government, continuously fueled by the new orders implemented by Khomeyni on a daily basis and by his stubbornness, demonstrated in continuation of the war and many other such decisions. Anti-war sentiments have also been spreading in the military; while a number of high-ranking officers were being subjected to various changes of position, leaflets and appeals pointing to the senselessness of the war and demanding an early reconciliation with Iraq were being found in soldiers' pockets.

Nor are the monarchists abroad sitting around idle; they maintain ties with their sympathizers within Iran and take every opportunity to prick the skin of and wage counterpropaganda against the present regime. Iraq contains not only

a large number of Iranian refugees but also deserters from the army, members of the nobility, and even distant and close friends of members of Iran's royal family.

In this connection one should particularly not forget, however, the Shah's last prime minister, Bakhtiar, whose activities in France closely parallel Ayatollah Khomeyni's efforts to overthrow the Reza Shah Pahlavi during his days in exile. Shapur Bakhtiar's apartment has become a gathering place for opponents of the present regime, where the situation in Iran and current events are appraised daily. Shapur Bakhtiar does not hesitate to inform members of the foreign press that his supporters have been engaged for quite some time in a struggle and will continue the struggle until they overcome Khomeini and his regime. The Shah's last prime minister claims that they have established a strong, well-organized front, both in Iran and abroad, prepared to make a move when the time is right. Bakhtiar has also recently been insisting that the time is drawing near to resolve the situation and for this reason they are following the development of events more closely than ever.

Reza Shah's son is also being prepared, as the true heir to the throne, to inherit one day his father's position of rule. Farah Diba, the former Empress, also believes in the inevitability of Khomeyni's fall and states that they will definitely return victorious to Tehran. Bakhtiar in turn has high regard for the prince, heir to the throne, and notes that the Empress Farah had suggested to the Shah on numerous occasions that he abdicate and turn over power to his young son who, in spite of his lack of experience, was endowed with common sense and democratic principles and who could have exercised gentler and more flexible policies than his father, although the latter possessed years of experience.

Commenting on the war between Iraq and Iran, Bakhtiar insists that it is not known for sure who actually caused the war or, in other words, who was the initial aggressor; he notes, however, that during his days of exile in Iraq, Ayatollah Khomeyni was secretly advising the local Shiites to oppose the rule of Saddam Husayn. In actual fact this was the main reason why he was expelled from Iraq, and consequently it may be that this religious leader wants to take vengeance on Iraq's present leadership.

Shapur Bakhtiar adds that the Ayatollah Khomeyni has no real interest in ever ending the war; he is interested solely in continuing it, since if the war comes to an end, the people will turn to him and demand an accounting for all that has happened. Bakhtiar notes that Khomeyni is a very vindictive individual and is not all worthy of his title of religious leader. As an example, he recalls that during the Shah's reign the man who killed Khomeyni's father was hung. This shows the justice of the rule during that period, even toward the ruler's enemies. And yet today Ayatollah Khomeyni kills his closest friends with the utmost equanimity, even if they are innocent but their continued existence could present a danger to his interests.

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IRAN

BRIEFS

COAL PRODUCTION UP--Shahrud, Semnan Province, 23 Jul, IRNA--A total of 263,500 tons of unprocessed coal was exploited from coal mines covered by the Eastern Alborz Coal Company here during the past Iranian year (ended on March 20, 1985). This shows an increase of 13.7 per cent compared with the year before. A company official said that with a daily exploitation of about 950 tons of unprocessed coal, the company provides between 12 to 15 percent of the energy needed to charge the coke batteries of Isfahan steel mill complex. [Text]  
[Tehran IRNA in English 1050 GMT 23 Jul 85 LD]

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August 22, 1985